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Abstract
This paper uses a unique and large-scale quasi-experimental data to study the effect of de-
worming and school meals programs as a package on educational outcomes (pupils’ test scores:
aggregate, French or math; enrollment, promotion or dropout rates) in rural Senegal. We extend
the endogenous selection model a` la Heckman to incorporate a double-index selection mechanism.
We also generalize the Roy model accordingly. We develop estimation strategies based on the full
information maximum likelihood and the two-step method. We derive a wide and rich collection
of treatment effects ranging from exclusive to relative effects including sequential and substitution
effects. The results show that the combination of deworming and school meals programs is more
beneficial to pupils’s achievements than taking programs separately. The sequence of implemen-
tation does matter. The two programs are complementary in increasing scores and promotion
rates. However, they are substitutes in reducing dropouts. The cost-effectiveness analysis shows
the deworming program is by far cheaper than the meals intervention. Implementing meals pro-
gram before deworming is more cost-effective than the reverse. Lastly, unlike the deworming, meals
program and the package (deworming and meals) have a welfare-enhancing effect on households.
Key words: Deworming and school meals programs, double-index selection, complementarity vs.
substitutability, educational outcomes, quasi-experiment, welfare, Africa
JEL Classification: I25, C31, C34
∗Acknowledgements. We are deeply indebted to Franc¸ois Laisney, Pierre Mohnen, Bart Verspagen, Norbert Janz,
Franziska Gassmann and Yesuf Awel for their very helpful comments and suggestions. The research assistance of Sueli
Brodin is gratefully acknowledged. We also thank seminar participants at BETA, University of Strasbourg, University
of Lorraine Nancy, the African Econometric Society Conference in Naibobi (AES, 2011), the CSAE Conference 2012 on
Economic Development in Africa at Oxford, the Conference on Micro Evidence on Innovation in Developing Economies
(MEIDE, 2012) in Cape Town for useful comments and discussions. This research was supported by UNU-MERIT. All
views expressed as well as any errors are our own.
†Corresponding author: Azomahou T.T.: Keizer Karelplein 19, 6211 TC Maastricht, the Netherlands, Tel.
+31 433884440, Fax +31 433884499 (azomahou@merit.unu.edu); Diallo F.L. (faatdiallo@yahoo.fr); Raymond W.
(wladimir.raymond@statec.etat.lu)
1
1. Introduction
Policymakers are often interested in comparing the relative benefits of different programs rather than
the impact of a single program, as many relevant policy questions arise when multiple programs are
implemented. Would the implementation of a package be more effective than each program performed
separately? Are the programs complementary or substitute of each other? What is the impact of
a given intervention compared to the impact of another? Would the cumulative impact of two (or
more) programs be greater than the sum of impacts? Are the programs well(harmoniously)-designed
to meet their target? These are the policy questions to which this study provides some answers. We
contribute to this debate by examining in depth an important albeit neglected angle of the issue: the
package aspect of public policy interventions, in particular, nutrition and health programs as well as
their interaction effect on educational outcomes.
In support to educational public policies, deworming and school meals programs have been widely
implemented in developing countries (in Latin America, Asia and Africa) as they are considered as
important driving forces to improve educational outcomes (pupils’ academic achievement and school
performance). Determining the causal effects of these interventions on beneficiaries alongside the
determinants of educational outcomes have been a heated debate and findings are still mixed. To
this end, we develop an econometric framework that extends the basic endogenous selection models
while contributing to the assessment of deworming and school meals programs as a package. We use
unpublished quasi-experimental data from deworming and school meals programs conducted in rural
Senegal. These data are novel in the sense that both programs have been implemented at the same
time, during the school year 2007-2008, by the World Food Programme (WFP) and supported by the
Senegalese government to contribute to the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Therefore it is not a randomized control trial (hereafter RCT) and the population of beneficiaries (over
5000 pupils) is significantly higher compared to that usually considered in RCTs.
In addition, the design of the sampling is unique and rich in terms of program implementation as
it involves mutually non-exclusive treatments. We will return to this aspect in Section 3. To date,
these data have never been used and no evaluation of these programs has been undertaken. In 2009,
another school lunch program supported by the Policy Impact Evaluation Research Initiative (PIERI)
was coordinated by the Consortium pour la Recherche E´conomique et Sociale (CRES) in collaboration
with the Senegalese Ministry of Education. Our data came as baseline data for the RCT of the school
meals program initiated by PIERI. However, during the collection of baseline data for RCT, the
evaluators discovered the existence of the package of past programs that have been implemented by
WFP in 2007-2008. Thus, the baseline data for RCT was contaminated with pupils treated with
deworming, school meals program and both (package). Thereafter, the RCT has been corrected,
taking the contamination into account. Fortunately, the opportunity arose for us to take advantage
of the existence of such unique package of programs and of the richness of information it contains.
Thus, we decided to conduct an impact assessment study.1 From a methodological perspective and as
it will become clear in Sections 3, 4 and 5, such analysis requires econometric frameworks that extend
on basic endogenous selection methods a` la Heckman and on the Roy model.
Most of deworming and school meals interventions are part of the Food for Education (FFE) pro-
grams. Sarah et al. (2008) provide a review of the FFE programs. The authors show conflicting
evidence on the ability of school meals to improve pupils’ cognitive development and test perfor-
mance in math and Language. The effects of these programs on promotion and dropout rates seem
inconclusive. Some studies find that school meal programs lead to a significant increase in academic
performance as measured by test scores. They also show that the implementation of these programs
decreases dropout and repetition rates. Vermeersch and Kremer (2005) use data from a randomized
breakfast program in Kenyan kindergartens. The authors show that the breakfast program improves
student learning, but only for those whose teachers are more experienced at the beginning of the
program. Cueto and Chinen (2008) examine the impact of an experimental school breakfasts program
in primary schools in Peru. The results indicate that children in the program have higher rates of
1It is quite conceivable that many interventions have already been implemented in developing countries but have
never been evaluated. With the popularity of the RCTs, several past recipients of these programs can be enrolled in
RCTs if evaluators who set up these RCTs were not aware of similar past programs implemented in the same locations.
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attendance and lower dropout rates than those who have not benefited from the program. In addition,
children in the treatment group, who are in ‘multigrade’ schools and ‘simple flow’ performed better in
coding tests, arithmetic and reading. Tan et al. (1999) use data on Philippines and find no evidence
of school feeding program’s impact on dropout and repetition rates.
The study of the impact of deworming on educational outcomes is even less widespread. Kvalsvig
et al. (1991) examine the impact of deworming in South Africa and conclude that the drug treatments
have some effect on school performance, but some effects are not significant. Miguel and Kremer
(2004) study the impact of an experimental program of deworming on school participation, health,
nutrition and scores of students in Kenyan primary schools. They show that despite the reduction in
absenteeism, there is no evidence that deworming increases the scores of students. The study indicates
that ignoring deworming externalities may underestimate the effect of deworming program. Miguel
and Kremer (2004) also implement a cost benefit analysis and show that deworming programs are less
expensive than alternatives for increasing school participation.
This research assesses the impact of school feeding and deworming programs as a package on
educational outcomes (pupils’ aggregate, French or math scores), enrollment, promotion and dropout
rates, while elaborating on their determinants.2 To the best of our knowledge, previous contributions
used either a single program or a package of programs considered as single. Indeed, package of programs
are usually implemented by policy makers because of their efficiency and also because single programs
are costly compared to package. Banerjee and Duflo (2009) argued that the cost of organizing an
experiment may be high. Then it is worth implementing multiple treatments at the same time on
the same population to assess alternative variants of programs. However, due to the unavailability
of appropriate tools that may enable researchers to estimate jointly the effect of package and at
the same time to disentangle the effects within a unified setting, most studies have analyzed these
programs either separately or have considered the packages as unique program or do not take a stand
on the interactions between the programs in the package. Evaluating multiple programs requires the
identification and the estimation of many different treatment effects and this makes the analysis more
complex.
Our study is the first to assess such a package of programs. This entails developing appropriate
methodologies. Moreover, we use a very rich and unique large-scale data set of approximately 5,000
pupils in rural Senegal. The data relates to deworming and school meals interventions, educational
outcomes, pupils’ characteristics (age, sex, etc.) and their households’ and schools’ characteristics.
This data is interesting not only for the underlying above mentioned evaluation issues, but also because
they raise methodological challenge.
1.1. Summary of results
The main results that emerge from this study are the following. First, an interesting aspect of our
econometric specification is that, by incorporating a double-index selection mechanism, it enables
us to study whether deworming and school meals are complements or substitutes. We observe the
two programs are complements in the goal of increasing scores and promotion rates, while they are
substitutes with the aim of reducing dropouts.
Second, our framework has the advantage of allowing the identification and the estimation of a
wide and rich range of treatment effects: global effects (effects of programs taken together), exclusive
effects (disentangled effects), relative effects (effect of a program versus the effect of another program),
additional effects (effect following from having an additional program), sequential and substitution
effects. For the score outcomes, we obtain positive and significant additional exclusive and global
average treatment effects (ATE). The impact of the meals program on the scores is greater than
the impact of deworming. The combination of the two programs (package) has a greater impact.
This result reinforces the complementarity finding. Moreover, the relative effect of the package vs.
2Most empirical studies that evaluate nutrition or deworming programs use academic achievements (test scores)
and school participation (enrollment, promotion, dropout, etc) as outcomes, see, e.g. Glewwe and Jacoby (1991,1995)
and Miguel and Kremer (2004)). These outcomes are also widely used in other interventions dealing with educational
outcomes; see e.g. Carrell and West (2010), Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), Rouse (1998), Alderman et al.
(2001) and Glewwe et al. (2009).
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deworming alone is greater than that compared to the canteen only. For the average treatment effects
on the treated (ATET), the exclusive, global, and additional effects are positive and significant. It
should be noted that the effects on the treated are larger than the ATE. For the treatment effects on
the untreated (ATENT), the results show that the exclusive effect of deworming is negative while the
effect of canteen is positive. The combination of the two programs greatly increases scores.
The sequential effects indicate that for pupils in the treated group, the impact of the package
improves if the school meals is introduced before deworming. For pupils in the untreated group, the
reverse sequence is preferable. Consistently with sequential effects, substitution effects show that
for the treated group, implementing school meals for some time and replacing it with a deworming
program is more beneficial than the reverse in terms of enhancing scores. Regarding enrollment, we
obtain an exclusive negative ATE effect for the deworming program, an exclusive positive effect for the
meals program, a negative overall effect and an additional positive effect. Moreover, when the target
is to increase enrollment, the implementation of meals program alone is preferable to deworming or
the package. When the objective is to increase the promotion rate or reduce dropout, the package
is the best option. Overall, the results indicate that, if for a reason or another (for example funding
limitations), we have to substitute a program for another, then one should replace the meals program
by deworming if the goal is to improve pupils’ academic achievement.
Third, the cost-effectiveness analysis indicates that, regarding the scores, deworming is far cheaper
than the meals program. It also shows that introducing the meals before deworming is more cost
effective than the reverse. As for the promotion rate, the combination of the two programs is more
cost-effective than the single meals program. For the dropout rate, deworming is more cost effective
than the canteen and the package. However, the package is more cost effective than canteen only.
Finally, we go beyond the gain deworming and school meals programs can directly represent for
pupils beneficiaries by studying how these programs can also improve the living conditions of the
households in which these children live. For this, relying on the intra-household information contained
in the data set, we study the impact of these programs on household well being. In a context of
severe poverty and vulnerability in rural areas, this can be viewed as externality effects of programs
on household welfare. The externality is of two folds. First, deworming can protect other household
members of any contagion or transmission of worms. Then having meals at school reduces significantly
household food expenditure which accounts for more than 70% of household total expenditure. We
find that the deworming program alone does not contribute significantly to improving household
welfare while schools meals alone do. Furthermore, the combination of both programs (package)
improves welfare more than the meals program alone. This finding is interesting and also supports
the complementarity within the package.
1.2. Contribution to the literature
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is evidently closely related to the
literature on evaluating deworming and school meals programs. This literature has a long story both
in development economics and economics of education as these programs seek to assess the impact of
these interventions on educational outcomes (Glewwe and Jacoby, 1995; Glewwe et al., 2001; Whaley
et al., 2003; Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Vermeersch and Kremer, 2005 and Kazianga et al. 2014).
The novelty here is that we go beyond the evaluation of simple programs to tackle the issue of the
both interventions. The rationale of this is that of policy efficiency. As we mentioned above, the
implementation of single programs is costly compared to a package. As a result it is interesting for
policy makers to know whether a package would be more effective than programs performed separately.
As we previously outlined in the summary of results, the treatment effects differ depending on whether
they are derived from a package or exclusive. This shows the relevance of taking into account the way
the programs are implemented. We argue that packaging is more profitable.3
3Some ‘multiple treatment experiments’, albeit in a very different context and using different methodology, include
among others Banerjee et al. (2007), Duflo et al. (2006) and Olken (2007). However, it is worthwhile to note that
multiple treatments as previously studied in these contributions differ from what we study here. Indeed, set apart
from the fact that these papers were not interested in canteen or deworming programs, the authors did not study the
join effect of treatments as well as their interactions. Moreover these studies are based on RCT while our study uses
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Secondly, this paper is related to the literature on the determinants of educational outcomes.
However, we have put emphasis on the determinants that are of particular interest to the Senegalese
context. Among these determinants, schools’ characteristics and family environment were the most
commonly-used determinants. Coleman et al. (1966) found significant effects of school factors and
weak effects of family environment on educational outcomes for pupils in developing countries.4 There
is a common perception that school inputs have a positive effect educational outcomes. Indicators
such as class size, expenditure per pupil, the ratio of pupil to teacher, salary, age, experience and
academic level of the teacher have been used in some studies as school inputs. In addition to these
factors, teaching practices and school composition may help to explain why some schools are more
effective than others with identical levels of resources. In fact, research on the effects of reducing
class size on pupils’ performance has not produced consistent findings. Glass and Smith (1979) found
evidence of a relationship between class size and student achievement. Furthermore they found out
that the effect of reducing classes is not linear. While some studies show that students in small classes
have better achievement (Piketty, 2004), others show that the reduction of the class size still leaves
uncertainties (Davies, 2003). Clearly, there is no consensus about the effect of reducing class size on
pupils’ achievement. Here, we argue that class size does not affect pupils’ outcomes in schools with
canteens or for pupils in schools where both programs are implemented. On the contrary, in schools
without meals program or with only the deworming program, we find that class size has a negative
effect on the score in French. This is consistent with Brossard (2003) and Altinok (2006). In addition,
we also find that a female teacher has a positive influence on pupils’ achievement, particularly on girls,
who identify themselves more easily to a female teacher. This is of particular interest in the African
context where promoting the education of girls is an issue of development.
To explain the unequal achievement of pupils, studies have focused on the role of socioeconomic
status, family structure (gender of household head), family size and parental practices. Many studies
indicate that marked disparities in schooling and the acquisition of knowledge are associated with the
socioeconomic status of parents (Ryan and Adams, 1998). Lockheed et al., (1989) found significant
effects of social class on student performance in mathematics and languages. Parents’ socioeconomic
status has been found as a determinant of academic failure (Lawson-Body, 1993). In contrast, Curtis
and Phipps (2000) found evidence of a weak link between poverty or the household income and
educational outcomes of pupils. The family structure is often controlled by the variable gender of
household head in the literature. In fact, in the African context, it is usually argued that a female
head of household is associated with significant educational opportunities for children (Fuller and
Liang, 1999 and Lloyd and Blanc, 1996).
It is important to note that apart from school, individual and family factors, other elements such
as socioeconomic and health shocks can have consequences on student outcomes. There are some
shocks related to schooling that can lower student achievement. These shocks are for example the
delay in starting the courses and the temporary closure of classes. They reduce learning time and
therefore, pupils’ results. In addition, in primary education, teachers’ strikes and high absenteeism
rates constitute the main source of temporary closure of schools. In the context of our study, these
shock variables are important and therefore of particular interest. As can be expected, we found that
these variables have a negative effect on pupils’ performances.
Thirdly, from a methodological perspective, this study contributes to the literature on using se-
lection models for evaluation purposes. This literature dates back to the seminal contribution of
Heckman (1978, 1979) and later on Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986). These selection models have
been extended in several directions (Heckman, 2001). Furthermore, methodology for multiple treat-
ments have been considered by some scholars. For example Lechner (2001) extended the conventional
two state framework of the Rubin model to the case of multiple mutually exclusive treatment and dis-
cussed various measures of the causal effects. The author discussed the identification of these effects
under the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). The results showed that low dimensional
balancing scores, similar to the ones valid in the case of only two treatments, exist and can be used
for identification of various causal effects. Lechner (2001) outlined a matching estimator and showed
quasi-experimental data.
4See also Fuller and Clarke (1994).
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that for specific parameters, like the treatment effect on the treated, the multiple program nature of
the policy can be ignored, because individuals who are not in programs of interest, are not needed for
identification. Fro¨lich (2004) examined different nonparametric strategies to solve the selection bias
problem and to identify average treatment effects. The study outlines that the difference-in-difference
and the instrumental variable approach often identify only the treatment effect using participation
versus non-participation, and do not allow a comparison between different treatments. Lechner (2001)
and Fro¨lich (2004) are based on propensity score matching.
Heckman and Vytlacil (1998) developed models for counterfactuals and causality that build on
Cowles Commission econometrics. The authors generalized the IV approach to consider models with
multiple outcomes. They proposed both ordered and unordered choice models and defined treatment
effects for a general multiple treatment problem and presented conditions for the application of IV for
identifying a variety of new treatment parameters. Rather than relying on IV to estimate the local
average treatment effect, Wooldridge (2003) imposed assumptions that identify the average effect
for general kinds of treatment based on the correction function approach. The author developed a
correlated random coefficient model with multiple treatments which is more robust than the plug-in
estimators of Heckman and Vytlacil (1998).
Our approach departs from the previous studies on several aspects. First, the foregoing contri-
butions aim at providing a framework for analyzing experimental data such as RCTs. We do not
require instrumental variables like Wooldridge (2003), although this may be an alternative estimation
method as we will highlight in Section 5. Moreover, we are not in a pure propensity score matching
paradigm like Lechner (2001) and Fro¨lich (2004). Indeed, our framework requires the joint estimation
of selection and outcome equations. Propensity score matching for multiple treatments can easily
be retrieved from the first step estimation of our procedure by elaborating on multiple selection.
Lastly, our sampling process generates mutually non-exclusive data as will become clear in Section
3. We propose a structural framework for double-index selection where treatment indicators are en-
dogenous. Firstly, we use a double-index selection model (DISM) and secondly we use a generalized
Roy (1951) framework. For each specification, we propose two estimation procedures: full informa-
tion maximum likelihood (FIML) and control function (two-step estimation) a` la Heckman (1978,
1979). One difficulty in the two-step procedure as well as in the computation of treatment effects is
that, the conditional expectations in the second step regression function involve ‘truncated trivariate
normal distribution’. We compute these expectations relying on the moment-generating function for-
mula along the lines of Muthe´n (1990). As for the inference, it is well known that the conventional
standard errors of the parameters estimated in the second step are not valid and need to be corrected
by generalizing the results of Heckman (1978, 1979), or by using simulation or bootstrapping methods.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 takes the stock of the literature on
deworming and canteen programs and their effectiveness on educational outcomes in developing coun-
tries. Section 3 describes the data and variables. We propose two econometric frameworks: the
double-index selection model and the generalized Roy model. Section 4 describes the first framework
and the related estimation strategy. Section 5 describes the second framework. Section 6 presents the
treatment effects that follow from these two frameworks. Estimation results are discussed in Section
7. The penultimate section proposes a policy analysis that includes cost-effectiveness and welfare
analysis. The last section discusses implications of the results and highlights research perspectives.
2. Literature on deworming and school meals programs: A brief insight
In this section, we discuss salient features and evaluation studies from the literature, focusing on issues
related to the nature of interventions: school meals vs. deworming. Have these programs achieved
their ultimate objectives? We also highlight the main conclusions to which studies have led. This
brief review is by no means exhaustive and will target the nature of the interventions.
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2.1. Some facts
School feeding and deworming interventions became the subject of great interest in many developing
countries. They are considered as strategies to achieve the goals of ‘Education for All’ set up by
the international community in 2000 in Dakar. To meet these objectives, the Global Initiative Food
for Education was launched by USA in 2001 and was replaced in 2002 by the ‘Food for Education’
(FFE). These programs are often accompanied by medical treatment aiming at eliminating intestinal
helminths. They bring and keep pupils at school while improving their academic performance. Most
of them are initiated by the World Food Program (WFP).
The FFE program including meals served at school and the rations given to families conditional on
sending their children to school have recently become a policy instrument for achieving the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) especially primary universal education and reducing hunger in developing
countries. These programs have the potential not only to bring children to school by providing
nutritious meals, but also to stimulate learning and cognitive development of malnourished children
(Sarah et al., 2008).
For ethical purposes, school feeding programs are generally provided to all children in targeted
schools. This practice increases the cost of achieving program objectives such as increasing attendance
rates, because many children would attend school even if they did not benefit from the program. Take-
home ration programs are less criticized because they can be easily implemented thanks to an easy
identification of targeted groups. Some empirical studies found that school meals and take-home ration
programs induce a significant increase in student achievement as measured by test scores. However,
some other studies found no evidence or a significant negative effect of the programs on test scores
(Ahmed and del Ninno, 2002 and Kazianga et al., 2009).
Another well-known intervention, but rather connected to medical treatment is deworming. Indeed,
intestinal worms are endemic in tropical and subtropical areas. Their consequences are devastating,
particularly for children, and can lead to malnutrition, increased susceptibility to infections and slow
growth during a critical period of development. Children who are not dewormed fall ill. Consequently,
this will slow down their cognitive development, increase absenteeism from school and negatively affect
their performance. The impact of deworming on educational outcomes is therefore considered as an
important issue in poor countries.
2.2. School meals
Most empirical studies that evaluate school meals programs conclude that school meals programs
have a significant positive impact on attendance and enrollment. Other studies outlined that school
feeding programs have a positive impact on learning outcomes measured by test scores. As pointed
out by Ahmed (2004), Vermeersch and Kremer (2005), Powell et al. (1998), Jacoby et al. (1996) and
Akakpo (2004), school feeding does not have the same impact on all recipients which suggests causal
heterogeneity may exist.
Ahmed (2004) evaluated the impact of the school lunch program in Bangladesh on student out-
comes using test scores for 1648 students in fifth grade elementary school. The author found that the
aggregate scores of students who received the program are 15.7% higher than students in the control
group. Relying on disaggregated scores, the author found that the improvement is mainly due to an
increase in math score. By controlling for the characteristics of children, households and schools, in
particular the number of pupils, he observed that the program has a significant and negative effect
on scores in English. However, the impact is not sizeable. Ahmed and del Ninno (2002) found that
the FFE program in Bangladesh had a negative and significant impact on test scores for pupils who
benefited from the program in fourth-year primary schools. The authors also indicated that the dif-
ference between the two groups came from a decrease in scores of pupils who enjoyed the program.
This finding stems from the low socioeconomic status of beneficiaries. Vermeersch and Kremer (2005)
quantified the effects of subsidized school meals on student outcomes using randomized data from a
breakfast program in kindergarten in western Kenya. The results show that children in the treatment
group attended school 35.9% of the time, compared to 27.4% in the control group. The difference is
almost one third of attendance in the comparison group. They also showed that there is an improve-
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ment in student learning, but only for children in schools where teachers were more experienced at
the beginning of the program. Kazianga et al. (2009) used a randomized trial to assess the impact of
school meals and take-home ration on health and education outcomes for poor children in northern
rural Burkina Faso. They found that both programs increased girls’ enrollment but there was no
significant impact on raw scores in mathematics. Also the interventions had caused an increase in
absenteeism in households with low use of child labor while it decreased for household that had a
relatively large use of child labor.
Powell et al. (1998) used data on 814 children in the fifth year in primary schools in rural Jamaica.
The children were randomly divided into two groups. The treated group received a breakfast containing
576 to 703kcal and 27g of protein. The control group received a placebo consisting in a slice of orange
with 18kcal every day during eight months of school year. School attendance rates records showed a
slight increase for children in the control group. This impact was greater for malnourished children
than for well fed children. However, these impacts are relatively small compared to the extent of the
real impact because participation rates were about 70% in both groups. Jacoby et al. (1996) found
that a breakfast program in Peru increases attendance rates of pupils in fourth and fifth year of primary
school. The authors found that there was no significant difference in the rates of school attendance
between the two groups before the implementation of the program. During the implementation of
the program they found that attendance increased by 0.58% in schools of the treatment group and
decreased by 2.98% in the control group.
Akakpo (2004) examined the impact of school canteens on enrollment and attendance and on
student achievement with certificates of completion of elementary study (FEAC) in rural public schools
in three regions (Fatick, Kaolack and Tambacounda) of WFP intervention in Senegal. The results
showed that school attendance is much better in schools where WFP operates as enrollment grew by
12% per year while the increase is only 8% in the group of schools where WFP does not operate. The
schooling of girls is particularly high in schools where WFP was operating and the number pupils
grew by 15% per year against 10% in schools without canteens. Cueto and Chinen (2007) examined
the impact of an experimental program of school breakfasts in primary schools in three departments
of Peru. The outcome variables were test scores on standardized coding, arithmetic and reading as
well as attendance, enrollment and dropout rates. The results showed that children in the program
have high rates of attendance and low dropout rates, compared to children not receiving the program.
In addition, children in the treatment group and who are enrolled in multigrade schools performed
better in coding test, arithmetic and reading.
Several studies have sought to measure the impact of feeding programs at schools on the cognitive
development of children. Simeon and Grantham-McGregor (1989) used data on rural Jamaica and
found that breakfast had no effect on the cognitive performance of children with normal weight and
height for their age while breakfast increases the performance of children at risk. Whaley et al. (2003)
studied the impact of animal foods (meat and milk) on the cognitive development of children at
primary school in rural Kenya using a randomized program. The authors concluded that the quality
and quantity of food can predict the performance in arithmetic. The study shows that food of animal
origin as well as energy have a positive effect on the results of children in cognitive tests such as
arithmetic and perceptions.
2.3. Deworming
Compared to school feeding, the effect of deworming programs is less documented. Miguel and Kremer
(2004) assessed the impact of a randomized deworming program in Kenyan schools. The results
showed that absenteeism in the treatment group was 25% lower than in the control group. Moreover,
deworming increases school attendance by 0.14 per treated student on average. They also studied the
impact of deworming on test scores. The results showed that despite the reduction in absenteeism,
there is no evidence that deworming increased students scores. Additionally, the authors use the
Kenya Life Panel Survey (KLPS) to document the long-term impact of deworming program on school
achievement, cognitive skills, labor market, fertility, marital choice, health, physical strength and
personal happiness. The authors found that children’s health and participation in school are increasing
not only for students in the treatment group but also for students whose primary schools are located
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within 6km from treated schools. In particular the impact was significant on schools located within
3km. The impact on nearby schools seems to be due to the reduction of transmission of the disease
(positive externalities) thanks to the intervention. A key finding of the study is that the failure to take
these externalities into account leads to a significant underestimation of the benefits of the intervention
and the actual cost of deworming. However, increased participation in schools is not reflected in the
results of tests score. In addition, the authors presented a cost-effectiveness analysis showing that the
intervention is cost effective, and the intervention does also improve basic skills.
Bobonis et al. (2006) conducted a randomized trial in India as part of a health program that
provides iron supplementation and deworming to children aged from 2 to 6 years in 200 kindergartens
in poor urban areas of Delhi. After five months of treatment, the authors found significant weight
gains and a reduction of one fifth of absenteeism. This finding is consistent with Miguel and Kremer
(2004). Subsequently, Bobonis et al. (2006) have tried to obtain estimates after two years of program
implementation. But the attrition of the sample and the apparently non-random entry of new children
in kindergartens make it difficult to obtain unbiased estimates of impacts in the long run. An important
channel through which the gains of preschool attendance in Bobonis et al. (2006) could affect the
long run entry of new children in kindergartens is an improvement over time in academic performance
in primary school. In fact 71% of the parents in the field study of India argued that the improved
outcomes in primary school has been a motivation for sending their children to preschool. In this
study, children received both iron supplementation and deworming. However, the study does not
distinguish between the effects of both treatments meaning that iron supplementation and deworming
were considered together as one program.
Other studies focus on the impact of parasitic infection on cognitive development. Kvalsig et al.
(1991) examined the impact of whipworms and other parasites in South Africa and found no associ-
ation between drug treatment and educational attainment or memory function. Nokes et al. (1992)
evaluated a treatment of whipworms in Jamaica and concluded that cognitive functions improved after
undergoing the treatment, but other outcomes, particularly those related to academic performance,
do not seem to have changed significantly.
The main lesson from this brief literature review is that school meals and deworming interventions
as well as the potential policy implications have received substantial attention by scholars. The debate
has reached a state of maturity thanks to all the impact evaluation studies that helped accumulate a
rich and substantial knowledge of the success and failure of these programs. However, still consensus
has emerged yet as the conclusions are highly mixed and controversial. This paper aims at contributing
to this heated debate by exploring in depth an important aspect of the problem which has so far been
neglected: the package aspect of nutrition and health interventions.
3. Data: The package of deworming and school meals
As we have outlined earlier, the design of the sampling of the two programs is unique and rich. This
richness follows from the fact that the two treatments are mutually non-exclusive meaning that having
deworming does not prevent pupils from benefiting from meals. As a result, some of pupils get only
deworming, some only meals, some get both and others receive nothing. This section presents the
data we use. To understand the data structure and the motivation of the econometric specification, we
first give a flavor of the data generating process. Then we describe the actual sample and programs.
3.1. Data generation process (DGP)
Our DGP is a multiple non-exclusive kind of interventions. In the case of a package consisting in two
treatments denoted by T1 and T2, we have four regimes: T1T2, T1(1−T2), (1−T1)T2 and (1−T1)(1−T2).
This DGP tells that some individuals receive only T1 whereas others receive only T2. Some others
receive both T1 and T2 and the remaining nothing. The latter represents the control group. As a
result, the treatments are typically mutually non-exclusive events. In the case of 3 treatments we
have 8 regimes. The general case of n interventions lead to 2n regimes. It is clear that higher order
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treatments become extremely difficult to handle, the empirical analysis being no longer easily tractable
and excessively data consuming.
In terms of impact analysis, this type of data sampling makes the study particularly rich compared
to the case where all individuals in the treated group receive both treatments or when the interventions
are mutually exclusive meaning that deworming and meals cannot be implemented at the same time.5
In other words, the occurrence of deworming does not automatically rule out the occurrence of meals
and vice versa. This kind of data arrangement offers the possibility to study only the impact of each
intervention as single, but also the impact of the combination of the two programs and several relative
effects. Moreover, its enables to design a specification that aims at testing the complementarity vs.
substitutability of the two programs.
3.2. Programs package: Area covered and sampling
The school feeding or Food For Education (FFE) is the activity through which the World Food
Programme (WFP) has supported the education sector in Senegal since the 1960s. This intervention
aims at providing pupils with a regular diet and to promote children’s access to basic education
quality, especially girls. This intervention supports the government in achieving universal education
for all children by the year 2015 which is one of the goals of the Ten-Year Education and Training
(PDEF) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). WFP activities are implemented within
the framework of two programs, namely, the Country Programme which extends from 2007 to 2011
and the Programme of Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (IPSR) for the 2008-2009 and later.
To be assisted by WFP, the school must meet the following requirements: i) be located in an area of
food insecurity or be particularly affected by higher prices, ii) be in a rural or peri-urban area, iii) have
a minimum size of 50 pupils and a maximum of 600 (management concerns requirement), iv) have
an operational management committee, v) have the commitment of the local community to develop
infrastructure such as storage, even cooking based on local materials, vi) have an acceptable standard
of hygiene.
Initially, WFP’s school feeding covered the regions Fatick, Kaolack, Tambacounda and Matam
(under the Country Programme 2007-2011) and the regions Ziguinchor, Kolda and Se´dhiou (under
the IPSR successively carried out since 2003 in Casamance Natural). Under the action plan, WFP has
strengthened the school feeding program in its initial intervention areas: Fatick, Kaolack, Kaffrine,
Tambacounda, Kedougou, Matam, Ziguinchor, Kolda and Se´dhiou considered as priority areas. Later
on, the action plan has been extended to other regions: Diourbel, Louga and Thies. The program
involves a total of 12 regions out of 14 in Senegal.
In addition, the Ministry of Education, through the Direction of General Administration and
Equipment (DAGE) also funds a program for canteens implementation. Its division of the medical
school (DCMS), also leads to another program which focuses exclusively on deworming and medical
monitoring in rural public schools. In this study, we used primary data collected by CRES and
the Ministry of Education as part of an intervention of school canteens (meal) and deworming. For
intervention areas, four regions (Fatick, Kolda, Diourbel and Se´dhiou) of Senegal were chosen. Central
regions (Diourbel and Fatick) are mainly composed of farmers and are closer to the capital (Dakar),
while those in the South (Kolda and Se´dhiou) are very isolated and livestock farming is the main
economic activity. The southern regions also suffer from poor living conditions and lack of access
to basic infrastructure, which prevents people from getting out of poverty. The regions of Kolda
and Se´dhiou belong to southern regions and in 2003, they are classified as having a very low risk
management capacity whereas Fatick has average risk management capacity and Diourbel a good
capacity to manage risk (PAM, 2003).6 These four regions are characterized by weak school enrollment
5See e.g. Brodaty et al. (2001) and Lechner (2001) for multiple mutually exclusive treatments analysis with non-
experimental data.
6In Senegal, rural areas, most risks that people are facing are natural hazards such as drought, land degradation,
animal diseases, pests and flooding. The consequences of these risks are felt on agricultural production (production loss,
lower yields), livestock (cattle decreased, decreased production of animal products) and household incomes because they
will lose a portion of income from the sale of agricultural and animal products. In addition there are other risks such as
economic risks associated with rising prices of basic necessities, lower prices for agricultural products and livestock and
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and high prevalence of poverty and vulnerability. Because of low harvests, food insecurity in these
regions reduced not only households’ income, but also impoverished their diet. Therefore children
are exposed to acute malnutrition. Indeed, 31% of nutritional deficiency cases at school age and
adolescence and a prevalence of nutritional anemia for children at 4 to 14 years, with 62% of boys and
38% of girls were recorded (PAM, 2006).
The sample study is made up of pupils in the second and fourth year of primary school (hereafter
CP and CE2) in these four regions. Several reasons have guided the selection of these two groups of
pupils. On one hand, for reasons of investigation costs, it was difficult to include into the interventions
all pupils in each school. It should be noted that all pupils within a school benefit from school lunch.
On the other hand, if at the end of the second year the pupil cannot read and write, the probability
to fail before the end of the education cycle is very strong. In addition, if after four years of primary
education, skills in reading and writing are not vested, it is unlikely that the pupils can learn the basic
skills that education is supposed to provide. The interventions take about two years. We have an
observational database of 159 schools with about 5650 pupils of whom 2800 are in second year (CP)
and 2850 in fourth year (CE2) randomly selected from a large population. The pupils were offered
the two programs: deworming (T1) and/or meals (T2) as described above. Relying on that we formed
the four groups: a group of pupils who benefit from the meal program only, a group of pupils who are
dewormed only, a group of pupils who receives the two programs and a control group who receives
nothing.
To conclude the presentation of the programs, it is important to note that, for the population
involved, deworming is free of charge whereas the school meals program is not. For a child to benefit
from the canteen, the household must pay a lump sum contribution of 200 FCFA per pupil and per
month.7 However, a pupil is not excluded from canteen if her/his family does not pay the contribution.
Unfortunately, we did not have the identification of households who pay and those who do not. We do
know that most households make the payment. There is a debate in the literature about the role of
price in evaluating programs (see, e.g. Cohen and Dupas, 2010). The idea is that people value more
the interventions if they don’t have it for free. In our case, the meals program does not suffer from
this problem. The case of deworming is special. Indeed, deworming is a health intervention. If this
program becomes cost-sharing, it is likely that households could easily adopt traditional medicines of
deworming, which in practice, are made without medical supervision. One of the objectives of this
program is indeed to combat traditional deworming.
3.3. Variables and descriptive statistics
The variables used in this study are of two types: the outcome or performance variables (aggregate,
French and math scores; enrollment, promotion and dropout rates) and the determinants of perfor-
mance or control variables. We have gathered the controls into four categories: pupils’ characteristics,
households’ characteristics, schools and teachers’ characteristics, the characteristics of the community
where pupils live and the geographical location or regions (Diourbel Fatick, Kolda and Se´dhiou). The
treatment indicators are the response variables in the selection mechanism. The definitions of all
variables are summarized in Table 20. The control variables were chosen based on data availability
from the survey sample and their relevance for the analysis. Some of them are specific to the context
of the study and therefore are of particular interest. We mention them as such and also elaborate on
the rationale of their use.
3.3.a. Variables
The characteristics of pupils. Pupils’ characteristics are: gender, age, class, having attended a Koranic
school, early childhood institution, being sick in the last three months preceding the survey, eat at
cattle theft. Any region that doesn’t have the ability to manage risk is highly vulnerable to food insecurity. This has a
negative impact on children’s education, their nutrition and school performance.
7Note that 200 CFA is equivalent to 0.419 U.S. dollars. Although this amount is very small, it is sufficient to sensitize
rural households.
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fill, bring a snack to school and be dewormed at home. It is worth noticing that deworming at home
is not part of the deworming program studied. The latter consists only of being dewormed at school.8
The gender of pupils can influence their academic performance. As pointed out by Felouzis (1997),
boys perform better than girls in mathematics and in science. On the other hand, Ma (2007) found
that gender difference is not statistically significant and sometimes results are mixed. In the context of
rural Senegal, we anticipate that boys perform better than girls because the latter are often confined
to domestic tasks. In addition, some families still question the value of education of girls and are
very reluctant to promote the schooling of girls. The age of pupils may have a negative effect on
their achievement in cases where there is a delay in school progress due to the repeated repeating.
However, if one considers that the delay follows from late entry to school, the literature mentions a
positive relation between age and academic achievement (Schwille et al., 1991). Health status is a
major determinant of performance. In the survey sample, it was asked whether a pupil had being sick
during the last three months preceding the survey. Intuitively, being sick will reduce learning ability
and school attendance time.
Attending an early childhood institution and a Koranic school are specific to the context of the
study. Indeed, the development of structures like nursery that aims at supporting children of young
age are still underdeveloped.9 The Koranic school, usually found in Muslim countries, is an informal
private structure that provides religious education to children. In Senegal, 95.9% of the population
practice Islam. Albeit informal, attending Koranic schools is a common practice. Children usually
go to Koranic school between the ages of 5 and 6. These schools are very popular and contribute to
a tremendous development of children’s capacity to learn and memorize at young age. We can say
that the learning mechanism in these schools is a memory based learning. We hypothesize that these
two variables (early childhood institution and a Koranic school) will positively influence the academic
performance of pupils. Two other variables that are not frequently used in the literature are the fact
to eat one’s fill at home and bringing a snack to school. Remember that the study focused on rural
population. These food indicators provide information on the nutritional well-being of children. We
also anticipate that these two variables act positively on pupils’ performance.
The characteristics of schools and teachers. The following schools’ characteristics have been taken
into account: the number of classes in provisional shelters, the distance between school and the home
of pupils, the class size, the number of pupils per textbook, the existence of latrines, hand washing
device, association of pupils’ parents, water point, opportunity for pupils to eat near school, disruptions
that delay the kick-off of classes, absenteeism of teachers and schools stating that the tuition fee or
schooling expense is high. Among these variables, those that allow us to contextualize the study are
classes in provisional shelters, hand washing device, association of pupils’ parents, the opportunity for
pupils to eat near their school and disruptions that delay the start of classes.
For the variable temporary shelters, we expect a negative effect on the scores but a positive effect
on enrollment, promotion and dropout rate. Indeed, in Senegal, temporary shelters have been set up to
overcome the lack of classrooms in some rural areas. They are usually precarious straw constructions
which become unusable during the rainy season. Through the office of the association of parents, the
community can control the school, which could have a positive effect on the effectiveness of schools.
We take into account the quality of sanitation in schools through the variables latrines and hand
washing device. We expect a positive effect of these variables on pupils’ performance. The same goes
for the ease with which students have a meal near their school. The existence of disturbances having
driven delays in the start of the course reduces the learning time. We hypothesize a negative effect of
this variable on pupils’ achievement. In the Senegalese context, there are often disruptions or strikes
by teachers and also disruptions due to floods that delay the starting of classes. This reduces the
learning time of pupils. The schooling expense variable may impact negatively on the enrollment rate
because if costs are too high households may not be able to enroll their children.
The following teachers’ characteristics are used: gender, age, receive training, professional and
8Remark: Deworming at home usually involves the use of traditional medicines or drugs by families without any
control of a practitioner.
9In relation to the provision of education, institutions to support early childhood in Senegal are: community houses,
houses for toddlers, nursery schools and kindergartens. However, enrollment in kindergarten is very low.
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academic qualifications and absenteeism. In the Senegalese context, we expect a female teacher has
a positive influence on pupils’ achievement particularly on girls who identify themselves more easily
to a female teacher. Regarding the age of the teacher we assume a positive effect. We introduced the
square of the age of the teacher to take into account a possible nonlinearity that may exist between
the age and pupil’s performance. It is important to note that in the literature, some authors have
found no evidence between the age of the teacher and pupils’ scores. Concerning the academic degree
of teachers, we made the distinction between the national certificate which is a diploma certifying
the acquisition of general knowledge at the end of the secondary education and the ‘High School
Diploma’ which is the national graduate certifying the acquisition of high school.10 The literature
reports mixed results regarding the effect of the academic level of teachers on pupils’ achievement
(Clotfelter et al., 2006). Regarding the variable teachers’ teaching training, we expect a positive
effect on pupils’ achievement. Indeed, training improves the teaching skills of teachers. There is
no consensus in the literature as to the effect of the professional degree of teacher. According to
CONFEMEN (1999), the teachers trained for a year in Burkina Faso and Cameroon have less satis-
factory results than those who received five years of training. In Senegal, the same phenomenon is
reflected for teachers who received two years of training compared to those who only received one year.
The characteristics of households. We have included some control variables usually found in the
literature such as education spending, health care spending, literacy of the household head, gender of
household head and marital status. Two other control variables which are important for our context
but not often mentioned in the literature are whether the household owns arable land and cattle. These
two variables could be considered as indicators of wealth and we expect they will have a negative effect
on pupils’ academic performance and also on enrollment, promotion and dropout rates. Indeed, as we
previously outlined, especially in rural areas, it is likely that pupils living in households with farmland
are required by the families to work in the fields or for domestic work.11 This will result in keeping
them away from school. The same rationale applies to the number of cattle owned by the household.
Indeed, the more the head of cattle the higher the probability that pupils’s labor is demanded. This
variable is relevant in explaining the dropout because the communities who mainly practice livestock
farming are generally nomadic and move permanently with their families.
As regards marital status, more than 95% of household heads are married. We then created two
marital status consisting of married and unmarried people where unmarried includes singles, unmar-
ried, divorced and widowed. We expect that pupils living in a household with married parents will
have a much better performance. Some facts suggest that children living with a divorced or widowed
mother are generally more successful than children living in a large polygamous household.
The community characteristics. Studies that have examined the effects of neighborhood or community
factors on pupils’ performance are still scarce. These factors could have both positive and negative
effects on pupils’performance. In our study, we use the following indicators: the existence of a college
in the village, living in a community in which some children do not go to school because parents
are not interested in school, or where some children do not attend school because they only go to a
Koranic school, and the number of primary schools in the village. These variables are context-specific
and can enrich our understanding of the determinants of pupils’ achievement.
Regarding the existence of a college, we expect a positive effect on performance. Indeed, parents
who have no way to help their children to pursue studies in a remote village after their primary
certificate will invest little in the education of their children. This could lead to premature termination
of schooling. In addition, living in a village where there is a college implies that there are facilities for
further study and possibly also that there are elders in these colleges who can help the younger pupils in
primary schools. Regarding the variable parents who are not interested in school, we expect a negative
effect. The number of primary schools in a community informs about the educational opportunities, so
10In the French system, the national certificate is denoted ‘Le diploˆme national du brevet (DNB)’ and the High School
Diploma is called ‘Baccalaure´at’. The latter does not mean bachelor’s degree. It is equivalent to the ‘General Education
Diploma’.
11Note that agriculture (crops and livestock farming) is the main economic activity in the target rural regions of the
programs under study.
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it is expected that this variable will have a positive effect on enrollment. Lastly, to take into account
certain unobserved characteristics of the areas where the programs were implemented, we introduced
region dummies. The region of reference is Fatick because it has the largest number of schools and
students.
3.3.b. Descriptive statistics
The distribution of the pupils according to programs received are shown in the bottom of Table 1.
About 4% of pupils receive both programs, 8% receive deworming but not meal, 23% receive meal but
not deworming and 65% did not receive any of the two programs. Table 1 also summarizes descriptive
by treatment status.12 To check whether there is any pairwise difference in treatment status, we
provide mean difference tests. In what follows, we describe salient features on outcome indicators:
scores (aggregate, French and math) and enrollment rate, promotion and dropout rates.
Include Table 1
On average, pupils who received the package of two programs have the highest academic results:
47.66, 45.24 and 50.08 respectively for the aggregate scores and the scores in French and math. Those
who have only deworming have the lowest aggregated average score and score in French (36.69 and
35.36 respectively). The lowest average score in math is 36.96 and this occurs in the untreated group.
As indicated in the test of mean difference, the differences between groups are significant except
between untreated and deworming groups for the aggregate score and score in math.
We observe negative average rate of enrollment for the deworming group, package and untreated.
This rate is positive for the meal group (7.6%). Negative values mean that the number of students
enrolled in school at year t − 1 is greater than the number of entries in t. In our data we observe
that some schools that reported no registration at t, had registered in t − 1, resulting in significant
negative rates as shown on the distributions. These enrollment statistics are particularly instructive
in several respects. Recall that earlier (Section 2) we discussed issues related to the objectives of the
school meals and deworming programs and we pointed that several criticisms and doubts persist as
for the objectives assigned to them. This is due to the fact that these programs can be diverted from
their original objectives, which would explain the particularly high attractiveness of schools where
these programs are implemented because they could allow families to meet the food needs of their
children. With a lot of caution, we may tentatively say that the observed positive average enrollment
rate applies only for the meals group – while the average rates of other groups are negative.
The average rate of promotion is highest in the group of pupils who received the package (81.89%),
followed by the untreated group (79.15%), meal group (78.76%) and deworming group (73.34%).
Regarding the dropout rate, it is lowest in the package group (10.2%) and highest in the untreated
group (16.6%). Note that the test of mean difference indicates that the average enrollment rate
between the deworming group (-32.28%) and the untreated group (-31.40%) was not significantly
different. The same goes for the average promotion rate between the untreated group (79.15%) and
the meal group (78.76%), and the average dropout rate between deworming group (15.18%) and meal
group (15.07%).
Include Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 display the distribution of outcomes according to the treatment status. For
the group of pupils who received the deworming program only (Figure 1), the distributions of scores
are basically bimodal with a main mode on the left side. This means that two main populations of
pupils emerge: those (but few) with large scores and those with low scores. The same pattern can
be observed in Figure 2 for pupils having only the meals program. However, the second modality is
less pronounced here. This trend almost vanishes for the last two groups (Figures 3 and 4) for which
one observes a unimodal distribution. The major information we draw from the distribution of scores
12We do not report the minimum and maximum of variables. Moreover, for dummy variables only the mean is reported
as it is well known that the standard deviation for dummies can easily be retrieved from their mean as p(1− p) where p
denotes the mean.
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is that the academic performance of pupils is quite low. Indeed, most of them have scores below the
central value (50). It is therefore clear that improving the academic performance of pupils became
an objective of policy makers. Aside from the group of pupils having only the meals program and for
whom the enrollment rate has a unimodal distribution (Figure 2), we see a bimodal distribution for
other groups. Promotion and dropout rates also show unimodal distribution for all groups except the
dropout rate for pupils who only get the deworming program.
To complete the description of the data, as indicated by the test of mean differences in Table 1,
we observe significant differences between some outcomes and control variables. This clearly came as
support to the fact that experimental methods (e.g, RCTs) are not suited to assess the impact of the
package of programs we are studying.13 In the two subsequent sections, we develop the econometric
frameworks.
4. The double-index selection model (DISM)
Let T ∗1i and T
∗
2i denote two latent (unobserved) variables denoting the reasons for pupil i (i = 1, · · · , N)
to receive treatment 1 (deworming) and treatment 2 (school meals) respectively. These variables are
assumed to be functions of observed characteristics of the pupil or the household he/she belongs to,
which we denote by wji (j = 1 or 2). Formally,
T ∗1i = γ
′
1w1i + µ1i,(1)
T ∗2i = γ
′
2w2i + µ2i,(2)
where γj denotes the vectors of parameters to be estimated, and µji denotes the error terms. We
assume that µji ⊥ wji. The observed counterparts to T
∗
1i and T
∗
2i, denoted by T1i and T2i, are defined
as
T1i = 1[T ∗1i>0],(3)
T2i = 1[T ∗2i>0],(4)
where 1[·] denotes the indicator function which takes on the value 1 if the corresponding latent variable
is positive, and 0 otherwise. In other words, if the unobserved reasons for pupil i to receive treatment
j are sufficiently valid, i.e. T ∗ji > 0, the pupil does receive the treatment, in which case Tji = 1.
Otherwise, the pupil does not receive the treatment, i.e. Tji = 0. The outcome for pupil i, yi, in terms
of achievement (e.g. scores, enrollment, promotion and dropout rate) is given by
(5) yi = β
′xi + δ1T1i + δ2T2i + θT1iT2i + εi,
where xi denotes the control variables, β, δj and θ are parameter vectors to be estimated;
14 xi also
contains an intercept whose coefficient will be the effect of the absence of treatment on the outcome;
εi denotes the error term that captures among other things the effect of unobserved factors on the
outcome. Since T1i and T2i are endogenous, E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) 6= 0. By including the interaction term,
T1iT2i as additional regressor in Eq.(5), we can isolate the exclusive effect of either treatment and
their joint effect. Moreover, depending on the sign, θ reflects the complementarity (positive sign) or
the substitutability (negative sign) between T1 and T2.
The model consisting of Eqs.(1)-(5) is a generalization of the dummy endogenous variable model of
Heckman (1978) in that we have two endogenous dummy variables. To estimate the model, we consider
two approaches: the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (hereafter FIML) and a generalized two-
step Heckman method as described in the next section.
13The beauty of RTCs which makes it very popular as a powerful tool for impact assessment is its ability to make
the treatment and control groups equal on average in all aspects, i.e, observed and unobserved characteristics of units
(see e.g. Duflo et al. (2008)). This is the case when randomization is perfect. However, in reality, randomization is not
free from imperfection and selection bias is always likely, examples of which are among others noncompliance and/or
non-response (see Horiuchi et al., 2007).
14The vectors and matrices are bold faced while scalars are typeset normally.
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4.1. FIML estimation
We make the following distributional assumption: conditionally on (wi,xi), (µ1i, µ2i, εi)
′ is normally
distributed with vector mean 0 and covariance matrix Σ =
 1ρµ1µ2 1
ρµ1εσε ρµ2εσε σ
2
ε
 .15
The likelihood function of the model consists of four parts due to the combination of the two
treatments. The contributions to the likelihood are as follows: those of pupils who benefit from
deworming and canteen meals (T1i = 1 ∧ T2i = 1), from deworming only (T1i = 1 ∧ T2i = 0), from
canteen meals only (T1i = 0∧T2i = 1), and from neither one (T1i = 0∧T2i = 0). For all four categories
of pupils, the outcome is observed. Formally, the likelihood is written as
L =
N∏
i=1
[∫ ∞
−γ′1w1i
∫ ∞
−γ′2w2i
f3(µ1i, µ2i, yi)dµ1idµ2i
]T1iT2i
[∫ ∞
−γ′1w1i
∫ −γ′2w2i
−∞
f3(µ1i, µ2i, yi)dµ1idµ2i
]T1i(1−T2i)
(6)
[∫ −γ′1w1i
−∞
∫ ∞
−γ′2w2i
f3(µ1i, µ2i, yi)dµ1idµ2i
](1−T1i)T2i
[∫ −γ′1w1i
−∞
∫ −γ′2w2i
−∞
f3(µ1i, µ2i, yi)dµ1idµ2i
](1−T1i)(1−T2i)
,
where f3 = f2(µ1i, µ2i|yi)f1(yi|xi,wi) denotes the trivariate normal density function and where f2
and f1 denote respectively the bivariate and the univariate normal density function. Substituting
f2(· · · )f1(· · · ) for f3 into equation (6) yields
L =
N∏
i=1
[∫ ∞
−γ′1w1i
∫ ∞
−γ′2w2i
f1(yi|xi,wi)f2(µ1i, µ2i|yi)dµ1idµ2i
]T1iT2i
[∫ ∞
−γ′1w1i
∫ −γ′2w2i
−∞
f1(yi|xi,wi)f2(µ1i, µ2i|yi)dµ1idµ2i
]T1i(1−T2i)
(7)
[∫ −γ′1w1i
−∞
∫ ∞
−γ′2w2i
f1(yi|xi,wi)f2(µ1i, µ2i|yi)dµ1idµ2i
](1−T1i)T2i
[∫ −γ′1w1i
−∞
∫ −γ′2w2i
−∞
f1(yi|xi,wi)f2(µ1i, µ2i|yi)dµ1idµ2i
](1−T1i)(1−T2i)
,
where f1(yi|xi,wi) =
1
σε
φ1
(
yi−β
′
xi−Ai(T1i,T2i)
σε
)
, φ1 denotes the univariate standard normal density
function and Ai(T1i, T2i) is given by
(8) Ai(T1i, T2i) ≡ δ1T1i + δ2T2i + θT1iT2i.
The difficulty consists in evaluating the double integrals of Eq.(7) which result in bivariate (stan-
dard) normal cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) conditional on a third random variable, yi. It
is known that
(9) (µ1i, µ2i)
′|yi ∼ N
[(ρµ1ε
σε
[yi − E (yi|T1i, T2i,xi)]
ρµ2ε
σε
[yi − E (yi|T1i, T2i,xi)]
)
;
(
1− ρ2µ1ε
ρµ1µ2.ε 1− ρ
2
µ2ε
)]
,
15With ρ12 6= 0, Eqs.(1)-(4) form a bivariate probit where σµ1 and σµ2 are not identified. Thus, σµ1 = σµ2 = 1.
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with E (yi|T1i, T2i,xi) = β
′xi + Ai(T1i, T2i) + E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi), where E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) 6= 0 and ρµ1µ2.ε
denotes the partial correlation between µ1i and µ2i conditional on yi and is given by:
16
(10) ρµ1µ2.ε =
ρµ1µ2 − ρµ1ερµ2ε√
(1− ρ2µ1ε)(1− ρ
2
µ2ε
)
.
Using the symmetry property of the normal distribution, we derive the final expression of the likelihood
as
L =
N∏
i=1
[
f1(yi|xi,wi)Φ2 (ζ1, ζ2; ρµ1µ2.ε)
]T1iT2i[
f1(yi|xi,wi)Φ2 (ζ1,−ζ2;−ρµ1µ2.ε)
]T1i(1−T2i)
[
f1(yi|xi,wi)Φ2 (−ζ1, ζ2;−ρµ1µ2.ε)
](1−T1i)T2i[
f1(yi|xi,wi)Φ2 (−ζ1,−ζ2; ρµ1µ2.ε)
](1−T1i)(1−T2i)
(11)
where Φ2 denotes the bivariate standard normal cdf, and ζk is defined as
(12) ζk ≡
γ ′kwki +
ρµkε
σε
(
yi − β
′xi −Ai(T1i, T2i)
)√
1− ρ2µkε
, k = 1, 2
To obtain FIML estimates of the model, we can maximize the log-likelihood lnL using standard
numerical techniques (e.g. Newton-Raphson). Standard errors of the estimates are obtained using the
inverse Hessian or the outer product of gradient.
4.2. Two-step estimation
The regression equation Eq.(5) is the equation of interest. The population regression can be written
in the form of a conditional expectation, i.e.
(13) E(yi|T1i, T2i,xi) = β
′xi + δ1T1i + δ2T2i + θT1iT2i + E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi).
Since T1i and T2i are endogenous, E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) 6= 0 and the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator
of β, δ1, δ2 and θ is inconsistent. The endogeneity of Tji (j = 1 or 2) comes from the fact that
Tji depends on µji and the latter is correlated with εi. Hence, the endogeneity is accounted for by
taking the correlations ρµ1ε and ρµ2ε into account. The conditional expectation E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) can
be written as
E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) = T1iT2iE(εi|T1i = 1, T2i = 1,xi)
+ T1i(1− T2i)E(εi|T1i = 1, T2i = 0,xi)(14)
+ (1− T1i)T2iE(εi|T1i = 0, T2i = 1)
+ (1− T1i)(1 − T2i)E(εi|T1i = 0, T2i = 0,xi).
Note the similarity between the four types of likelihood contributions. Using the definition of T1i and
T2i (Eqs.3–4) and the latent equations (Eqs.1–2), Eq.(14) can be written as
E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) = T1iT2i E(εi|µ1i > −γ
′
1w1i, µ2i > −γ
′
2w2i,xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(εi|>,>)
+ T1i(1− T2i)E(εi|µ1i > −γ
′
1w1i, µ2i ≤ −γ
′
2w2i,xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(εi|>,≤)
(15)
+ (1− T1i)T2i E(εi|µ1i ≤ −γ
′
1w1i, µ2i > −γ
′
2w2i,xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(εi|≤,>)
+ (1− T1i)(1 − T2i)E(εi|µ1i ≤ −γ
′
1w1i, µ2i ≤ −γ
′
2w2i,xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(εi|≤,≤)
.
16See for instance Kotz et al. (2000).
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The conditional expectations in Eq.(15) involve the truncated trivariate normal distribution. Using
the moment-generating function formula along the lines of Muthe´n (1990), these expectations are
shown to be (detailed calculations are gathered in the Supplementary Appendix A):
E(εi| >,>) =
σερµ1εφ1(γ
′
1w1i)
Φ2 (γ
′
1w1i,γ
′
2w2i, ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
γ ′2w2i − ρµ1µ2γ′1w1i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2

+
σερµ2εφ1(γ
′
2w2i)
Φ2 (γ
′
1w1i,γ
′
2w2i, ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
γ ′1w1i − ρµ1µ2γ ′2w2i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2
 ,(16)
E(εi| >,≤) =
σερµ1εφ1(γ
′
1w1i)
Φ2 (γ′1w1i,−γ
′
2w2i,−ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
ρµ1µ2γ ′1w1i − γ ′2w2i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2

−
σερµ2εφ1(γ
′
2w2i)
Φ2 (γ′1w1i,−γ
′
2w2i,−ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
γ′1w1i − ρµ1µ2γ ′2w2i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2
 ,(17)
E(εi| ≤, >) = −
σερµ1εφ1(γ
′
1w1i)
Φ2 (−γ′1w1i,γ
′
2w2i,−ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
γ ′2w2i − ρµ1µ2γ ′1w1i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2

+
σερµ2εφ1(γ
′
2w2i)
Φ2 (−γ
′
1w1i,γ
′
2w2i,−ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
ρµ1µ2γ ′2w2i − γ ′1w1i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2
(18)
and
E(εi| ≤,≤) =−
σερµ1εφ1(γ
′
1w1i)
Φ2 (−γ′1w1i,−γ
′
2w2i, ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
ρµ1µ2γ ′1w1i − γ ′2w2i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2

−
σερµ2εφ1(γ
′
2w2i)
Φ2 (−γ
′
1w1i,−γ
′
2w2i, ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
ρµ1µ2γ ′2w2i − γ ′1w1i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2
 ,(19)
where we use the symmetry property of the normal distribution (i.e., ∀ξ, φ1(−ξ) = φ1(ξ)) and Φ1 and
Φ2 denote respectively the univariate and bivariate standard normal cdf. For notational convenience,
let
λ++1 ≡
φ1(γ
′
1w1i)
Φ2 (γ′1w1i,γ
′
2w2i, ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
γ′2w2i − ρµ1µ2γ′1w1i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2
 ,(20a)
λ++2 ≡
φ1(γ
′
2w2i)
Φ2 (γ
′
1w1i,γ
′
2w2i, ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
γ′1w1i − ρµ1µ2γ′2w2i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2
 ,(20b)
for pupils who receive both deworming and meals,
λ+−1 ≡
φ1(γ
′
1w1i)
Φ2 (γ
′
1w1i,−γ
′
2w2i,−ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
ρµ1µ2γ′1w1i − γ′2w2i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2
 ,(20c)
λ+−2 ≡
φ1(γ
′
2w2i)
Φ2 (γ ′1w1i,−γ
′
2w2i,−ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
γ ′1w1i − ρµ1µ2γ′2w2i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2
 ,(20d)
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for those who get deworming but not meals,
λ−+1 ≡
φ1(γ
′
1w1i)
Φ2 (−γ
′
1w1i,γ
′
2w2i,−ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
γ ′2w2i − ρµ1µ2γ′1w1i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2
 ,(20e)
λ−+2 ≡
φ1(γ
′
2w2i)
Φ2 (−γ
′
1w1i,γ
′
2w2i,−ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
ρµ1µ2γ′2w2i − γ′1w1i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2
 ,(20f)
for those who get meals but not deworming, and
λ−−1 ≡
φ1(γ
′
1w1i)
Φ2 (−γ′1w1i,−γ
′
2w2i, ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
ρµ1µ2γ′1w1i − γ′2w2i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2
 ,(20g)
λ−−2 ≡
φ1(γ
′
2w2i)
Φ2 (−γ′1w1i,−γ
′
2w2i, ρµ1µ2)
Φ1
ρµ1µ2γ′2w2i − γ′1w1i√
1− ρ2µ1µ2
 ,(20h)
for those that don’t receive any of the treatments (untreated group). The λ’s are generalizations of
the inverse Mill’s ratio. Replacing the expressions of Eqs.(20a)-20h) into the conditional expectations
of Eq.(15) yields
E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) = T1iT2i(σερµ1ελ
++
1 + σερµ2ελ
++
2 ) + T1i(1− T2i)(σερµ1ελ
+−
1 − σερµ2ελ
+−
2 )
(21)
+ (1− T1i)T2i(−σερµ1ελ
−+
1 + σερµ2ελ
−+
2 ) + (1− T1i)(1− T2i)(−σερµ1ελ
−−
1 − σερµ2ελ
−−
2 ),
which after factorization yields
E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) = σερµ1ε
[
λ++1 T1iT2i + λ
+−
1 T1i(1− T2i)− λ
−+
1 (1− T1i)T2i − λ
−−
1 (1− T1i)(1− T2i)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
h1(T1i,T2i)
+ σερµ2ε
[
λ++2 T1iT2i − λ
+−
2 T1i(1− T2i) + λ
−+
2 (1− T1i)T2i − λ
−−
2 (1− T1i)(1− T2i)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
h2(T1i,T2i)
.
(22)
Since E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) 6= 0, one approach to estimate consistently the population regression (Eq.13)
consists in using the control function approach (Heckman 1978, 1979). In other words, we rewrite the
regression equation as
(23) yi = β
′xi + δ1T1i + δ2T2i + θT1iT2i + σερµ1ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
η1
h1(T1i, T2i) + σερµ2ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
η2
h2(T1i, T2i) + νi,
where E[νi|xi, h1(T1i, T2i), h2(T1i, T2i)] = 0 and η1 and η2 are additional parameters to be estimated. In
theory, the coefficients of Eq.(23) can be consistently estimated using OLS. In practice, one problem
occurs in that h1(T1i, T2i) and h2(T1i, T2i) are unobserved as they are functions of the unobserved
parameters γ1, γ2 and ρµ1µ2 , hence the two-step approach:
1. Obtain consistent and efficient (under normality) estimates for γ1, γ2 and ρµ1µ2 by estimating a
bivariate probit using maximum likelihood. Compute ĥ1(T1i, T2i) and ĥ2(T1i, T2i) by estimating
the different λ’s given in Eqs.(20a)-(20h) using γ̂1, γ̂2 and ρ̂µ1µ2 .
2. Use ĥ1(T1i, T2i) and ĥ2(T1i, T2i) as regressors in Eq. (23) alongside xi, T1i and T2i and apply OLS
to Eq.(23). Since we use their estimates in lieu of h1(T1i, T2i) and h2(T1i, T2i), the conventional
standard errors are not valid and need to be corrected by generalizing the results of Heckman
(1976, 1979), or by using techniques of simulation or bootstrap.
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5. The generalized Roy model
Roy (1951) introduced a framework of self-selection that aims to analyze occupational choice with
heterogeneous skill. This framework is one of the most important in economics and has been widely
applied in many other contexts including evaluation. The Roy (1951) model has been extended in
several directions and many generalizations have been proposed (see e.g. Heckman and Taber, 2008 and
Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007, Chap.70). By generalized Roy model, we mean here multiple selections
in the Roy framework also known as endogenous switching regression.
Based on the four regimes: (1, 1) for those who receive both treatments; (1, 0) for those who receive
only treatment T1; (0, 1), those who receive only receive T2; and (0, 0) for those who receive neither
treatments, let us define the four corresponding outcomes as yi11, yi10, yi01 and yi00 respectively. The
generalized model of Roy consists of Eqs.(1)-(4) and the following equations:
yi11 = β
′
11xi + εi11,(24a)
yi10 = β
′
10xi + εi10,(24b)
yi01 = β
′
01xi + εi01,(24c)
yi00 = β
′
i00xi + εi00.(24d)
An individual unit cannot be present in two different regimes at the same time so the correlations
between the error terms of Eqs. (24a)-(24d) are not identified and hence set to zero.
5.1. Maximum likelihood estimation
In order to estimate the generalized Roy model, we maintain the normality assumption. In this
case, (µ1i, µ2i, εi11, εi10, εi01, ε00)
′ is normally distributed with vector mean 0 and covariance matrix Ω
defined as
Ω =

1
ρµ1µ2 1
ρµ1ε11σε11 ρµ2ε11σε11 σ
2
ε11
ρµ1ε10σε10 ρµ2ε10σε10 0 σ
2
ε10
ρµ1ε01σε01 ρµ2ε01σε01 0 0 σ
2
ε01
ρµ1ε00σε00 ρµ2ε00σε00 0 0 0 σ
2
ε00
 .
The likelihood function of the model is given by
L =
N∏
i=1
[∫ ∞
−γ′1w1i
∫ ∞
−γ′2w2i
f3(µ1i, µ2i, yi11)dµ1idµ2i
]T1iT2i
[∫ ∞
−γ′1w1i
∫ −γ′2w2i
−∞
f3(µ1i, µ2i, yi10)dµ1idµ2i
]T1i(1−T2i)
(25)
[∫ −γ′1w1i
−∞
∫ ∞
−γ′2w2i
f3(µ1i, µ2i, yi01)dµ1idµ2i
](1−T1i)T2i
[∫ −γ′1w1i
−∞
∫ −γ′2w2i
−∞
f3(µ1i, µ2i, yi00)dµ1idµ2i
](1−T1i)(1−T2i)
,
where f3 still denotes the trivariate normal density function. Using the results of Section 4.1, the
likelihood function can be written as
L =
N∏
i=1
[
Φ2
(
ω11, ξ11; ρµ1µ2.ε11
)
ϕ11i
]T1iT2i[
Φ2
(
ω10,−ξ10;−ρµ1µ2.ε10
)
ϕ10i
]T1i(1−T2i)
(26)
[
Φ2
(
− ω01, ξ01;−ρµ1µ2.ε01
)
ϕ01i
](1−T1i)T2i[
Φ2
(
− ω00,−ξ00; ρµ1µ2.ε00
)
ϕ00i
](1−T1i)(1−T2i)
,
20
where ωjk, ξjk and ϕjki (j, k ∈ {0, 1}) are defined as follows
ωjk ≡
γ ′1w1i +
ρµ1εjk
σεjk
(
yijk − β
′
jkxi
)
√
1− ρ2µ1εjk
(27a)
ξjk ≡
γ ′2w2i +
ρµ2εjk
σεjk
(
yijk − β
′
jkxi
)
√
1− ρ2µ2εjk
(27b)
ϕjki ≡
1
σεjk
φ1
(
yijk − β
′
jkxi
σεjk
)
(27c)
In order to obtain ML estimates of the generalized Roy model, lnL can be maximized using standard
numerical methods.
5.2. Two-step estimation
In order to estimate the model using the two-step approach, we write the regression of the subpopu-
lations as
E(yi11|T1i = 1, T2i = 1,xi) = β
′
11xi + E(εi11|T1i = 1, T2i = 1,xi),(28)
E(yi10|T1i = 1, T2i = 0,xi) = β
′
10xi + E(εi10|T1i = 1, T2i = 0,xi),(29)
E(yi01|T1i = 0, T2i = 1,xi) = β
′
01xi + E(εi01|T1i = 0, T2i = 1,xi),(30)
E(yi00|T1i = 0, T2i = 0,xi) = β
′
00xi + E(εi00|T1i = 0, T2i = 0,xi),(31)
where each regression is estimated using data for the corresponding subsamples. Using the results of
the conditional expectations of Section 4.2, we can write the regression equations (eqs. (24a)-(24d))
as
yi11 = β
′
11xi + σε11ρµ1ε11λ
++
1 + σε11ρµ2ε11λ
++
2 + νi11,(32a)
yi10 = β
′
10xi + σε10ρµ1ε10λ
+−
1 − σε10ρµ2ε10λ
+−
2 + νi10,(32b)
yi01 = β
′
01xi − σε01ρµ1ε01λ
−+
1 + σε01ρµ2ε01λ
−+
2 + νi01,(32c)
yi00 = β
′
00xi − σε00ρµ1ε00λ
−−
1 − σε00ρµ2ε00λ
−−
2 + νi00,(32d)
with E(νi11|xi, λ
++
1 , λ
++
2 ) = · · · = E(νi00|xi, λ
−−
1 , λ
−−
2 ) = 0, and where the expressions of the λ’s are
given in equations (20a)-(20h). Equations (32a)-(32d) can be estimated separately by OLS using the
two-step approach described in Section 4.2, i.e.
1. Obtain consistent and efficient (under normality) estimates for γ1, γ2 and ρµ1µ2 by estimating a
bivariate probit using maximum likelihood. Compute the λ̂’s, given in Eqs.(20a)-(20h), by using
γ̂1, γ̂2 and ρ̂µ1µ2 .
2. Use the λ̂’s as regressors in Eqs.(32a)-(32d) alongside xi, and apply OLS to these equations.
Since we use the estimates of the λ’s, the standard errors of the estimates must be corrected once
again by generalizing the results of Heckman (1976, 1979), or by using techniques of simulation
or bootstrap.
General remarks
Remark 1 (Performance of DISM vs. Roy) Several comments are in order about the rationale
of the use of the two frameworks (DISM vs. Roy) as well as their economic performance. Both models
complement each other. They are different and deliver different estimations and treatment effects as it
will become clear in Section 6. i) The DISM model uses the selection processes alongside one outcome
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equation for the full sample. It allows to estimate the Average Treatment Effects (ATE). Moreover, as
Eq.(5) embeds the interaction term T1T2, the DISM model enables us to test for complementarity vs.
substitutability within the programs. ii) The generalized Roy model is a switching regression framework
with four regimes.17 It also uses the two selection equations but allows for different outcome equations
(one for each regime). As a result, in addition to the ATE, we can also estimate heterogenous effects:
the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) and the Average Treatment Effect on the Non-
Treated (ATENT). In both cases (DISM and Roy), the double-index selection given by relations (1-4)
is endogenous.
Remark 2 (Alternative estimation: IV approach) The Instrumental Variables (IV) can be an
alternative approach to the methods developed here (maximum likelihood and two-step control function).
IV has the advantage of being simpler and less dependent on distribution assumptions whereas the ML
based estimation is known to be efficient. Relying on Imbens and Wooldridge (2007)18, the IV (for the
DISM framework in Section 4) can be summarized as follows:
1. Estimate the bivariate probit model using maximum likelihood method.
2. Compute ρˆ(T1i = 1|wi), ρˆ(T2i = 1|wi) and ρˆ(T1iT2i = 1|wi).
3. Use these variables as IV for T1, T2 and T1T2 in the estimation of Eq.(5). Moreover the estima-
tion of the covariance matrix of parameters does not require correction related to the estimation
in step 1.19
6. Treatment effects
As outlined earlier, our framework allows to identify and estimate a wide range of treatment effects
depending on the model used. In the double endogenous selection model we identify a class of average
treatment effects. For the generalized Roy model, in addition to the average treatment effects, we
provide several heterogenous treatment effects as well.
6.1. Treatment effects in the double-index selection model
Relying on the first model, we can identify several average treatment effects as summarized in Table
2. Let us consider them in turn.
i) Exclusive effect. Assume the two programmes T1 and T2. The exclusive effect of T1 respectively
T2 is the marginal effect of T1 resp. T2 conditional on the fact that agents are not in the
alternative programme. Such effects allow to measure the impact T1 or T2 only on the outcome
y, given controls x. This leads to the exclusive effects of T1 and T2.
ii) Global effect. The global effect is the effect of both programmes taken together.
iii) Additional effect. The additional effect is the effect following from having additionally another
programme. It is given by the difference between the global effect and the exclusive effect. This
effect should be distinguished from the global and the sequential effects (see below defined in
Section 6.2) even if they are closely related. It is different from the global effect because the
implementation starts only with one program, either meal or deworming, contrary to the global
effect for which both programs are administered together starting from the beginning of the
implementation. It is also different from the sequential effect because the order doesn’t matter.
iv) Relative effect. Within our framework, we are able to assess the effectiveness of implementing
(T1, T2) vs. T1 or T2. Thus, we have the effect of package (T1, T2) vs. T1 and the effect of
17See e.g., Heckman and Taber (2008) for an exposition of the Roy model.
18Imbens and Wooldridge (2007): Control Function and Related Methods, Lecture Notes 6, Summer 2007.
19To save space, we do not report estimation results from the IV method. Estimates are available from authors upon
request.
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package (T1, T2) vs. T2. We can also assess the effect of a programme vs. the effect of the
other programme. For example, in the case of exclusive effects, taking the difference also yields
a relative effect between the two programs.
Include Table 2
6.2. Treatment effects in the generalized Roy model
The Roy model allows to compute the average treatment effects as in the case of the double-index
endogenous selection model, but also to derive several heterogenous average treatment effects: the
effects on the treated and on the untreated. For each of these effects, we also compute the associated
exclusive, global, additional and relative effects. In addition, some new effects can be identified viz,
sequential and substitution effects. Both effects are relevant for policy analysis.
i) Sequential effect. This effect is of particular interest. Depending on which treatment is imple-
mented first, the overall effect may differ. This means that we will not have the same effect if
the school meals program is implemented before deworming, and vice versa. In our empirical
application where T1 and T2 denote deworming and meals programs respectively, it is expected
that the sequence T1T2 be more efficient than T2T1.
ii) Substitution effect. By substitution effect, we mean replacing one program with another. For
example, what would happen if after having started a program, it is stopped and replaced by
another. The substitution effect is different from the sequential effect. The substitution effect is
particularly interesting when the substitution is made with programs targeting the same goal.
For instance, in the case of the deworming and canteen programs the question arises whether
the substitution makes sense. The answer is yes. On one hand, the two programs have the
same goal: improve pupils’ performance. On the other hand, if during the implementation of
programs, a program appears to be more expensive than anticipated compared to the other, and
in case of lack of resources, the organizers may face such choices. In this case, it seems clear that
the cheapest program will be substituted for the more expensive one. Experience has shown
that the deworming program is cheaper than the canteen because the resources mobilized are
cheaper. This fact is supported by cost-benefit analysis (see Miguel and Kremer, 2004).
In our data, although both treatments (deworming and meals) have not been implemented sequen-
tially or been substituted, we can identify and estimate these effects. Thus we are able to provide
decision makers with powerful policy analysis tools. These effects are summarized in Table 3.
Include Table 3
7. Estimation results
Remember that this study focuses on two things: the treatment effects from the package of deworming
and school meals programs alongside the determinants of the academic performance of pupils. Both
objectives have motivated our modeling strategy in the previous section. We have estimated the two
models presented in the previous section: the DISM model in Eqs.(1, 2 and 5) and the generalized
Roy in Eqs.(1, 4 and 24a-24d).20 The estimation results are provided in Tables 4, 5 and 6 for the
score outcomes (aggregate, French and math) and Tables 7 and 8 for the rate outcomes (enrollment,
promotion and dropout).
Include Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
20All the computations are performed with STATA. Authors developed their own code. Simulated data based codes
are available upon request. Despite the complexity of the procedures, the codes are optimized to run fast.
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7.1. Selections
The bivariate selection equations (1–2) describe the participation mechanisms in the two programs
(deworming and school meals). As documented in the data section, we used the criteria set by World
Food Program and the Ministry of National Education of Senegal to motivate the choice of the control
variables for the selection equations. Among these criteria, some were recorded by the survey such
as being located in an area with food insecurity, or being particularly affected by rising prices. The
variables that we use are the existence of a management committee in the school, storage, school
cooperative, association of pupils’ mothers, grant from the Rural Council, distance to home, the total
number of pupils in the school, disruptions that delayed the starting of the courses, the gender of
pupils, medical box. These factors of selection are the same regardless of the outcome. This implies
that we have the same selection equations for each outcome (aggregate, French and math scores;
enrollment, promotion and dropout rates).
For the deworming program, the results show that the total number of pupils, the existence of a
management committee of the school, association of pupils’ mothers, school cooperative, existence of
water point in the school and the gender of pupils have a positive effect on the probability of benefiting
from the program. Indeed, the existence of school infrastructure and various associations in schools
promote the supply of food and health programs. The existence of a medicine chest in the school
reduced the likelihood of benefiting from the deworming program. This suggests that pupils in schools
with first aid box are less affected by parasitic worms so that the concerned schools are less likely to
get into the deworming program. This may be because schools with medicine box are likely to have
already an established medical facility.
On the school meals program, the results show that the total number of pupils, the distance
between pupils’ home and school, the existence of association of pupils’ mothers, a grant from the
rural council, storage, disturbances that have caused delays in starting the academic year act positively
on the probability of receiving a meals program at school. On the contrary, the existence of school
cooperative reduces the probability of receiving school meals program. Indeed, the school cooperative
plays several roles (cleanliness of the school, gardening activities, etc.). In reality, in some schools, the
school cooperative is not operational. In other schools, the school cooperative plays its role fully and
even goes further to organize activities to enable children to enjoy their lunch.
The variable distance to school (distance between school and the pupils’ home) is also one of the
selection criteria listed by the government for establishing canteens. In our sample, most schools have
benefited from the so-called canteens ‘price increase’. These were established to respond to the rising
prices of food staples. This could explain the fact that we found a positive effect of the distance control
on the probability of benefiting from the meal program.
7.2. Outcomes
7.2.a. Scores
It is usually accepted that pupils in schools that are well equipped with ‘appropriate’ textbooks are
likely to perform better.21 Our results show a nonlinear relationship between the number of pupils
for a textbook and test scores. Indeed, the coefficient of the linear term of the control ‘Manual’ is
positive and significant (for all score outcomes) while its square is negative (for the aggregate and
French scores). In other words, scores increase with the number of pupils who share a textbook up to
a certain threshold from which the scores drop. This threshold is 4 pupils per textbook for the French
score. For the aggregate score, the square term is negative but not significant and the turning point
is 7, which corresponds to the maximum of pupils per textbook. Observe that the decreasing part of
the curve is out of sample. This result could be explained by the fact that the learning time decreases
when the number of pupils by textbook increases. This result corroborates the findings of Michaelowa
21A well known result in the literature is that of Glewwe et al. (2009). This study evaluates a program of textbook
delivered to pupils in Kenya. The authors found that the textbook program lessens pupils’ achievement. The problem
was that the textbooks were in English which was not the language commonly used by Kenyan pupils at this level of
education.
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(2006). According to CONFEMEN (1999), French and mathematics textbooks have a positive impact
on learning, with a larger effect for the French textbooks.
Another interesting control variable is class size. Our results show a negative but not significant
effect of class size on scores (see Tables 4, 5). Estimates based on the Roy model (see Table 6)
sometimes show a positive effect, sometimes a negative one depending on the regime. Indeed, for
pupils who benefit from deworming, we find a negative and significant relation between class size and
the aggregate and French scores. For those who receives the meals program or the package (deworming
and meals), the results show a positive and significant relation between class size and test scores. For
the untreated group, the effect of class size on French score is negative and significant. Along the
lines of Altinok (2006), we could argue that class size does not affect pupils’ outcomes in schools with
canteens or for those in schools where both programs are implemented. On the contrary, in schools
without meals program or with only the deworming program, we find that class size does negatively
impact the score in French. This is consistent with Brossard (2003). It is worthwhile noticing that in
the Senegalese context, there is a decline of the French language compared to national languages in
particular the ‘Wolof’ language (ANSD, 2006).22
We observe a nonlinear relationship between the age of the teacher and scores. The linear term is
negative while the square is positive drawing a U shaped relation. As a result, the age of the teacher
has a negative effect on pupils’ performance up to a threshold from which the relation becomes positive.
This threshold is 32 years old for the aggregate score, 34 years old for the French score and 31 years
old for math score. In our sample, the age of the teachers varied between 20 and 53 years old with
an average age of 31 old for the whole sample. Thus the age of teacher impacts positively on scores
when it reaches the average age of 31 years old. This finding regarding the age of the teacher probably
reflects an experience effect. Indeed, if we assume that mastering a classroom is positively related to
teachers’ experience, we can expect a positive effect of the age of the teacher on pupils’ performance
(Schwille et al., 1991). It is important to remember that in the literature, there is no consensus on
the relation between the age of the teacher and pupil’s achievement. Indeed, the age of the teacher
can interact with both experience and education. This means that teachers of the same age but with
different levels of education and different experience will not necessarily have the same effects on
pupils’ achievement. In conclusion, the effect of age of teachers is much more akin to a cohort effect.
The profile we observe is certainly binds to the quality of education they themselves received.
The age of pupils is another potential determinant of their performance. The results obtained
from the DISM model (see Tables 4, 5) show a positive and significant effect of pupils’ age on scores.
UNESCO (1987) considers that the common age for primary school ranges between 6 and 11 years.
In our sample, the age of pupils varies between 6 and 15 years. This means that either pupils entered
school late, or they failed several times. If we consider the case of late entry, a positive relation
can be observed (Schwille et al., 1991). In the case of promotion, one generally expects a negative
relation between age and pupils’ performance. In fact, when pupils have a high rate of repetition,
this indicates a low academic performance. The Roy model (see Table 6) shows a negative relation
between the age of pupils and the aggregate and French scores for the group of pupils who benefit
from the package. This finding could follow from the fact that this group of students is the youngest
on average, meaning the less mature compared to pupils in other groups (see descriptive statistics in
Table 1: the average age is about 9.3 against 9.5, 9.7 and 9.9 respectively for pupils in the deworming,
canteen and untreated groups).
Another interesting evidence is the positive relation between education spending and the aggregate
and French scores. This result is not surprising because the more parents invest in the education of
their children the higher achievement we could expect. The estimates also show that disturbed courses,
gender of the teacher, level of study or class of students, absenteeism of teachers, deworming at home
and living in a community where parents are not interested in school have a negative effect on students’
scores. Indeed, disruption and teacher absenteeism decreased the learning time of pupils. According to
UNESCO (2005), teacher absenteeism affects much of the time devoted to learning and hence learning
22Wolof is the most widely spoken language in Senegal (by the Wolof ethnic group which represents about 45% of
the total population, as well as non-Wolof people). This language, which is also spoken in Gambia and Mauritania, is
experiencing a cultural expansion.
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outcomes. The result regarding the gender of teacher is consistent with the finding of Jarousse and
Mingat (1989). Indeed, the authors found similar results relying on data from Togo meaning pupils
with female teachers perform better than those with male teachers. For deworming at home, the
relation found could be explained by the nature of the drug used for deworming children. Indeed,
rural households use either traditional or modern deworming drugs. As we have mentioned in Section
2, many side effects (fatigue or triggered diarrhea) have been reported. Also, the use of traditional
drugs is not without consequences. This could lead to a decline in pupils’ performance.
The control variables like Koranic school, early childhood institution, existence of latrine, existence
of hand washing device, existence of a college in the village where the school of pupils is located have
a positive effect on the scores. These results are expected. For example, the effect of college in the
village where the school of pupils is operating can be viewed as indirect effect of more advanced sisters
or brothers of pupils in this college. They could act as mentors for the younger ones who are in
primary school. Unfortunately, we have no direct information on the fact that a pupil would have
a brother or sister in a college town. One can also argue that having a college in the village will
motivate pupils. The results concerning modern preschool (also known as early childhood institution)
and informal school (here Koranic school) are fairly well known in the literature. Indeed, the Koranic
school, usually found in Muslim countries, is an informal private educational structure that provides
religious education based on memorization. The Koranic school is known for developing the capacity
of learning and memory because children learn by heart very early.
On the qualification of teachers, the results show that pupils taught by a teacher with the teachers’
teaching training qualification CEAP perform better than those supervised by a teacher with another
teachers’ teaching training degree (the reference).23 A surprising result is that pupils taught by teach-
ers without teachers’ teaching training qualification perform better than those supervised by teachers
with teachers’ teaching training degree. In the case of Senegal, CONFEMEN (2007) has reported no
evidence or negative correlation between teachers’ teaching training and pupils’ achievement. Espe-
cially in rural areas, this can be explained by two factors. First, in practice, it may be that those
teachers in the category without teachers’ teaching training degree are awaiting to graduation because
most often they have already passed the written examination. Second, they are teachers whose moti-
vation is much more important than those with teachers’ teaching training degree. Indeed, they can
be inspected at any time. This control is crucial for their career. The performance of pupils under
their care is reflected in the state of their job. As a result, it is likely that this motivation is a push
factor which leads them to supervise pupils very well. This may also explain why pupils supervised
by these teachers are more effective.
Regarding the academic degree of teachers, the results from the DISM model show that pupils
supervised by a teacher with the High School Diploma perform better in mathematics than those
supervised by a teacher with the national certificate. As pointed out by Rivers and William (2002),
this result suggests that teachers with High School Diploma and more have a higher level of knowledge
in mathematics than those with the certificate. When we use the Roy model, we get a positive relation
between the scores and the proportion of teachers with High School Diploma for the group of pupils
who received the deworming program. On the contrary, the effect is negative for pupils who received
the meals program only or the package. This finding is consistent with the results of CONFEMEN
(1999). The results also show that pupils taught by teachers who have received teachers’ teaching
training are less successful in mathematics than those taught by teachers who have not received such
training. This result is surprising but could be explained by the length of the teachers’ teaching
training. As pointed out by UNESCO (2000), the impact of the training on pupils’ achievement
becomes positive only if the training covers several periods, otherwise one can observe a negative
effect.
On the geographical area, the results show that students living in Diourbel perform better than
those living in Fatick (reference) unlike those living in Kolda and Se´dhiou who record weak perfor-
mance. As we have already stated in the data section, Kolda and Se´dhiou are isolated southern regions
23It is worth remembering that the two most important professional degrees in Senegal are the CAP (Certificat
d’Aptitude Pe´dagogique, meaning ‘Pedagogical Aptitude Certificate’) and CEAP (Certificat Ele´mentaire d’Aptitude
Pe´dagogique, which is ‘Basic Pedagogical Aptitude Certificate’).
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with very weak risk management capacity and which practice mainly livestock. Fatick and Diourbel
are located in the center with a good ability to manage risk. These two regions are predominantly
involved in agriculture.24 In the southern regions, the livestock system is traditional and extensive.
The combination of heavy rainfall, dense water system and the availability of crop residues (e.g. rice
straw, stalks of millet and corn, peanut vines, etc.) after the rainy season promote the development of
a rich and varied pasture capable of maintaining the herd throughout the year (ANSD 2010). However,
the frequency of bushfires leads to food deficits at the end of the dry season (by end of May, June
and July). It is worth noticing that this period also corresponds to the exams period for pupils. This
means that at the end of the school year, farmers are concerned by the search of food for livestock.
As some pupils are requested by their family to help with the economic activities, this increases their
absenteeism and negatively impacts their performance.
The coefficient of the treatment dummy T1 for the deworming program is negative and significant
whereas the dummy of the meals program is of the opposite sign for all scores except for the score
in math for which T2 is not significant. Note that these effects are not the treatment effects of
the programs as the estimated partial correlation coefficients are also significant. Consequently, the
treatment effects will be computed as derived in Section 6. As we outlined in Section 4, an interesting
aspect of our specification (see Eq.5) is that it enables to investigate whether deworming and meals
programs are complementary or substitutes. This is given by the sign of the interaction term T1T2.
The coefficient is positive and significant for the aggregate and French scores meaning that in the
perspective of improving pupils’ achievement, the two programs are complementary.
7.2.b. Enrollment, promotion and dropout
The estimation results for enrollment, promotion and dropout rates are reported in Table 7 and 8.
Enrollment. The control variables temporary shelters, association of pupils’ parents, age of teacher,
Koranic school, snack, pupils who eat their fill and literacy of the household head have a positive
effect. Particularly, we find a U shape relation between the age of teacher and the enrollment rate
with a threshold at 32 years old from which the age of teacher has a positive effect. On the contrary,
determinants like class size, health expenditure, distance between pupils’ home and their school,
disturbances that have delayed the starting of courses, gender of the teacher, holding a farmland and
school expenses have a negative effect. The coefficients of these variables are all of expected sign
except for the variable distance from pupils’ home to their school for which we do not anticipate a
particular sign. The result shows that living less than one kilometer from the school has a negative
effect.
Another interesting and intuitive result is that having a literate household head increases the
enrollment rate. On the contrary, the enrollment rate declines with schooling expense. This result is
important for education policy in improving the literacy rate in rural areas where the living standard
are rather low. Indeed, if policy makers want to encourage families to send their children to school, it
would be interesting to ensure that the cost of schooling is not too high. Two other results are worth
noting: having a male teacher and holding arable land have negative effect. In the first case, in rural
areas, the enrollment of girls is not always well received. The promotion of female teachers may be
desirable and may help in that respect. In the second case, arable land increases the practice of child
labor, which would in turn reduce enrollment. The geographical location or regions also influence
the rate of enrollment. Indeed, contrary to Kolda and Se´dhiou that have a negative effect on the
enrollment rate compared to Fatick (reference), Diourbel has a positive effect.
Relying on the Roy model, for the pupils who participate in the deworming program and those
receiving the package, we see that the number of classes in temporary shelters have a negative effect.
On the contrary, for the group of pupils in the meals program and those in the untreated group, the
effect is positive. We also have a negative relation between enrollment and the proportion of children
who have experienced early childhood institution and those who bring a snack for the group receiving
meals program. Indeed, as the pupils in our sample are at second and fourth year class, if there are
24In our sample, the number of head of cattle by household varied between 0 and 500 in the region of Kolda, 0 to 502
in Se´dhiou, 0 to 111 in Fatick and 0 to 48 in Diourbel. As for agriculture, we have the following proportions of arable
land holding in each region: 97% in Diourbel, 92% in Fatick, 96% in Kolda and 87% in Se´dhiou.
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no children of school age in the family and even if the pupils had experienced an early childhood
institution or bring food to school, it is possible to find a negative relation between these variables
and the enrollment rate.
Promotion. The variables temporary shelters, age of teacher, age of pupil, distance to school, as-
sociation of pupils’ parents, gender of the teacher, teachers’ teaching training, Koranic school, early
childhood institution, pupils who eat their fill and ownership of arable land have a positive effect.
Indeed, as in the case of enrollment rate, there is U shape relation between the age of the teacher and
the promotion rate with a turning point at 38 years old. On the contrary, health expenditure, number
of head of livestock owned, disturbance that have caused delay in courses and absenteeism have a
negative effect. Note that holding an arable land has a positive effect, while the number of head of
livestock affects the promotion negatively. As we have already mentioned, this result may be related
to the economic characteristics of the study areas. On the one hand, Kolda and Se´dhiou have low
capacity to manage risk and these two regions are those where households have the greatest number
of heads of cattle. On the other, Diourbel and Fatick are more agriculture oriented. In addition,
the practice of livestock based on a system of transhumance in which farmers often move with their
families is not beneficial to children who go to school. On the geographical locations, the results show
a positive effect of Diourbel and Se´dhiou compared to the Fatick region. This effect is negative for
the Kolda region.
The deworming program has a positive effect while the meals program has a negative and signifi-
cant effect. The sign of the coefficient of the interaction term T1T2 reveals that the two programs are
complementary. The estimates derived from the Roy model support the previous findings except for
the control variable eat at fill in the group of meals program.
Dropout. The variable temporary shelters, class size, age of pupil, distance to school, association
of pupils’ parents, gender of teacher, teachers’ teaching training, Koranic school, early childhood
institution, pupils who eat their fill, ownership of arable land and the existence of a college in the
village have a negative effect. Remember that now (in the case of the dropout rate), a negative sign
on a coefficient is a positive result as we seek to reduce the dropout rate. On the contrary, the controls
health spending, number of cattle, disturbances that caused delay in starting the courses, the gender
and the literacy of household head have a positive effect on the dropout rate. The coefficient of the
variable arable land is negative while the number of cattle is positive. This means that children in
households that keep livestock are more likely to drop, while the possession of arable land reduces
the dropout rate. This result is very interesting in two respects. On the one hand, as we have
already widely documented, farmers are mainly located in the regions of Kolda and Se´dhiou which
are landlocked with low capacity of risk management. These farmers often face problems of feeding
livestock at the end of each school year. On the other hand, we can link this result with that obtained
from the scores outcome so that the two results complement each other. Indeed, we obtain a negative
effect of the variable number of cattle on the scores while the effect on the dropout rate is positive. As
for regions, the results show that there is a negative relation between the dropout rate and Diourbel
and Se´dhiou compared to Fatick, unlike the Kolda region where the effect on the dropout rate is
positive. Deworming and meals programs have respectively a negative and a positive effect on the
dropout rate. The coefficient on the interaction term T1T2 shows that both programs are substitutes
with the aim of reducing dropouts.
The estimates obtained from the Roy specification pointed to the same direction as those observed
from the DISM model except for temporary shelters, class size and the age of pupils for the deworming
regime. With regard to the gender of pupil, the estimation results for the deworming and package
regimes show a negative effect of male pupils on dropout rate.
7.3. Treatment effects
As we have described in Section 6 and summarized in Tables 2 and 3 the package of deworming
and meals programs and the data sampling allow us to estimate a wide range of treatment effects.
Depending on the specification, we have computed these effects for the entire population: Average
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Treatment Effect (ATE) and for subpopulations of treated (ATET) and untreated (ATENT). For
each, we distinguish the exclusive, global, additional and relative effects in the case of DISM model.
In addition, we include sequential and substitution effects in the case of the Roy model. The results
are presented in Tables 9, 10 and 11 for the score outcomes, and in Tables 12 and 13 for the enrollment,
promotion and dropout rates. Let us now take them in turn.
Include Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 13
7.3.a. Scores
Exclusive effects. Remember the exclusive effects are the effects of each program separately. These
effects are positive and significant. Thus, having only the deworming program has a positive and
significant effect on pupils’ achievement (aggregate, French and math). The exclusive effect of meal
is also positive and significant. In other words, each program taken separately has a positive and
significant effect on pupils’ achievement. It is important to note that the effect of the meals program
is more pronounced than the deworming. The generalized Roy model provides exclusive effects that
point to the same direction as those obtained from the DISM specification.
Global effects. The global or overall effect is the effect of the package, i.e, the combination of deworm-
ing and meals. The global effects are positive and significant for all scores. Note that the global effects
are larger than the exclusive ones. This implies that pupils who get both deworming and meals expe-
rienced greater improvement in their academic performance compared to pupils who receive only one
of the two programs. This result is very interesting and is consistent with our expectations. Indeed,
as we have mentioned earlier from the estimation results, the two programs are complementary. This
means that the global effect is expected to be higher than the sum of exclusive effects. The global
effects computed from the generalized Roy model tell the same story as those obtained from the DISM.
Additional effects. These effects are positive and significant both from the DISM and the Roy frame-
work. This means that if pupils have already enjoyed the meals (or deworming), then taking deworming
(or meals) in addition improves their scores. The sign of this effect can be seen as a corollary of the
complementarity of the two programs. Remember that the additional effect is different from the global
and the sequential effects as we have shown in Section 6.
Relative effects. Relative effects seek to compare pairwise programs, including the fact of having the
package vs. a single program. We observe that the relative effects of the package vs. deworming is
positive and significant. The same holds for package vs. meals. It is worth noticing hat the relative
effect of the package vs. deworming is larger than package vs. meals. This is not surprising as the
exclusive effect of the meals is higher than that of deworming. We observe that the relative effect of
deworming vs. meals is negative and significant for all scores. This result makes sense because the
exclusive effect of meals is larger than the exclusive effect of deworming. The relative effects calculated
from the generalized Roy model tell the same story.
In addition to the average treatment effects (ATE) discussed above, the generalized Roy model
allows us to estimate the effects on the treated (ATET) and on the untreated (ATET). As in the case
of ATE, here we also have exclusive, global, and additional effects.
Average treatment effects on the treated (ATET). Except for the French score, we observe that the
exclusive effects on the treated are larger than their analogue ATE. The global effects of both programs
are greater than the exclusive effects and greater than the sum of the exclusive effects. Observe that
for the math score, the exclusive effects of deworming are larger than the effects of the meals program.
This explains why we have a positive and significant relative effect of deworming vs. meals.
Average treatment effect on the untreated (ATENT). Regarding the effect on the untreated, i.e, the
group of pupils who received neither deworming nor meals, the purpose is to inform policy makers on
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the rationale for extending the programs to a wider population. Indeed, such extension could result
in significant costs of implementation. The results show that the exclusive effects of deworming are
negative while those of the meals program are positive. It is important to note that the combination
of the two programs greatly improves pupils’ achievement. We also obtain positive additional effects.
The relative effects of deworming vs. meals are negative because the exclusive effects of meal are larger
than those of deworming. So for untreated pupils, it is recommended to combine the two programs to
increase scores.
Sequential effects. The sequential effect is of particular interest as it accounts for the order in which
the programs are implemented. Indeed, we expect the effect to differ depending on whether pupils got
school feeding first and deworming next or vice versa. From a nutritional perspective for example, the
ideal order would be to deworm first, hence the rationale of the sequence. Unfortunately, we do not
have a nutritional outcome indicator for which it may be expected that the sequence T1T2 might be
more efficient than T2T1. For the group of treated pupils, there are positive sequential effects. How-
ever, the sequence T2T1 proves to be more effective. Thus, it seems more advantageous to introduce
the meals program before deworming. As we have discussed in Section 2, this result could be related
to the negative perception that some families have towards deworming as consequences of the sides
effects of drugs used. On the contrary, for pupils in the untreated group, it is better to do deworming
first. For this group, introducing the meals program before deworming significantly lowers pupils’
achievement.
Substitution effects. For pupils in the treated group, we observe a very interesting result. Indeed,
introducing the canteen until a certain time and replacing it with a deworming program is more
beneficial in terms of improving pupils’ academic achievement than the reverse. This is important for
policy analysis in particular for policy makers and NGOs who fund these kind of programs. Indeed, we
know that a deworming program is far less expensive than meals program. We will come back to this
aspect in the next section for further details through the cost-effectiveness analysis. What this result
says is that, if for one reason or another, we have to substitute a program for another (for example
funding limitations), then it is more interesting to replace the meals program by the deworming if we
seek to improve pupils’ academic achievement. This result is consistent with the sequential effect.
For the untreated group, deworming pupils first before replacing the program by meals would
positively act on scores. However, unlike pupils in the treated group, it is not beneficial to introduce
meals program, and then replace it with deworming. Again, this is consistent with the sequential
effect results. Overall, the combination of the two programs is more beneficial in terms of increasing
pupils’ academic achievement.
7.3.b. Enrollment, promotion and dropout
Enrollment. We expect positive effects of programs on enrollment rate. The estimates give us expected
impacts for the meals program and unexpected effects for the deworming. The exclusive effect of meals
and deworming is respectively positive and negative. Even if the additional effect is positive, it is not
high enough to offset the negative impact of deworming. We also observe the global effect is negative
which means that putting the two programs together decreases the enrollment rate.
The relative effect of the package vs. deworming is positive. This is not surprising because we
have an exclusive effect of deworming which is negative and an additional effect which is positive. So
the relative effect of the package vs. deworming simply means that when you set as goal to increase
enrollment, among deworming alone and the combination of the two programs, it is better to choose
a combination of both. The relative effect of the package vs. the meals is negative. This implies that
when we set the target of increasing enrollment, the implementation of the meals program alone is
better than the package. The relative effect of the meals program compared to deworming is positive.
This is normal because the exclusive effect of meals is positive while that of deworming is negative.
This means that the meals program would better help to increase enrollment compared to the de-
worming program.
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Promotion. Here positive effects are expected. The exclusive effect of deworming is negative while
other effects are positive and significant. The global effects show that combining the two programs is
the best option. For the DISM model the global effect is computed as 7.040 which is larger than the
effect of the meals (2.727) and deworming (-5.198). For the generalized Roy model, the global effect
is computed as 2.547 which is lower than the meals (5.021) and higher than the deworming (-8.290).
The relative effects clearly reveal that the package perform better than the single programs. The
relative effect of the meals program vs. deworming shows that if one has to choose between the two
alternatives, implementing the meals program fits better the target of achieving a higher rate of pro-
motion. The exclusive effects lead to the same conclusion.
Dropout. Here we expect negative effects. Note that negative treatment effects here mean that the
program has reduced the dropout rate. The exclusive effect for deworming is negative as well as the
effect of the meals program. The global effect indicates that the combination of the two managed to
reduce significantly the dropout rate compared to the single programs. Indeed, the global effect is
computed as -9.029 in the DISM and -8.100 in the generalized Roy model whereas the figures for the
exclusive effects are -1.443 and -4.797 for the deworming and the meals in the DISM and -1.263 and
-5.430 in the generalized Roy model, respectively.
The relative effect of the package vs. deworming shows that the package performs better in terms
of reducing dropouts. The relative effect of the package vs. meals is slightly lower than the exclusive
effect of the meals program. The relative effect of meals compared with deworming shows that the
former performs better.
8. Policy analysis
8.1. Cost-effectiveness
A major policy issue of impact analysis is whether other alternatives are more effective than the
programs under study in terms of cost-effectiveness. Cheung and Perrotta (2011) outlined that there
are very few papers that studied the cost per outcome for school meals programs. Relying on an
experiment in Cambodia, they found that on-site school feeding is the most cost-effective program while
distributing take home rations is relatively expensive. They also found that adding the deworming
intervention to both on-site feeding and take home ration make the full package much more cost-
effective thanks to the fact that the complete package attracts many more pupils and the deworming
medications are extremely cheap. Miguel and Kremer (2004) found that the cost per additional year
of school participation for the deworming is very cost-effective compared to other programs. In this
section we conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis for our package. We will compare various alternatives
in terms of cost effectiveness in improving pupils’ performance.
A first step in this analysis consists in determining the operation cost of the programs. Tables
14 and 15 report the average cost per year of running deworming and meals programs. These costs
have been calculated using information obtained from the Division of School Canteens (DCS) of the
Ministry of Education of Senegal. Indeed, the World Food Program has planned 16,900 tons of food
for a total cost of 7,165,413,861 CFA in 2011. This is intended for 3,400 schools or 560,000 pupils, in
elementary schools in few regions, including Fatick, Kolda, Sedhiou, Diourbel and Matam.
We used this information to compute the cost per child of the meals program in 2011. To these
costs, we added costs related to strengthening capacities and resources of the Division of School
Canteens, personnel responsible for the canteens and school management committees. For expenses
related to deworming, we used the information obtained from the division of school canteens (DCS)
and the DCMS of the Ministry of education. In fact, in 2011, it was planned for some regions to
receive 400,000 mebendazole tablets for 200,000 pupils meaning two tablets per pupil and per year.
The estimated cost of a tablet is about 16 CFA, so the total cost of the drug is 6.4 million CFA. To
these costs, we added estimated costs of transportation, mission of advocacy and surveillance. To
assess the cost-effectiveness we used the cost of a program divided by the percentage of additional
outcome due to the program.
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8.1.a. Scores
The results for the cost effectiveness analysis are reported in Tables 16 and 17. Our findings are
consistent with the results in the literature. The deworming program is by far the most cost effective in
increasing pupils’ achievement compared to the meals program. Indeed, with the deworming program
it takes about 37,038 CFA per year and per pupil to increase the French score by one point, whereas
this figure is about 761,227 for the meals program. As a result, the meals program is twenty times
more expensive. The combination of both programs cost about 237,166 CFA per pupil and per year to
increase the score in French by one point. To increase the score in math by one point it will take about
1,540; 557,089 and 107,304 CFA per year and per pupil for deworming, meals and for the package
respectively. It is important to note that deworming alone is more cost effective in terms of increasing
scores than the combination of the two programs.
Include Table 16
This makes the deworming program the easiest and least expensive to implement, because it does
not require all the material required by the establishment of a canteen. However, at the same time
deworming is not the program that has the greatest impact for pupils (in terms of academic results)
and for the families given their attitude towards deworming. Also, most families would prefer canteens
as they contribute directly to the alleviate food poverty which is a serious problem in rural areas.
The analysis also shows that the introduction of canteen before deworming is more cost effective
than introducing deworming first. For example, to increase math score by one point, the meal-
deworming sequence cost about 132,302 CFA and the deworming-meal sequence cost about 238,903
CFA. The substitution of the deworming program to the meal is more cost effective compared to the
reverse. Overall, compared to the meals program alone, the combination of both programs, whatever
the order of implementation or substitution, the deworming alone is much more cost effective.
8.1.b. Enrollment, promotion and dropout
The results show that it takes about 1,172.046 CFA to increase the enrollment rate by one percent with
the school feeding program. In terms of promotion rate, we find that the package (with 1,871.323 CFA)
is more cost effective than the meals program (4,803.801 CFA). It is not surprising that deworming
only is not enough to increase promotions. Indeed, we know that deworming improves the health of
children and so it must be combined with another program (here meals) to be more beneficial.
Include Table 17
For the dropout rate, we find evidence that deworming is more cost effective than the meals
program only and the package. However, the package is more cost effective than the meals program.
Indeed, to reduce the dropout rate of 1%, it takes 51,386 CFA per year and per pupil about for the
deworming program, 2,730.866 CFA for meals program and 1,459.089 for the package.
8.2. Welfare-enhancing effect of deworming and meals programs
In this section, we discuss the welfare implications of the two programs for households. The question is
whether having pupils benefiting from the programs improves households’ welfare. We call this effect,
intra-household externality. As outlined earlier, this externality occurs at two levels: firstly deworming
can protect other household members of contagion or transmission of worms. Then, having meals at
school reduces significantly household food expenditure contributes to or more than 70% of the total
household expenditure.
As we have discussed earlier, health and nutrition programs are part of economic and social policies
that aim at poverty alleviation in developing countries. The surveys used in this study have been also
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designed to collect data on households’ living standards as well as community and school character-
istics. We use this rich information to study how the access of pupils to the deworming and meals
programs has impacted household welfare. Of course, we do not aim at explaining household welfare
solely in terms of the access of their pupils to the programs. Other driving factors such as inequality,
food intake, the access to various services and so on will be accounted for.
8.2.a. Welfare measurement
Welfare is ideally reflected by the total utility obtained from all goods and services consumed. In
practice the comparison of welfare levels across households can rely on money metric utility, meaning
the minimum cost of reaching a given utility level given a vector of prices (see Deaton and Muellbauer,
1980 and Deaton, 1980, for further details). This implies that for a utility maximizing household,
money metric utility is given by that household’s total expenditure. In order to compare welfare
across households, on assumes that households with a given set of characteristics (size, composition,
wealth, etc.) have a same utility function. As a result, when all households face the same prices (which
is usually the case under perfectly competition), one can translate the quantity of goods and services
into expenditure and aggregate these expenditures across items. Such expenditures are proxy of real
consumption of goods and services from which we can hypothesize that households derive welfare.
However, the measurement of welfare needs further behavioral assumptions about the utilities which
are not observable.
Let us assume that we have j items for i households for which expenditures ωi = (ω1, · · ·ωj) are
available. So ωi is the aggregate expenditure over all j items for household i. As the data concern
households of different demographic composition, this directly introduces the question of equivalence
scales. An equivalence scale may be a simple per capita measure or a more sophisticated way to account
for the fact that, within any given household, economies of scale may operate via the consumption of
certain goods. Here we made the correction by using expenditures by adult equivalent.25
In our application below ωi is the sum of j = 9 expenditure items: food, leisure, clothing, telephone,
water, electricity and gas, transportation, education, health and others. We use this welfare measure
and intra-households data (household characteristics such as composition, age, economic activity, etc.),
village characteristics and inequality measures that our data set make available to perform the welfare
analysis. As discussed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), endogeneity of household characteristics
such as household composition may be an issue. Indeed, the decisions on the number of children
and expenditure might be simultaneous and introduces statistical bias if the model specification does
not fit well. However, as outlined by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), in the short run, the family
composition is much less endogenous than expenditures as the decision on whether to have another
child is not daily and is likely to depend on future expectations. As nicely phrased by Tobin (1973)
and cited by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), ‘children are not chattels that can be readily sold or
otherwise disposed of’.
Another source of potential endogeneity may come from the inequality measure. As pointed by
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), in practice, there is reasonably wide assent that inequality should
not depend on the level of expenditures, but on their distribution. In that sense, we could make the
inequality regressor as function of the distribution of expenditure.
8.2.b. Welfare estimation
Based on the above, our empirical strategy is a system of equations regression:
ωi = η
′zi + ξIi + ǫ1i i = 1, · · · ,H(33)
Ii = α+ βF (Ei) + ǫ2i(34)
25Expenditure per adult equivalent is the ratio between total expenditure and household size per adult equivalent. To
calculate the size of the household per adult equivalent, we used the equivalence scale of Oxford A which is the old OECD
scale and is widely used in poverty analysis (note that Oxford B scale corresponds to Atkinson and al., 1995). With this
scale, the household head is counted as 1, other adults in the household are worth 0.7 adults while children (less than
14 years) account for 0.5 adults. This leads to the following definition: Adult equivalent size = 1 + 0.7(number of other
adults) + 0.5(number of children less than 14 years).
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where i denotes a household, ǫ1i and ǫ2i are error terms with zero mean and allowed to be heteroskedas-
tic. The first equation is the equation of interest that relates welfare ωi to a set of controls z and
inequality measure I. In the second equation, inequality is function of the distribution of expenditure
F (Ei). In the estimation, we use the density of Ei. The determinants of welfare z include:
i) Treatment status: number of children in household i benefiting from programs (deworming and
meals).
ii) Household characteristics: includes household composition (number of children aged between 0-
5, 6-14 and 15 and more), area of arable land owned the household in hectare (dummy: between
0-5 which is the reference, 6-10, 11-15 and 16 and more), number of livestock owned by the
household, number of meals taken per day by the household, age of household head, presence of
electricity in the house (indicator), gender of household head (indicator), literacy of household
head (indicator).
iii) Inequality measure: The literature reports various measures of inequality including among others
the Gini index, the generalized entropy index of Theil and Atkinson.26 Although Gini index is
the most widely used inequality index, for robustness purpose, we use these three measures of
inequality. The inequality indexes are computed at village level.
Descriptive statistics of variables used in the welfare analysis are reported in Table 18. As outlined
earlier, total expenditure is the sum of 9 components with the subsequent contribution of each to
the total expenditure: food (73.76%); leisure (0.34%); clothing (3.5%); telephone (3.09%); water,
electricity and gas (2.5%), transportation (4.27%), education (2.83%) and health (3%) and others
(6.7%). Clearly, food expenditure represent the main consumption spending of household. On average,
0.37 children per household get the meals program, while 0.12 have the deworming and 0.05 have both.
The average number of meals per day is about 3, but can go up to 6 which quite substantial. However,
this is typical in rural areas where meals can be very fragmented. Another important item is the high
number of livestock, with an average of 8.7 per household.
Include Table 18
Estimation results are reported in Table 19. The estimation is implemented by three stages least
square which involves instrumental variables; the exogenous variables are taken to be instruments for
the endogenous variable. The control variables: number of children receiving the meals program, the
package (combination of meals and deworming), ownership of arable land, number of meals per day,
presence of electricity in the house, literacy of household head have a significant and positive effect on
households’ welfare. The finding regarding the number of children receiving the meals and package
can be explained in two ways. On the one hand, as we already know from the treatment effects, the
implementation of school canteen and the package improves pupils’ scores, promotion and dropout
rates. Therefore the welfare of households having children beneficiaries is improved. On the other
hand, in a context of poverty and vulnerability of households, if there are pupils who received school
meals, other household members will have relatively more food than usual. In addition, we know
that food expenditures are by far the largest share of total spending (more than 70%). As a result,
households with children benefiting from the school feeding will spend less on food which directly
contributes to improving their well-being. It is also important to note that the deworming program
alone does not contribute significantly to improving households’ welfare. The coefficient of this control
is positive but not significant. However, the number of children receiving the combination of both
programs increases welfare more than the number of children benefiting from meals program alone.
This finding supports the complementarity nature of the package.
Include Table 19
26See e.g., Atkinson (1970) and Deaton (2013).
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In view of this result and the finding presented in the previous section, it appears that school meals
and the package not only have a positive effect on improving students’ achievement but also contribute
to enhance households’ welfare. In terms of economic policy if policymakers agree on the objective
of improving educational outcomes and households’ well-being as well, the school meals program or
the combination of school meals and deworming can serve as lever to achieve this goal. This result is
complemented by that on the number of meals taken per day which shows that increasing the number
of meals improves households’ well-being. In addition, the control ownership of arable land (area
between 11 and 15 ha and 16 ha and more) has a positive and significant effect on welfare compared
to the area between 0 and 5 ha which is the reference. This result provides some interesting insights
into the economic behavior of households. Indeed, assets such as land, equipment and real estate
are well known factors that may contribute to improving welfare thanks to their potential sources of
revenue. This result shows the positive value that households give to their property. The result also
suggests that the effect of arable land becomes significant only after a sizable surface, here 6 ha.
The presence of electricity in the house also has a positive effect on welfare. Indeed, in rural areas,
having power connection is not only an indicator of a certain ease, but also it allows the household
to use a number of electrical equipment (TV, fridge etc.) that evidently may improve daily life. The
literacy of the head of household is conducive to welfare. A similar result was found by Glewwe et al.
(2001) in the case of Ivory Coast. The results also indicate a nonlinear relationship between the age
of household head and welfare. Recall that in our sample, the age of household head ranges between
18 and 98 years old. This variable displays a U-shaped curve with a threshold around 54 years old.
This finding is somewhat surprising at first sight. However, it can be explained by the context of
our study. Indeed, in rural areas, it is not uncommon to have relatively young household heads. The
majority of families live from agriculture, livestock and also remittances. Young household heads may
face difficulties to provide for their family. To avoid heavy debts, some of them are constrained to
live with their grandparents. In that case, family decisions can be shared with grandparents. When
becoming more mature, the household head becomes empowered and has likely accumulated sufficient
assets enabling him to enhance the welfare of his/her household.
The household composition has a negative effect on welfare, meaning that welfare deteriorates
gradually as households expand. Indeed, it is intuitive that spending increases with household size.
As regard the inequality measure, recall that the economic theory reported a negative relationship
between inequality and welfare. In our analysis we find no evidence of inequality on welfare. Lastly,
whatever the inequality measure used, our results point to the same direction.
9. Conclusion
Thanks to a unique observational data set, we are able to assess the impact of deworming and school
meals as a true package on pupils’ achievement in rural Senegal. In that, our approach is new and can
be distinguished from previous contributions in which deworming and school feeding are implemented
and studied separately as single programs or a single joint program. From our field experience and in
conducting this analysis, several comments come to our mind regarding to contribute to the debate
regarding the role of such interventions.
Let us first highlight the pressing issues and reflections raised by school meals and deworming
programs. Several school meals programs were initiated in developing countries. The impact of
these programs on pupils’ performance is often contradictory. Over the last decade a heated debate
has taken place over the ability of these programs to actually attract and retain pupils at school as
well as increase pupils’ performance. Therefore, doubts were expressed about the objectives of these
programs to improve educational outcomes. These criticisms point out that in the context of acute
poverty, school meals programs contribute more to reduce food poverty. In other words, school meals
would be a palliative of food poverty. Indeed, some parents send their children to schools where these
programs are implemented so that they can receive food rations. Reducing food poverty is by itself a
noble goal. The issue comes when the analyst eventually seeks to measure the program’s effect on an
outcome that ultimately would not be the most relevant. However, the choice of the targeted outcome
is made (before survey design) by policymakers and those who administer the programs. Economic
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theory provides some understanding of the underlying mechanisms. For example, the neo-classical
framework has been widely used to predict the effects of food assistance on household consumption
and welfare. Indeed, according to Engel’s Law poorer households spend a greater share of their
expenditure on food.27 As a result, the propensity to consume food from food programs may be larger
in the poorest households compared to relatively better off ones.
Another issue regarding the role of school meals is their ability to reduce child labor. Child labor
is widely practiced in rural communities. This allows some families to generate additional income for
the household. As food costs constitute a significant share of households’ spending in rural areas,
it is likely that some parents send their children to school in the hope of thereby reducing their
food expenditures. Therefore one pathway from food assistance programs to decreased child labor
supply is through an income effect. A second pathway to decreased labor child supply is through food
assistance triggering dependency by crowding out pre-existing safety nets like remittances which is a
very widespread practice in Senegal given the large Senegalese diaspora in the world, or community
gifts as these communities are very welded and support each other.
Regarding deworwing programs, it is worthwhile noticing that the perception of families about
this intervention is mixed or even negative. Several families have fairly serious reservations due to
side effects of deworming drugs. It is therefore quite possible that the outcome of this program is
contrary to what is expected. A major effort of information and education must be done to convince
families and also children of the merits of such interventions. All these considerations should lead
analysts to be cautious about the conclusions of impact assessments. As we pointed out, the novelty
of the interventions that we seek to evaluate in this study is to combine them as a package. Intuitively,
deworming and meals are complementary so that both programs could reinforce each other. Moreover,
the sequence with which the programs are administered makes sense and can have an impact on the
outcomes. This study aims to provide answers to these questions.
Several challenging research perspectives may deserve attention. Empirically, a multiple outcome
framework seems promising. In this study, we have considered separately six outcomes (aggregate,
French and math scores; enrollment, promotion and dropout rates). It would be interesting to consider
the improvement of all these outcome jointly. Evidently, these outcomes are related. For example, in
order to record good scores, one needs to be enrolled and not to dropout. Moreover, being successful in
terms of academic achievements may also imply a high probability to be promoted. Another challenge
consists in extending the double-index selection process to the case of M-selections. This is not only
a methodological challenge, but represents a real empirical interest. Indeed, many food and nutrition
programs involve the implementation of many treatments that are interdependent (fresh fruit and
vegetable taking to combat childhood obesity, vitamins supplementation to improve child survival,
special milk, etc). However, this does not go without methodological difficulties. Yet in this study, the
likelihood maximization procedure is complex. As for the Roy model, the main difficulty is that the
procedure is data consuming. Indeed, all the parameters have to be estimated for each regime. As a
result, the problem of parameter inflation is likely. In this sense, the two-stage estimation and the IV
approaches provide a more manageable alternative without arbitrary distribution assumption. Lastly,
an immediate extension of this study would be to provide statistical criteria for choosing between the
DISM and the Roy model for each of outcomes. At the time of writing, none of these issues have been
addressed in the literature. We speculate that these are promising research avenues.
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Table 1: Summary descriptive statistics
Deworming (T1) Meal (T2) Package (T1T2)
a Untreated t-test
Variable Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. p > |t|1 p > |t|2 p > |t|3 p > |t|4 p > |t|5 p > |t|6
Aggregate score 36.694 16.561 41.771 18.992 47.663 14.266 37.687 19.306 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.405 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
French score 35.366 19.817 40.742 21.028 45.242 17.885 38.413 21.071 0.000∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Math score 37.627 17.687 42.678 21.204 50.084 16.699 36.965 21.121 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.611 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Enrollment rate -32.281 34.715 7.631 37.574 -20.358 51.624 -31.404 60.005 0.036∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.808 0.005∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Promotion rate 73.345 14.798 78.760 11.740 81.887 6.760 79.152 12.959 0.015∗∗ 0.451 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Dropout rate 15.181 12.400 15.072 9.302 10.191 0.950 16.603 12.989 0.000∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.079∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.877
Temporary shelters 1.800 0.920 1.625 1.292 0.777 0.852 1.522 1.169 0.000∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗
School manual 0.819 0.860 0.833 0.555 0.589 0.476 1.069 1.050 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.747
Total pupils 231.818 171.293 187.302 128.113 289.496 200.752 191.256 121.595 0.000∗∗∗ 0.435 0.000∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Class size 32.884 10.113 27.882 12.378 36.274 18.061 36.560 14.824 0.829 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Teacher’s age 34.545 5.296 32.389 5.805 31.325 6.014 31.143 5.570 0.713 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Pupil’s age 9.513 1.778 9.662 1.699 9.281 1.586 9.885 1.790 0.000∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.196 0.015∗∗ 0.211
Total expenditureb 11.490 0.508 11.501 0.525 11.393 0.532 11.450 0.540 0.236 0.021∗∗ 0.233 0.073∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.771
Education expenditureb 8.001 0.878 7.606 1.159 7.580 1.333 7.524 1.402 0.651 0.136 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.811 0.000∗∗∗
Health expenditureb 7.265 2.274 7.763 1.674 7.848 1.630 7.407 2.138 0.018∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.295 0.007∗∗∗ 0.585 0.000∗∗∗
Livestock 6.965 11.075 9.788 25.884 21.629 85.703 12.664 23.151 0.000∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.074∗
Primary schools 1 0 1.305 0.773 1.274 0.447 1.209 0.479 0.130 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.644 0.000∗∗∗
Distance to school 0.898 0.813 0.785 0.776 0.820 0.029∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.438 0.000∗∗∗
Management committee 0.751 0.653 0.459 0.532 0.096∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Association of parents 1 0.953 1 0.964 0.026∗∗ 0.162 0.001∗∗∗ - 0.010∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Association of mothers 0.384 0.430 0.496 0.150 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.154 0.177
Cooperative school 0.755 0.685 0.733 0.668 0.120 0.374 0.003∗∗∗ 0.629 0.269 0.027∗∗
Council grant 0.723 0.926 0.770 0.616 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.310 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Water point 0.639 0.450 0.770 0.395 0.000∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Storage 0.402 0.441 0.496 0.176 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.068∗ 0.239 0.245
Medicine box 0 0.080 0.229 0.141 0.004∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Toilets 0.639 0.635 1 0.558 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.902
Hands washing 0 0.080 0 0.099 0.000∗∗∗ 0.103 0.000∗∗∗ - 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Disturbed courses 0.737 0.893 0.733 0.701 0.429 0.000∗∗∗ 0.203 0.923 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Meals near school 0.227 0.342 0.496 0.277 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.069∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
School cost 0.527 0.627 0.274 0.514 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.674 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
Gender of teacher 0.874 0.812 0.718 0.835 0.000∗∗∗ 0.133 0.093∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.017∗∗
No profes. diploma 0.171 0.220 0.125 0.301 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.232 0.012∗∗ 0.079∗
Profes. diploma CAP 0.430 0.143 0.251 0.157 0.003∗∗∗ 0.377 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Profes. diploma CEAP 0.132 0.352 0.237 0.203 0.353 0.000∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Other profes. diploma 0.265 0.282 0.385 0.337 0.260 0.004∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.579
Acad. diploma bacplus 0.622 0.415 0.762 0.436 0.000∗∗∗ 0.308 0.000∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Acad. diploma brevet 0.377 0.584 0.237 0.563 0.000∗∗∗ 0.308 0.000∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Continuing training 0.353 0.451 0.733 0.655 0.065∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
Absenteeism 0.125 0.071 0.266 0.083 0.000∗∗∗ 0.281 0.016∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
Gender of pupil 0.489 0.495 0.444 0.509 0.142 0.500 0.524 0.388 0.271 0.859
Grade 0.498 0.489 0.481 0.489 0.861 0.664 0.991 0.878 0.720 0.802
Deworming at home 0.157 0.214 0.311 0.202 0.002∗∗∗ 0.470 0.073∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.039∗∗
Koranic school 0.146 0.309 0.214 0.310 0.018∗∗ 0.922 0.000∗∗∗ 0.082∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Early childhood inst. 0.143 0.033 0.081 0.072 0.706 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.072∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Snack 0.083 0.077 0.111 0.107 0.899 0.014∗∗ 0.217 0.370 0.190 0.734
Sick last 3 months 0.269 0.297 0.333 0.298 0.387 0.986 0.311 0.176 0.407 0.360
Pupils eat at fill 0.895 0.888 0.933 0.887 0.101 0.959 0.717 0.207 0.117 0.763
Gender of house head 0.863 0.926 0.911 0.897 0.604 0.016∗∗ 0.082∗ 0.164 0.542 0.001∗∗∗
Lit. of house head 0.206 0.170 0.111 0.170 0.071∗ 0.974 0.135 0.016∗∗ 0.084∗ 0.173
Married 0.951 0.958 0.962 0.955 0.696 0.737 0.709 0.583 0.816 0585
Land 0.972 0.939 0.970 0.944 0.195 0.636 0.048∗∗ 0.924 0.153 0.035∗∗
Parents school 0.472 0.488 0.725 0.509 0.000∗∗∗ 0.298 0.232 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.640
Koranic school com. 0.132 0.645 0.274 0.419 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
College 0.125 0.138 0.274 0.234 0.295 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.580
Diourbel 0 0 0 0.068 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ - - -
Fatick 0.779 0.634 0.770 0.434 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.830 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Kolda 0.220 0.214 0.229 0.453 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.830 0.684 0.825
Sedhiou 0 0.151 0 0.044 0.012∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ - 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
# Observations
Continued on next page . . .
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Table 1 – continued
Deworming(T1) Meal (T2) Package (T1T2)
a Untreated t-test
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p > |t|1 p > |t|2 p > |t|3 p > |t|4 p > |t|5 p > |t|6
Total 286 799 135 2267
% 8.2 22.9 3.9 65
Notes:a: Package of meal and deworming programs b: In log; 1=Untreated vs. package; 2=Untreated vs. Meal; 3=Untreated vs. Deworming; 4=Deworming vs. Package
5=Meal vs. Package; 6=Deworming vs. Meal
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table 2: Average treatment effects in the double endogenous model
Parameter Definition Treatment effect
Exclusive effect of T1, EATET1(x) E(y|T1 = 1, T2 = 0,x)− E(y|T1 = 0, T2 = 0,x) δ1 + σερµ1ε(λ
+−
1 + λ
−−
1 )
= δ1 + E(ε|µ1 > −γ
′
1w1, µ2 ≤ −γ
′
2w2,x) +σερµ2ε(λ
−−
2
− λ+−
2
)
−E(ε|µ1 ≤ −γ
′
1w1, µ2 ≤ −γ
′
2w2,x)
Exclusive effect of T2, EATET2(x) E(y|T1 = 0, T2 = 1,x)− E(y|T1 = 0, T2 = 0,x) δ2 + σερµ1ε(λ
−−
1 − λ
−+
1 )
=δ2 + E(ε|µ1 ≤ −γ
′
1w1, µ2 > −γ
′
2w2,x) +σερµ2ε(λ
−+
2
+ λ−−
2
)
−E(ε|µ1 ≤ −γ
′
1w1, µ2 ≤ −γ
′
2w2,x)
Global effect (of T1, T2), GATE(x) E(y|T1 = 1, T2 = 1,x)− E(y|T1 = 0, T2 = 0,x) δ1 + δ2 + θ + σερµ1ε(λ
++
1 + λ
−−
1 )
= δ1 + δ2 + θ + E(ε|µ1 > −γ
′
1w1, µ2 > −γ
′
2w2,x) +σερµ2ε(λ
++
2
+ λ−−
2
)
−E(ε|µ1 ≤ −γ
′
1w1, µ2 ≤ −γ
′
2w2,x)
Additional effect, AATE(x) GATE(x)-EATET1(x)-EATET2(x) θ + σερµ1ε(λ
++
1 − λ
+−
1 + λ
−+
1 − λ
−−
1 )
= E(y|T1 = 1, T2 = 1,x)− E(y|T1 = 1, T2 = 0,x) +σερµ2ε(λ
++
2
+ λ+−
2
− λ−+
2
− λ−−
2
)
−E(y|T1 = 0, T2 = 1,x) + E(y|T1 = 0, T2 = 0,x)
Relative effect of (T1, T2) vs. T1, RATET1(x) GATE(x)-EATET1(x) δ2 + θ + σερµ1ε
(
λ++1 − λ
+−
1
)
= E(y|T1 = 1, T2 = 1,x)− E(y|T1 = 1, T2 = 0,x) +σερµ2ε(λ
++
2
+ λ+−
2
)
Relative effect of (T1, T2) vs. T2, RATET2(x) GATE(x)-EATET2(x) δ1 + θ + σερµ1ε(λ
++
1
+ λ−+
1
)
= E(y|T1 = 1, T2 = 1,x)− E(y|T1 = 0, T2 = 1,x) +σερµ2ε(λ
++
2 − λ
−+
2 )
Relative effect of T1 vs. T2, RATET1,T2(x) EATET1(x) - EATET2(x) δ1 − δ2 + σερµ1ε(λ
+−
1 + λ
−+
1 )
= E(y|T1 = 1, T2 = 0,x)− E(y|T1 = 0, T2 = 1,x) +σερµ2ε(−λ
+−
2 − λ
−+
2 )
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Table 3: Treatment effects in the generalized Roy model
Parameter Definition Treatment effect
Average treatment effect
Exclusive effect of T1, EATET1(x) E(yi10 − yi00|x) xi(β
′
10 − β
′
00) := ϑ
00
10(x)
Exclusive effect of T1, EATET2(x) E(yi01 − yi00|x) xi(β
′
01 − β
′
00) := ϑ
00
01(x)
Global effect of (T1, T2), GATE(x) E(yi11 − yi00|x) xi(β
′
11 − β
′
00) := ϑ
00
11(x)
Additional effect, AATE(x) GATE(x) - EATET1(x) - EATET2(x) xi(β
′
11 − β
′
10 − β
′
01 + β
′
00) := ϑ
10.01
11.00(x)
Relative effect of (T1, T2) vs. T1, RATET1(x) E(yi11 − yi10|x) xi(β
′
11 − β
′
10) := ϑ
10
11(x)
Relative effect of (T1, T2) vs. T2, RATET1(x) E(yi11 − yi01|x) xi(β
′
11 − β
′
01) := ϑ
01
11(x)
Relative effect of T1 vs. T2, RATET1,T2(x) EATET1(x) - EATET2(x) xi(β
′
10 − β
′
01) := ϑ
01
10(x)
Treatment effect on the treated
Exclusive effect of T1, EATETT1(x) E(yi10 − yi00|T1 = 1, T2 = 0,x) ϑ
00
10(x) + λ
+−
1
(σε10ρµ1ε10 − σε00ρµ1ε00)
+λ+−2 (σε00ρµ2ε00 − σε10ρµ2ε10)
Exclusive effect of T2, EATETT2(x) E(yi01 − yi00|T1 = 0, T2 = 1,x) ϑ
00
01(x) + λ
−+
1 (σε00ρµ1ε00 − σε01ρµ1ε01)
+λ−+2 (σε01ρµ2ε01 − σε00ρµ2ε00)
Global effect of (T1, T2), GATET(x) E(yi11 − yi00|T1 = 1, T2 = 1,x) ϑ
00
11(x) + λ
++
1 (σε11ρµ1ε11 − σε00ρµ1ε00)
+λ++2 (σε11ρµ2ε11 − σε00ρµ2ε00)
Additional effect, AATET(x) GATET(x) - EATETT1(x) - EATETT2(x) ϑ
10.01
11.00(x) + λ
++
1 (σε11ρµ1ε11 − σε00ρµ1ε00)
+λ++2 (σε11ρµ2ε11 − σε00ρµ2ε00)
−λ+−
1
(σε10ρµ1ε10 − σε00ρµ1ε00)
−λ+−2 (σε00ρµ2ε00 − σε10ρµ2ε10)
−λ−+1 (σε00ρµ1ε00 − σε01ρµ1ε01)
−λ−+2 (σε01ρµ2ε01 − σε00ρµ2ε00)
Relative effect of (T1, T2) vs. T1, RATETT1(x) GATET(x) - EATETT1(x) ϑ
10
11(x) + λ
++
1 (σε11ρµ1ε11 − σε00ρµ1ε00)
+λ++2 (σε11ρµ2ε11 − σε00ρµ2ε00)
−λ+−1 (σε10ρµ1ε10 − σε00ρµ1ε00)
−λ+−2 (σε00ρµ2ε00 − σε10ρµ2ε10)
Relative effect of (T1, T2) vs. T2, RATETT2(x) GATET(x) - EATETT2(x) ϑ
01
11(x) + λ
++
1
(σε11ρµ1ε11 − σε00ρµ1ε00)
+λ++2 (σε11ρµ2ε11 − σε00ρµ2ε00)
−λ−+1 (σε00ρµ1ε00 − σε01ρµ1ε01)
−λ−+2 (σε01ρµ2ε01 − σε00ρµ2ε00)
Relative effect of T1 vs. T2, RATETT1,T2(x) EATETT1(x) - EATETT2(x) ϑ
01
10(x) + λ
+−
1 (σε10ρµ1ε10 − σε00ρµ1ε00)
+λ+−
2
(σε00ρµ2ε00 − σε10ρµ2ε10)
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 3 – continued
Parameter Definition Treatment effect
−λ−+
1
(σε00ρµ1ε00 − σε01ρµ1ε01)
−λ−+2 (σε01ρµ2ε01 − σε00ρµ2ε00)
Sequential effect: (T1, T2), SeqATETT1,T2(x) E(yi11 − yi10|T1 = 1, T2 = 1,x) ϑ
10
11(x) + λ
++
1 (σε11ρµ1ε11 − σε10ρµ1ε10)
+λ++2 (σε11ρµ2ε11 − σε10ρµ2ε10)
Sequential effect: (T2, T1), SeqATETT2,T1(x) E(yi11 − yi01|T2 = 1, T1 = 1,x) ϑ
01
11(x) + λ
++
1 (σε11ρµ1ε11 − σε01ρµ1ε01)
+λ++
2
(σε11ρµ2ε11 − σε01ρµ2ε01)
Substitution effect: (T1, T2), SubATETT1,T2(x) E(yi01 − yi10|T1 = 0, T2 = 1,x) −ϑ
01
10(x) + λ
−+
1 (σε10ρµ1ε10 − σε01ρµ1ε01)
+λ−+2 (σε01ρµ2ε01 − σε10ρµ2ε10 )
Substitution effect: (T2, T1), SubATETT2,T1(x) E(yi10 − yi01|T2 = 0, T1 = 1,x) ϑ
01
10(x) + λ
+−
1 (σε10ρµ1ε10 − σε01ρµ1ε01)
+λ+−2 (σε01ρµ2ε01 − σε10ρµ2ε10)
Treatment effect on the untreated
Exclusive effect of T1, EATENTT1(x) E(yi10 − yi00|T1 = 0, T2 = 0,x) ϑ
00
10(x) + λ
−−
1 (σε00ρµ1ε00 − σε10ρµ1ε10)
+λ−−2 (σε00ρµ2ε00 − σε10ρµ2ε10)
Exclusive effect of T2, EATENTT2(x) E(yi01 − yi00|T1 = 0, T2 = 0,x) ϑ
00
01(x) + λ
−−
1 (σε00ρµ1ε00 − σε01ρµ1ε01)
+λ−−2 (σε00ρµ2ε00 − σε01ρµ2ε01)
Global effect of (T1, T2), GATENT(x) E(yi11 − yi00|T1 = 0, T2 = 0,x) ϑ
00
11(x) + λ
−−
1 (σε00ρµ1ε00 − σε11ρµ1ε11)
+λ−−2 (σε00ρµ2ε00 − σε11ρµ2ε11)
Additional effect, AATENT(x) GATENT(x) - EATENTT1(x) - EATENTT2(x) ϑ
10.01
11.00(x)
+λ−−1 (σε10ρµ1ε10 + σε01ρµ1ε01 − σε11ρµ1ε11 − σε00ρµ1ε00)
+λ−−2 (σε10ρµ2ε10 + σε01ρµ2ε01 − σε11ρµ2ε11 − σε00ρµ2ε00)
Relative effect of (T1, T2) vs. T1, RATENTT1(x) GATENT(x) - EATENTT1(x) ϑ
10
11(x) + λ
−−
1
(σε10ρµ1ε10 − σε11ρµ1ε11)
+λ−−2 (σε10ρµ2ε10 − σε11ρµ2ε11)
Relative effect of (T1, T2) vs. T2, RATENTT2(x) GATENT(x) - EATENTT2(x) ϑ
01
11(x) + λ
−−
1 (σε01ρµ1ε01 − σε11ρµ1ε11)
+λ−−2 (σε01ρµ2ε01 − σε11ρµ2ε11)
Relative effect of T1 vs. T2, RATENTT1,T2(x) EATENTT1(x) - EATENTT2(x) ϑ
01
10(x) + λ
−−
1 (σε01ρµ1ε01 − σε10ρµ1ε10)
+λ−−2 (σε01ρµ2ε01 − σε10ρµ2ε10)
Sequential effect: (T1, T2), SeqATENTT1,T2(x) E(yi11 − yi10|T1 = 1, T2 = 0,x) ϑ
10
11(x) + λ
+−
1 (σε11ρµ1ε11 − σε10ρµ1ε10)
+λ+−2 (σε10ρµ2ε10 − σε11ρµ2ε11)
Sequential effect: (T2, T1), SeqATENTT2,T1(x) E(yi11 − yi01|T2 = 1, T1 = 0,x) ϑ
01
11(x) + λ
−+
1
(σε01ρµ1ε01 − σε11ρµ1ε11)
+λ−+2 (σε11ρµ2ε11 − σε01ρµ2ε01)
Substitution effect: (T1, T2), SubATENTT1,T2(x) E(yi01 − yi10|T1 = 0, T2 = 0,x) −ϑ
01
10(x) + λ
−−
1 (σε10ρµ1ε10 − σε01ρµ1ε01)
+λ−−2 (σε10ρµ2ε10 − σε01ρµ2ε01 )
Substitution effect: (T2, T1), SubATENTT2,T1(x) E(yi10 − yi01|T2 = 0, T1 = 0,x) ϑ
01
10(x) + λ
−−
1 (σε01ρµ1ε01 − σε10ρµ1ε10)
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 3 – continued
Parameter Definition Treatment effect
+λ−−
2
(σε01ρµ2ε01 − σε10ρµ2ε10)
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Table 4: DISMa model: FIMLb
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Selection Eq. Deworming
Total pupils 0.0005∗ 0.0002 0.0004∗∗ 0.0002 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0002
Management committee 0.014 0.059 0.010 0.060 -0.026 0.060
Medicine box -0.414∗∗∗ 0.090 -0.360∗∗∗ 0.091 -0.400∗∗∗ 0.092
Association of mothers 0.386∗∗∗ 0.059 0.363∗∗∗ 0.060 0.406∗∗∗ 0.060
Cooperative school 0.331∗∗∗ 0.068 0.296∗∗∗ 0.069 0.317∗∗∗ 0.069
Water point 0.441∗∗∗ 0.066 0.460∗∗∗ 0.067 0.439∗∗∗ 0.067
Gender of pupil -0.043 0.055 -0.047 0.056 -0.048 0.056
Intercept -1.823∗∗∗ 0.079 -1.792∗∗∗ 0.080 -1.812∗∗∗ 0.079
Selection Eq. Meal
Total pupils 0.0004∗ 0.0002 0.0004∗∗ 0.0002 0.0004∗∗ 0.0002
Distance to school 0.022 0.061 0.028 0.062 0.021 0.061
Management committee -0.041 0.055 -0.047 0.055 -0.044 0.054
Association of mothers 0.631∗∗∗ 0.057 0.646∗∗∗ 0.058 0.631∗∗∗ 0.057
Cooperative school 0.080 0.055 0.077 0.056 0.085 0.055
Rural council grant 0.717∗∗∗ 0.068 0.691∗∗∗ 0.068 0.738∗∗∗ 0.068
Water point -0.009 0.062 0.003 0.062 -0.020 0.062
Disturbed courses 0.911∗∗∗ 0.072 0.917∗∗∗ 0.072 0.909∗∗∗ 0.072
Storage 0.831∗∗∗ 0.058 0.834∗∗∗ 0.058 0.817∗∗∗ 0.058
Gender of pupil -0.060 0.050 -0.060 0.050 -0.061 0.049
Intercept -2.435∗∗∗ 0.119 -2.430∗∗∗ 0.119 -2.436∗∗∗ 0.119
Performance Eq.
Temporary shelters 0.342 0.316 0.367 0.338 0.189 0.355
School manual 3.150∗∗∗ 0.915 3.576∗∗∗ 0.979 2.944∗∗∗ 1.021
School manual squared -0.096 0.159 -0.450∗∗∗ 0.170 0.240 0.177
Class size -0.013 0.024 -0.025 0.026 -0.007 0.027
Teacher’s age -3.102∗∗∗ 0.528 -1.974∗∗∗ 0.562 -3.976∗∗∗ 0.588
Teacher’s age square 0.048∗∗∗ 0.007 0.028∗∗∗ 0.008 0.064∗∗∗ 0.008
Pupil’s age 0.833∗∗∗ 0.226 0.831∗∗∗ 0.244 0.811∗∗∗ 0.253
Education expenditurec 0.507∗∗ 0.244 0.729∗∗∗ 0.263 0.320 0.273
Health expenditurec -0.052 0.150 0.029 0.162 -0.165 0.168
Livestock -0.007 0.010 -0.011 0.011 -0.0004 0.011
Disturbed courses -4.963∗∗∗ 0.918 -4.177∗∗∗ 0.988 -6.080∗∗∗ 1.020
Meals near school 0.124 0.727 -0.554 0.783 0.727 0.814
Toilets 2.787∗∗ 0.762 1.626∗∗ 0.820 3.791∗∗∗ 0.850
Hands washing 3.078∗∗ 1.219 4.058∗∗∗ 1.303 2.401∗ 1.358
Gender of teacher -4.555∗∗∗ 0.913 -4.118∗∗∗ 0.986 -5.147∗∗∗ 1.023
No professional diploma 3.274∗∗∗ 0.870 2.400∗∗ 0.934 4.399∗∗∗ 0.971
Professional diploma CAP -0.167 1.060 0.782 1.150 -0.819 1.186
Professional diploma CEAP 3.081∗∗∗ 0.919 1.265 0.990 4.594∗∗∗ 1.027
Academic diploma (bacplus) 0.661 0.721 -0.653 0.773 1.638∗∗ 0.803
Continuing training -0.701 0.672 0.107 0.722 -1.643∗∗ 0.750
Absenteeism -4.025∗∗∗ 1.135 -1.667 1.226 -6.371∗∗∗ 1.269
Gender of pupil 0.670 0.627 -0.291 0.662 1.543∗∗ 0.699
Grade -11.209∗∗∗ 0.815 -17.697∗∗∗ 0.876 -4.605∗∗∗ 0.912
Deworming at home -1.595∗∗ 0.749 -1.650∗∗ 0.807 -1.324 0.838
Koranic school 2.669∗∗∗ 0.676 2.561∗∗∗ 0.727 2.927∗∗∗ 0.756
Early childhood inst. 1.920 1.197 2.712∗∗ 1.295 1.207 1.344
Snack -1.104 1.015 -1.094 1.094 -0.750 1.137
Sick last 3 months 0.005 0.655 0.251 0.705 -0.293 0.732
Pupils eat at fill 1.956∗∗ 0.990 1.944∗ 1.063 1.922∗ 1.107
Gender of household head 0.130 1.103 -0.486 1.190 0.581 1.235
Lit. of household head -0.116 0.799 -0.080 0.861 -0.353 0.895
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 4 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Married 1.654 1.568 2.753 1.691 0.588 1.754
Land -1.949 1.358 -1.299 1.465 -2.417 1.519
Parents school -2.047∗∗ 0.654 -2.802∗∗∗ 0.697 -1.221∗ 0.728
College 6.235∗∗∗ 0.905 4.496∗∗∗ 0.971 8.050∗∗∗ 1.016
Diourbel 4.484∗∗∗ 1.639 2.531 1.751 6.590∗∗∗ 1.828
Kolda -3.818∗∗∗ 0.952 -4.474∗∗∗ 1.025 -2.870∗∗∗ 1.063
Sedhiou -4.194∗ 1.530 -5.255∗∗∗ 1.633 -2.783 1.713
Deworming (T1) -17.155
∗∗∗ 2.516 -18.719∗∗∗ 3.008 -15.190∗∗∗ 2.816
Meal (T2) 3.488
∗ 1.948 4.147∗∗ 2.076 2.966 2.048
T1T2 3.600
∗ 2.097 5.868∗∗ 2.268 2.216 2.342
Intercept 82.369∗∗∗ 9.427 69.068∗∗∗ 10.037 92.011∗∗∗ 10.520
ρ12 -0.071∗ 0.039 -0.066∗ 0.039 -0.067∗ 0.039
ρ13 0.567∗∗∗ 0.058 0.494∗∗∗ 0.070 0.528∗∗∗ 0.060
ρ23 0.098 0.068 -0.010 0.068 0.181∗∗∗ 0.063
se3 18.383
∗∗∗ 0.335 19.414∗∗∗ 0.358 20.500∗∗∗ 0.360
Log likelihood -17710.647 -17970.804 -18098.279
# Observations 3487 3487 3487
Wald χ2(7) 210.25 191.39 209.36
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes a: Double-Index Selection Model; b:Full Information Maximum Likelihood; c: In log.
Significance levels (bootstrap): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 5: DISMa model: 2-stepb
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Selection Eq. Deworming
Total pupils 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001
Management committee 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056
Medicine box -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089
Association of mothers 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052
Cooperative school 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055
Water point 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059
Gender of pupil -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047
Intercept -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067
Selection Eq. Meal
Total pupils 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001
Distance to school 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048
Management committee -0.045 0.042 -0.0456 0.042 -0.045 0.042
Association of mothers 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043
Cooperative school -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041
Rural council grant 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.0457
Water point 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046
Disturbed courses 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044
Storage 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044
Gender of pupil -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037
Intercept -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075
Performance Eq.
Temporary shelters 0.374 0.306 0.369 0.343 0.297 0.358
School manual 3.273∗∗∗ 0.966 3.611∗∗∗ 1.011 2.939∗∗ 1.188
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 5 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
School manual squared -0.096 0.156 -0.450∗∗∗ 0.148 0.257 0.223
Class size -0.015 0.024 -0.027 0.024 -0.025 0.031
Teacher’s age -2.979∗∗∗ 0.493 -1.912∗∗∗ 0.534 -3.935∗∗∗ 0.548
Teacher’s age square 0.046∗∗∗ 0.007 0.027∗∗∗ 0.008 0.063∗∗∗ 0.008
Pupil’s age 0.867∗∗∗ 0.240 0.836∗∗∗ 0.260 0.870∗∗∗ 0.269
Education expenditureb 0.544∗∗ 0.240 0.762∗∗ 0.298 0.348 0.257
Health expenditureb -0.082 0.158 0.008 0.158 -0.182 0.186
Livestock -0.001 0.015 -0.007 0.015 0.004 0.017
Disturbed courses -5.787∗∗∗ 0.664 -4.392∗∗∗ 0.732 -7.295∗∗∗ 0.792
Meals near school -0.049 0.791 -0.653 0.850 0.564 0.853
Toilets 2.984∗∗∗ 0.725 1.733∗∗ 0.773 4.147∗∗∗ 0.831
Hands washing 3.459∗∗∗ 1.172 4.337∗∗∗ 1.314 2.663∗∗ 1.244
Gender of teacher -4.751∗∗∗ 0.936 -4.263∗∗∗ 1.028 -5.389∗∗∗ 1.021
No professional diploma 3.652∗∗∗ 0.837 2.565∗∗∗ 0.935 4.839∗∗∗ 0.911
Professional diploma CAP -0.148 1.207 0.672 1.301 -0.664 1.254
Professional diploma CEAP 3.134∗∗∗ 1.023 1.269 1.145 4.762∗∗∗ 1.093
Academic diploma (bacplus) 0.616 0.693 -0.618 0.743 1.673∗∗ 0.850
Continuing training -0.829 0.722 -0.015 0.754 -1.683∗∗ 0.836
Absenteeism -4.13∗∗∗ 1.114 -1.989 1.239 -6.209∗∗∗ 1.132
Gender of pupil 0.809 0.578 -0.154 0.592 1.672∗∗ 0.688
Grade -11.063∗∗∗ 0.806 -17.586∗∗∗ 0.913 -4.501∗∗∗ 0.874
Deworming at home -1.564∗ 0.809 -1.626∗ 0.839 -1.348 0.918
Koranic school 2.799∗∗∗ 0.707 2.652∗∗∗ 0.702 3.103∗∗∗ 0.841
Early childhood inst. 2.172∗∗ 1.038 2.898∗∗ 1.125 1.432 1.206
Snack -1.017 0.966 -1.029 0.994 -0.722 1.131
Sick last 3 months 0.053 0.672 0.287 0.746 -0.246 0.732
Pupils eat at fill 2.010∗ 1.052 1.947∗ 1.057 1.964 1.224
Gender of household head 0.042 0.941 -0.547 1.145 0.558 1.036
Lit. of household head -0.143 0.823 -0.060 0.875 -0.383 0.936
Married 1.612 1.452 2.697 1.695 0.570 1.589
Land -1.995 1.491 -1.330 1.600 -2.450 1.626
Parents school -1.927∗∗∗ 0.621 -2.770∗∗∗ 0.724 -1.086 0.669
College 6.251∗∗∗ 1.039 4.575∗∗∗ 1.038 8.048∗∗∗ 1.188
Diourbel 4.561∗∗∗ 1.359 2.652∗ 1.571 6.481∗∗∗ 1.538
Kolda -3.836∗∗∗ 0.959 -4.400∗∗∗ 0.975 -3.142∗∗∗ 1.152
Sedhiou -4.149∗∗∗ 1.471 -5.324∗∗∗ 1.575 -2.825∗ 1.726
Deworming (T1) -18.845
∗∗∗ 5.258 -19.479∗∗∗ 5.427 -19.717∗∗∗ 5.851
Meal (T2) 4.266
∗ 2.520 5.064∗ 2.635 3.397 2.903
T1T2 4.066
∗ 2.087 6.098∗∗∗ 2.326 2.442 2.338
h1(T1, T2) 11.161
∗∗∗ 2.713 9.772∗∗∗ 2.855 13.181∗∗∗ 3.054
h2(T1, T2) 1.418 1.622 -0.701 1.718 3.577
∗ 1.861
Intercept 80.332∗∗∗ 8.341 67.714∗∗∗ 9.065 91.690∗∗∗ 9.416
# Observations 3487 3487 3487
Wald χ2(43) 1395.70 1866.94 1243.89
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.166 0.203 0.145
Notes a: Double-Index Selection Model; b: Two step; c: In log.
Significance levels (bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
50
Table 6: Generalized Roy model: 2-stepa
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Selection Eq. Deworming
Total pupils 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001
Management committee 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056
Medicine box -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089
Association of mothers 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052
Cooperative school 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055
Water point 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059
Gender of pupil -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047
Intercept -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067
Selection Eq. Meal
Total pupils 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001
Distance to school 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048
Management committee -0.045 0.042 -0.0456 0.042 -0.045 0.042
Association of mothers 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043
Cooperative school -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041
Rural council grant 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.0457
Water point 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046
Disturbed courses 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044
Storage 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044
Gender of pupil -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037
Intercept -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075
Performance Eq. Deworming
Temporary shelters -3.374∗∗ 1.479 -3.232∗ 1.917 -4.523∗∗∗ 1.741
Class size -0.321∗∗ 0.154 -0.495∗∗∗ 0.167 -0.195 0.161
Teacher’s age -8.972∗∗∗ 2.039 -10.737∗∗∗ 2.416 -7.080∗∗∗ 2.427
Teacher’s age square 0.125∗∗∗ 0.029 0.141∗∗∗ 0.035 0.106∗∗∗ 0.033
Pupil’s age 1.594∗∗ 0.602 2.361∗∗∗ 0.705 0.733 0.637
Academic diploma (bacplus) 8.193∗∗∗ 2.615 10.269∗∗∗ 2.958 7.295∗∗ 2.839
Absenteeism 4.796 5.956 3.182 6.778 11.155∗ 5.952
Gender of pupil -0.917 1.439 -0.884 1.706 0.101 1.824
Grade -16.738∗∗∗ 2.343 -25.852∗∗∗ 2.818 -7.910∗∗∗ 2.528
Deworming at home -3.087 2.211 -0.425 2.626 -2.631 3.083
Koranic school -0.064 2.038 1.593 2.701 0.418 2.508
Early childhood inst. -2.572 2.821 -2.322 2.786 -4.188 3.342
Snack -3.450 3.166 -1.729 3.580 -2.574 3.731
Pupils eat at fill 6.722∗∗∗ 2.498 9.624∗∗∗ 2.834 3.494 3.008
Gender of household head 2.225 2.829 0.573 3.116 2.107 3.688
Lit. of household head 1.075 1.999 1.938 2.011 1.396 2.369
Married 2.795 4.993 0.393 5.960 2.584 6.012
λ+−1 24.389
∗ 13.036 18.653 15.745 38.823∗∗∗ 13.657
λ+−2 4.648 6.433 7.436 7.489 5.561 6.661
Intercept 146.152∗∗∗ 49.514 195.332∗∗∗ 60.408 86.224∗∗ 54.921
# Observations 320 320 320
Wald χ2(19) 244.51 298.29 135.96
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.356 0.401 0.227
Performance Eq. Meal
Temporary shelters -0.576 0.579 -0.333 0.573 -0.953 0.661
Class size 0.377∗∗∗ 0.043 0.368∗∗∗ 0.051 0.405∗∗∗ 0.051
Teacher’s age 1.068 1.347 1.315 1.467 1.180 1.362
Teacher’s age square -0.005 0.020 -0.010 0.022 -0.005 0.021
Pupil’s age -0.256 0.431 -0.453 0.501 -0.152 0.455
Academic diploma (bacplus) -2.768∗∗ 1.289 -3.568∗∗∗ 1.335 -1.976 1.434
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 6 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Absenteeism 5.027∗ 3.058 -0.043 3.140 10.013∗∗∗ 3.261
Gender of pupil 1.396 1.238 -0.710 1.324 2.866∗∗ 1.391
Grade -4.917∗∗∗ 1.454 -9.533∗∗∗ 1.660 -0.122 1.614
Deworming at home -3.531∗∗ 1.717 -4.292∗∗ 1.813 -2.743 1.886
Koranic school -6.009∗∗∗ 1.181 -7.180∗∗∗ 1.321 -4.715∗∗∗ 1.413
Early childhood inst. 4.712 3.445 5.665 4.023 3.260 3.616
Snack -4.253∗ 2.277 -2.717 2.635 -4.379∗ 2.618
Pupils eat at fill 7.617∗∗∗ 1.568 7.492∗∗∗ 1.667 7.586∗∗∗ 1.854
Gender of household head 1.271 2.524 -1.371 3.162 4.352∗ 2.550
Lit. of household head 0.031 1.772 -1.396 1.901 0.884 1.981
Married -2.955 2.871 2.301 3.371 -8.175∗∗ 3.684
λ−+1 15.248
∗∗∗ 5.588 16.141∗∗∗ 5.917 13.537∗∗ 6.754
λ−+2 5.570
∗∗ 2.265 5.468∗∗ 2.449 5.903∗∗ 2.700
Intercept -1.559 21.626 -1.500 24.074 -7.209 21.917
# Observations 915 915 915
Wald χ2(19) 326.95 277.05 291.21
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.170 0.168 0.153
Performance Eq. Package
Temporary shelters 5.109∗∗∗ 1.588 4.772∗∗∗ 1.809 5.447∗∗∗ 1.925
Class size 1.094∗∗∗ 0.167 0.918∗∗∗ 0.184 1.270∗∗∗ 0.189
Teacher’s age -45.806∗∗∗ 7.100 -41.943∗∗∗ 8.370 -49.670∗∗∗ 8.188
Teacher’s age square 0.662∗∗∗ 0.099 0.605∗∗∗ 0.120 0.718∗∗∗ 0.114
Pupil’s age -2.376∗ 1.239 -2.580∗ 1.390 -2.171 1.334
Academic diploma (bacplus) -18.169∗∗∗ 4.026 -21.428∗∗∗ 4.280 -14.911∗∗∗ 4.606
Absenteeism -28.398∗∗∗ 9.427 -18.943∗ 10.260 -37.853∗∗∗ 11.122
Gender of pupil -1.522 2.410 -2.182 2.674 -0.862 2.848
Grade -4.743 5.163 -8.657 5.915 -0.830 5.300
Deworming at home -5.012∗ 2.752 -4.619 3.328 -5.405 3.366
Koranic school 1.816 3.682 1.069 3.938 2.563 4.386
Early childhood inst. -14.486∗∗ 6.811 -10.298 6.825 -18.675∗∗ 9.133
Snack 1.302 5.644 1.527 5.840 1.077 7.072
Pupils eat at fill -0.029 4.594 1.950 4.358 -2.009 6.155
Gender of household head -2.709 4.383 -2.363 4.686 -3.054 4.773
Lit. of household head -3.546 3.994 -5.005 3.866 -2.087 4.795
Married -4.312 6.624 -4.114 7.045 -4.510 6.797
λ++1 80.384
∗∗∗ 18.355 68.143∗∗∗ 20.381 92.624∗∗∗ 22.789
λ++2 -47.396
∗ 27.553 -49.361 31.404 -45.432 32.294
Intercept 731.730∗∗∗ 105.850 695.734∗∗∗ 127.702 767.727∗∗∗ 123.242
# Observations 168 168 168
Wald χ2(19) 299.54 410.47 219.96
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.476 0.507 0.373
Performance Eq. Untreated
Temporary shelters -0.601∗ 0.313 -0.571∗ 0.319 -0.636∗ 0.356
Class size -0.036 0.026 -0.080∗∗∗ 0.026 0.007 0.031
Teacher’s age -0.471 0.526 -0.555 0.511 -0.384 0.620
Teacher’s age square 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.009
Pupil’s age 0.656∗∗ 0.298 0.522∗ 0.311 0.789∗∗ 0.322
Academic diploma (bacplus) 0.874 0.694 0.128 0.695 1.627∗ 0.819
Absenteeism -3.556∗∗∗ 1.261 -0.128 1.353 -7.001∗∗∗ 1.353
Gender of pupil 1.130 0.728 0.254 0.705 2.003∗∗ 0.855
Grade -13.060∗∗∗ 0.959 -18.900∗∗∗ 1.012 -7.215∗∗∗ 1.113
Deworming at home -1.965∗ 1.022 -1.535 1.063 -2.389∗∗ 1.098
Koranic school 2.252∗∗∗ 0.780 1.864∗∗ 0.810 2.640∗∗ 0.909
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Table 6 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Early childhood inst. 5.931∗∗∗ 1.531 6.724∗∗∗ 1.568 5.154∗∗∗ 1.729
Snack -2.311∗ 1.258 -1.879 1.411 -2.728∗∗ 1.335
Pupils eat at fill 4.699∗∗∗ 1.309 3.382∗∗ 1.339 6.016∗∗∗ 1.418
Gender of household head -3.243∗∗ 1.373 -3.234∗∗ 1.384 -3.261∗∗ 1.646
Lit. of household head 2.260∗∗ 1.030 3.086∗∗∗ 1.031 1.440 1.168
Married 0.879 1.813 1.202 1.769 0.570 2.187
λ−−1 14.650
∗∗∗ 3.452 15.842∗∗∗ 3.285 13.511∗∗∗ 4.162
λ−−2 -5.559
∗∗∗ 1.936 -4.644∗∗ 2.101 -6.439∗∗∗ 2.111
Intercept 46.542∗∗∗ 9.254 55.706∗∗∗ 9.063 37.308∗∗∗ 10.935
# Observations 2572 2572 2572
Wald χ2(19) 518.10 872.91 232.47
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.114 0.192 0.051
Notes a:Two-step; b In log.
Significance levels (bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 7: DISMa model (2-stepb)
Enrollment rate Promotion rate Dropout rate
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Selection Eq. Deworming
Total pupils 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001
Management committee 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056
Medicine box -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089
Association of mothers 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052
Cooperative school 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055
Water point 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059
Gender of pupil -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047
Intercept -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067
Selection Eq. Meal
Total pupils 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001
Distance to school 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048
Management committee -0.045 0.042 -0.0456 0.042 -0.045 0.042
Association of mothers 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043
Cooperative school -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041
Rural council grant 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.0457
Water point 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046
Disturbed courses 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044
Storage 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044
Gender of pupil -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037
Intercept -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075
Performance Eq.
Temporary shelters 6.700∗∗∗ 0.669 1.041∗∗∗ 0.161 -0.928∗∗∗ 0.158
Class size -0.451∗∗∗ 0.050 0.015 0.013 -0.021∗ 0.013
Teacher’s age -3.893∗∗∗ 1.056 -1.341∗∗∗ 0.343 0.354 0.314
Teacher’s age square 0.061∗∗∗ 0.015 0.017∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.005 0.004
Pupil’s age 0.268 0.342 0.202∗ 0.119 -0.207∗∗ 0.103
Education expenditurec -0.109 0.556 0.016 0.142 0.147 0.119
Health expenditurec -1.165∗∗∗ 0.333 -0.213∗∗ 0.087 0.144∗ 0.075
Livestock -0.019 0.022 -0.019∗∗∗ 0.006 0.011∗ 0.006
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Table 7 – continued
Enrollment rate Promotion rate Dropout rate
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Primary schools 0.241 0.982 - - - -
Distance to school -7.556∗∗∗ 2.038 3.995∗∗∗ 0.477 -2.959∗∗∗ 0.470
Association of parents 10.440∗∗∗ 2.377 6.021∗∗∗ 0.787 -3.703∗∗∗ 0.468
Disturbed courses -4.018∗∗ 1.630 -4.573∗∗∗ 0.485 5.258∗∗∗ 0.411
Meals near school 1.121 1.325 -0.598 0.385 -0.529 0.406
Gender of teacher -6.145∗∗∗ 2.114 3.749∗∗∗ 0.495 -1.203∗∗∗ 0.453
Continuing training - - 1.315∗∗∗ 0.459 -1.090∗∗ 0.423
Absenteeism -0.113 3.067 -1.761∗∗∗ 0.578 -0.155 0.606
Gender of pupil 1.159 1.144 0.416 0.403 -0.535 0.356
Koranic school 2.991∗∗ 1.251 1.405∗∗∗ 0.394 -0.983∗∗ 0.394
Early childhood inst. -3.321 2.120 1.913∗∗∗ 0.696 -2.313∗∗∗ 0.609
Snack 4.155∗∗ 1.843 0.277 0.683 -0.143 0.715
Sick last 3 months -0.525 0.378 0.416 0.374
Pupils eat at fill 5.852∗∗∗ 2.042 2.307∗∗∗ 0.799 -3.261∗∗∗ 0.788
Gender of household head -3.988 2.741 0.790 0.657 0.884∗ 0.499
Lit. of household head 10.834∗∗∗ 1.614 -0.524 0.497 1.009∗∗ 0.453
Married -0.213 3.435 -0.627 0.870 -0.243 0.823
Land -4.760∗ 2.424 1.643∗∗ 0.744 -1.459∗ 0.797
School cost -3.771∗∗ 1.462
Koranic school com. 1.030 1.432 1.167∗∗∗ 0.431
College -0.260 0.623 -1.213∗∗ 0.586
Diourbel 13.551∗∗∗ 3.995 5.728∗∗∗ 0.890 -4.680∗∗∗ 0.858
Kolda -76.376∗∗∗ 1.858 -5.258∗∗∗ 0.509 5.558∗∗∗ 0.534
Sedhiou -18.183∗∗∗ 2.721 9.914∗∗∗ 0.740 -6.079∗∗∗ 0.815
Deworming (T1) -8.007 10.196 7.548
∗∗ 2.917 -9.645∗∗∗ 2.887
Meal (T2) 58.966
∗∗∗ 5.924 -18.048∗∗∗ 1.646 13.065∗∗∗ 1.608
T1T2 1.623 3.601 9.494
∗∗∗ 1.339 -2.799∗∗∗ 1.001
h1(T1, T2) -9.007
∗ 5.140 -6.171∗∗∗ 1.486 3.943∗∗∗ 1.438
h2(T1, T2) -28.215
∗∗∗ 3.804 12.224∗∗∗ 1.059 -10.518∗∗∗ 1.009
Intercept 65.993∗∗∗ 20.599 93.063∗∗∗ 5.516 14.921∗∗∗ 5.268
# Observations 3428 3487 3487
Wald χ2(d.o.f) 19968.66 (34) 2534.05(34) 3453.24 (35)
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.602 0.250 0.249
Notes a: Double-Index Selection Model; b: Two step; c: In log.
Significance levels (bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 8: Generalized Roy model (2-stepa)
Enrollment rate Promotion rate Dropout rate
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Selection Eq. Deworming
Total pupils 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001
Management committee 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056
Medicine box -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089
Association of mothers 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052
Cooperative school 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055
Water point 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059
Gender of pupil -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047
Intercept -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067
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Table 8 – continued
Enrollment rate Promotion rate Dropout rate
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Selection Eq. Meal
Total pupils 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001
Distance to school 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048
Management committee -0.045 0.042 -0.0456 0.042 -0.045 0.042
Association of mothers 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043
Cooperative school -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041
Rural council grant 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.0457
Water point 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046
Disturbed courses 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044
Storage 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044
Gender of pupil -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037
Intercept -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075
Performance Eq. Deworming
Temporary shelters -17.718∗∗∗ 1.372 -4.563∗∗∗ 0.832 3.877∗∗∗ 0.560
Class size -1.833∗∗∗ 0.180 -0.191 0.120 0.375∗∗∗ 0.078
Pupil’s age -0.802 0.562 -0.471 0.361 0.507∗∗ 0.239
Education expenditureb 6.397∗∗∗ 1.258 3.490∗∗∗ 0.941 -2.114∗∗∗ 0.619
Health expenditureb -0.322 0.328 -0.201 0.237 0.178 0.159
Livestock -0.129∗ 0.077 -0.038 0.069 0.044 0.049
Distance to school 14.758∗∗∗ 2.762 5.703∗∗∗ 2.191 -1.429 1.410
Gender of teacher 21.138∗∗∗ 3.323 11.811∗∗∗ 1.792 -11.421∗∗∗ 1.419
Continuing training -3.469∗∗ 1.620
Gender of pupil 2.710 2.052 1.385 1.296 -1.721∗∗ 0.858
Koranic school 6.191∗∗∗ 2.337 4.217∗∗ 1.651 -2.940∗∗ 1.139
Early childhood inst. 1.763 2.816 -2.447 1.688 1.849∗ 1.122
Snack 5.863∗ 3.286 3.731∗ 2.002 -2.670∗∗ 1.273
Sick last 3 months -0.805 1.075 0.277 0.725
Pupils eat at fill 28.923∗∗∗ 3.800 15.421∗∗∗ 2.141 -10.674∗∗∗ 1.595
Gender of household head 2.794 3.136 2.558 1.988 -1.799 1.376
Lit. of household head 3.206 2.482 1.500 1.773 -0.470 1.275
Married -4.358 5.155 -1.001 3.477 0.673 2.356
Land -4.573 3.032 -4.560∗∗ 1.837 2.547∗ 1.464
λ+−1 -65.351
∗∗∗ 8.487 -3.835 6.480 23.827∗∗∗ 4.441
λ+−2 -38.792
∗∗∗ 4.391 8.434∗∗∗ 2.998 -3.129 2.201
Intercept 95.461∗∗∗ 27.436 40.598∗ 21.126 -9.200 14.720
# Observations 288 286 286
Wald χ2(d.o.f) 2276.27 (19) 1213.66(21) 2028.79(20)
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.790 0.528 0.696
Performance Eq. Meal
Temporary shelters 5.558∗∗∗ 0.577 2.835∗∗∗ 0.321 -0.994∗∗∗ 0.259
Class size -0.773∗∗∗ 0.100 0.143∗∗∗ 0.026 -0.242∗∗∗ 0.027
Pupil’s age 0.193 0.762 -0.173 0.220 -0.236 0.164
Education expenditureb -2.202∗ 1.152 -0.033 0.370 -0.056 0.305
Health expenditureb -0.351 0.565 -0.733∗∗∗ 0.219 0.498∗∗∗ 0.178
Livestock -0.101 0.087 -0.012 0.016 -0.024 0.023
Distance to school -4.514 3.076 2.597∗∗ 1.077 -0.873 1.049
Gender of teacher -34.665∗∗∗ 4.519 6.140∗∗∗ 1.028 -1.204 0.782
Continuing training -1.240 0.940
Gender of pupil 1.057 1.926 -0.492 0.700 0.556 0.582
Koranic school 3.015 2.301 1.302 0.827 0.765 0.726
Early childhood inst. -14.563∗∗∗ 4.928 2.457 2.100 -4.149∗∗∗ 1.562
Snack -14.347∗∗∗ 3.786 -2.507∗ 1.318 1.587 1.175
Sick last 3 months -0.930 0.848 0.948 0.673
Pupils eat at fill 2.785 3.002 -2.704∗∗ 1.207 0.653 0.885
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Table 8 – continued
Enrollment rate Promotion rate Dropout rate
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Gender of household head 13.535∗ 6.919 0.829 1.775 1.815 1.179
Lit. of household head 14.765∗∗∗ 3.149 2.875∗∗∗ 0.831 -0.282 0.736
Married -0.469 6.573 -1.701 1.784 -1.243 1.878
Land -3.955 5.090 1.093 1.395 1.562 1.186
λ−+1 42.324
∗∗∗ 7.314 -11.011∗∗∗ 2.738 7.086∗∗∗ 2.395
λ−+2 -25.219
∗∗∗ 4.571 15.937∗∗∗ 1.547 -9.221∗∗∗ 1.220
Intercept 70.729∗∗∗ 16.113 60.811∗∗∗ 5.263 27.725∗∗∗ 4.447
# Observations 827 822 822
Wald χ2(d.o.f) 379.93 (19) 273.15(21) 212.57 (20)
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.271 0.222 0.172
Performance Eq. Package
Temporary shelters -13.834∗∗∗ 0.584 5.512∗∗∗ 0.182 -0.868∗∗∗ 0.014
Class size -0.013 0.024 0.004 0.007 -0.0004 0.0006
Pupil’s age -0.047 0.040 0.032∗∗ 0.015 -0.001 0.001
Education expenditureb 0.001 0.068 0.003 0.023 -0.0004 0.001
Health expenditureb 0.021 0.063 -0.011 0.022 0.0009 0.001
Livestock 0.0006∗∗ 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001 0.00002 0.00001
Distance to school 9.046∗∗∗ 0.340 -2.847∗∗∗ 0.106 0.237∗∗∗ 0.008
Gender of teacher 0.554∗ 0.335 -0.232∗ 0.118 0.015 0.008
Continuing training -0.123 0.085
Gender of pupil 1.784∗∗∗ 0.094 0.700∗∗∗ 0.031 -0.079∗∗∗ 0.002
Koranic school -0.502∗∗∗ 0.149 0.158∗∗∗ 0.048 -0.012∗∗∗ 0.004
Early childhood inst. -0.387 0.255 0.106 0.074 -0.010∗ 0.006
Snack -0.226 0.200 0.068 0.052 -0.006 0.004
Sick last 3 months 0.017 0.025 -0.0005 0.002
Pupils eat at fill 0.340 0.250 -0.107 0.094 0.006 0.007
Gender of household head -0.209 0.142 0.061 0.048 -0.005 0.004
Lit. of household head -0.053 0.140 0.020 0.046 -0.002 0.003
Married 0.117 0.186 -0.054 0.062 0.004 0.005
Land -0.187 0.292 0.042 0.083 -0.006 0.007
λ++1 -167.168
∗∗∗ 0.797 -1.094 0.264 0.989∗∗∗ 0.021
λ++2 72.112
∗∗∗ 2.696 -23.553∗∗∗ 0.827 1.983∗∗∗ 0.069
Intercept 191.992∗∗∗ 1.855 101.787∗∗∗ 0.540 7.386∗∗∗ 0.047
# Observations 135 135 135
Wald χ2(d.o.f) 3.66e+06 (19) 327065.53 1.09e+06(20)
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99
Performance Eq. Untreated
Temporary shelters 2.571∗∗∗ 0.843 0.599∗∗∗ 0.194 -0.828∗∗∗ 0.171
Class size -0.449∗∗∗ 0.070 -0.027∗ 0.015 0.014 0.015
Pupil’s age -0.899 0.594 0.133 0.140 -0.233∗ 0.134
Education expenditureb 4.867∗∗∗ 0.917 0.067 0.173 -0.131 0.177
Health expenditureb -3.649∗∗∗ 0.585 -0.367∗∗∗ 0.105 0.346∗∗∗ 0.102
Livestock -0.413∗∗∗ 0.044 -0.074∗∗∗ 0.010 0.089∗∗∗ 0.010
Distance to school -12.540∗∗∗ 3.487 4.037∗∗∗ 0.629 -4.219∗∗∗ 0.608
Gender of teacher -20.712∗∗∗ 2.761 1.542∗∗ 0.684 0.722 0.665
Continuing training 2.225∗∗∗ 0.549
Gender of pupil 0.149 2.072 0.733 0.539 -0.741 0.528
Koranic school 0.865 2.351 1.985∗∗∗ 0.474 -1.364∗∗∗ 0.447
Early childhood inst. 4.222 3.705 2.277∗∗∗ 0.708 -2.908∗∗∗ 0.624
Snack 1.371 3.371 -0.387 0.829 -0.380 0.899
Sick last 3 months 0.332 0.517 -0.222 0.496
Pupils eat at fill 31.105∗∗∗ 2.854 4.286∗∗∗ 0.966 -6.112∗∗∗ 1.044
Gender of household head -20.150∗∗∗ 4.069 1.075 0.866 0.434 0.696
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Table 8 – continued
Enrollment rate Promotion rate Dropout rate
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Lit. of household head 17.791∗∗∗ 3.112 -0.466 0.659 -0.081 0.652
Married -4.055 7.092 -1.591 1.104 1.900∗ 1.039
Land -7.900∗∗ 3.738 3.034∗∗∗ 1.068 -3.034∗∗∗ 1.076
λ−−1 107.293
∗∗∗ 10.615 20.796∗∗∗ 2.161 -22.859∗∗∗ 2.143
λ−−2 23.885
∗∗∗ 6.695 -20.390∗∗∗ 1.233 19.688∗∗∗ 1.195
Intercept -19.412 13.954 73.448∗∗∗ 2.788 22.035∗∗∗ 2.870
# Observations 2312 2299 2299
Wald χ2(d.o.f) 1727.77(19) 812.10(21) 1033.09(20)
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.283 0.154 0.184
Notes a:Two-step; b In log.
Significance levels (bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 9: Average Treatment Effects: DISMa
FIMLb Two step
Aggregate French Math Aggregate French Math
Excusif: deworming 3.434∗∗∗ 0.055∗ 6.264∗∗∗ 3.700∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 6.866∗∗∗
Excusif: meal 7.197∗∗∗ 4.103∗∗∗ 10.158∗∗∗ 6.560∗∗∗ 3.779∗∗∗ 9.329∗∗∗
Global 15.097∗∗∗ 10.674∗∗∗ 19.578∗∗∗ 14.099∗∗∗ 9.997∗∗∗ 18.353∗∗∗
Additionnal 4.465∗∗∗ 6.515∗∗∗ 3.155∗∗∗ 3.838∗∗∗ 5.915∗∗∗ 2.157∗∗∗
Relative: package vs. deworming 11.663∗∗∗ 10.618∗∗∗ 13.313∗∗∗ 10.399∗∗∗ 9.694∗∗∗ 11.486∗∗∗
Relative: package vs. meal 7.900∗∗∗ 6.571∗∗∗ 9.420∗∗∗ 7.538∗∗∗ 6.218∗∗∗ 8.023∗∗∗
Relative: deworming vs. meal -3.763∗∗∗ -4.047∗∗∗ -3.893∗∗∗ -2.860∗∗∗ -3.476∗∗∗ -2.462∗∗∗
Notes a: Double-Index Selection Model; b=Full Information Maximum Likelihood
Significance levels (Bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
57
Table 10: Treatment Effects: Generalized Roy modela
Population (ATE) Treated (ATET) Untreated (ATENT)
Aggregate French Math Aggregate French Math Aggregate French Math
Exclusive: deworming 5.357∗∗∗ 3.7520∗∗∗ 8.832∗∗∗ 17.295∗∗∗ 2.002∗∗∗ 48.124∗∗∗ -2.192∗∗∗ -3.426∗∗∗ -2.838∗∗∗
Exclusive: meal 7.470∗∗∗ 5.659∗∗∗ 9.347∗∗∗ 20.124∗∗∗ 17.209∗∗∗ 23.515∗∗∗ 1.259∗∗∗ 0.064 2.587∗∗∗
Global 18.176∗∗∗ 11.793∗∗∗ 24.552∗∗∗ 89.231∗∗∗ 55.548∗∗∗ 122.773∗∗∗ 27.817∗∗∗ 25.718∗∗∗ 29.938∗∗∗
Additional 5.348∗∗∗ 2.382∗∗∗ 6.371∗∗∗ 51.811∗∗∗ 36.336∗∗∗ 51.133∗∗∗ 28.750∗∗∗ 29.080∗∗∗ 30.189∗∗∗
Relative: package vs. deworming 12.819∗∗∗ 8.041∗∗∗ 15.719∗∗∗ 71.936∗∗∗ 53.545∗∗∗ 74.649∗∗∗ 30.010∗∗∗ 29.144∗∗∗ 32.777∗∗∗
Relative: package vs. meal 10.705∗∗∗ 6.134∗∗∗ 15.204∗∗∗ 69.107∗∗∗ 38.339∗∗∗ 99.258∗∗∗ 26.557∗∗∗ 25.654∗∗∗ 27.350∗∗∗
Relative: deworming vs. meal -2.113∗∗∗ -1.907∗∗∗ -0.514 -2.829∗∗∗ -15.206∗∗∗ 24.609∗∗∗ -3.452∗∗∗ -3.490∗∗∗ -5.426∗∗∗
Notes a: Two step estimation.
Significance levels (Bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table 11: Substitution and Sequential Effects: Generalized Roy modela
Treated (ATET) Untreated (ATENT)
Aggregate French Math Aggregate French Math
Sequential: (T1, T2) 54.999
∗∗∗ 33.247∗∗∗ 55.144∗∗∗ 144.436∗∗∗ 130.512∗∗∗ 142.742∗∗∗
Sequential: (T2, T1) 68.244
∗∗∗ 38.043∗∗∗ 99.576∗∗∗ -63.891∗∗∗ -67.825∗∗∗ -60.469∗∗∗
Substitution: (T1, T2) 5.104
∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 6.254∗∗∗ 3.452∗∗∗ 3.490∗∗∗ 5.426∗∗∗
Substitution: (T2, T1) 15.066
∗∗∗ 1.550∗∗∗ 45.748∗∗∗ -3.452∗∗∗ -3.490∗∗∗ -5.426∗∗∗
Notes a: Two step estimation.
Significance levels (Bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 12: Average Treatment Effects
DISMa Royb
Enrollment Promotion Dropout Enrollment Promotion Dropout
Exclusive: deworming -25.619∗∗∗ -5.198∗∗∗ -1.443∗∗∗ -19.642∗∗∗ -8.290∗∗∗ -1.263∗∗∗
Exclusive: meal 11.177∗∗∗ 2.727∗∗∗ -4.797∗∗∗ 19.644∗∗∗ 5.021∗∗∗ -5.430∗∗∗
Global -12.400∗∗∗ 7.040∗∗∗ -9.029∗∗∗ -14.415∗∗∗ 2.547∗∗∗ -8.100∗∗∗
Additional 2.041∗∗∗ 9.511∗∗∗ -2.788∗∗∗ 2.735∗∗∗ 5.815∗∗∗ -3.680∗∗∗
Relative: package vs. deworming 13.219∗∗∗ 12.239∗∗∗ -7.585∗∗∗ 17.675∗∗∗ 10.837∗∗∗ -9.436∗∗∗
Relative: package vs. meal -23.578∗∗∗ 4.313∗∗∗ -4.231∗∗∗ -20.740∗∗∗ 1.768∗∗∗ -2.111∗∗∗
Relative: deworming vs. meal 36.797∗∗∗ 7.925∗∗∗ -3.353∗∗∗ 1.550∗∗∗ 2.381∗∗∗ -1.660∗∗∗
Notes a: Double-Index Selection Model, two-step estimations; b: Roy model, two-step estimations.
Significance levels (Bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 13: Treatment Effects: Generalized Roya
Treated (ATET) Untreated (ATENT)
Enrollment Promotion Dropout Enrollment Promotion Dropout
Exclusive: deworming -251.724∗∗∗ -59.885∗∗∗ 89.095∗∗∗ 80.410∗∗∗ -11.976∗∗∗ -0.995∗∗∗
Exclusive: meal -37.906∗∗∗ 41.619∗∗∗ -38.952∗∗∗ 45.890∗∗∗ -17.996∗∗∗ 9.014∗∗∗
Global -381.663∗∗∗ -31.793∗∗∗ 14.529∗∗∗ 58.663∗∗∗ 14.644∗∗∗ -1.869∗∗∗
Additional -92.032∗∗∗ -13.527∗∗∗ -35.613∗∗∗ -67.636∗∗∗ 44.617∗∗∗ -9.889∗∗∗
Relative: package vs. deworming -129.938∗∗∗ 28.091∗∗∗ -74.565∗∗∗ -21.746∗∗∗ 26.621∗∗∗ -0.874∗∗∗
Relative: package vs. meal -343.757∗∗∗ -73.413∗∗∗ 53.482∗∗∗ 12.773∗∗∗ 32.641∗∗∗ -10.884∗∗∗
Relative: deworming vs. meal -213.818∗∗∗ -101.504∗∗∗ 128.048∗∗∗ 34.520∗∗∗ 6.020∗∗∗ -10.010∗∗∗
Notes a: Two step estimation.
Significance levels (Bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table 14: Program cost per year: Deworming
Quantity Currency (CFA) Number of pupils Cost per pupil (in CFA)
Deworming
Drugs 400,000 6,400,000 200,000
Advocacy Mission 1 3,734,280
Transport 1 200,000
Supervision 1 4,496,000
Total deworming 14,830,280 200,000 74.151
Table 15: Program cost per year: Meal
Quantity Currency (CFA) Number of pupils Cost per pupil (CFA)
Meal
Food 16,900 7,165,413,861 560,000
Other costsa 1 170,566,943 560,000
Total meal 7,335,980,804 560,000 13,099.966
Note: a Strengthening capacities and resources of the DCS, responsible of canteens and school
management committees.
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Table 16: Cost effectiveness analysis
DISMa Roy b
Aggregate French Math Aggregate French Math
Cost deworming only 74.151 74.151 74.151 74.151 74.151 74.151
Cost meal only 13,099.966 13,099.966 13,099.966 13,099.966 13,099.966 13,099.966
Cost deworming and meal 13,174.117 13,174.117 13,174.117 13,174.117 13,174.117 13,174.117
Percentage of additional score
ATE
Exclusive: deworming 3.700 0.302 6.866 5.357 3.752 8.832
Exclusive: meal 6.560 3.779 9.329 7.470 5.659 9.347
Global 14.099 9.997 18.353 18.176 11.793 24.552
ATET
Exclusive: deworming 17.295 2.002 48.124
Exclusive: meal 20.124 17.209 23.515
Global 89.231 55.548 122.773
Sequential: (T1,T2) 54.999 33.247 55.144
Sequential: (T2,T1) 68.244 38.043 99.576
Substitution: (T1,T2) 5.104 0.178 6.254
Substitution: (T2,T1) 15.066 1.550 45.748
Cost per percentage of additional score
ATE
Exclusive: deworming 20.040 245.533 10.799 13.841 19.763 8.395
Exclusive: meal 1996.946 3466.516 1404.219 1753.676 2314.890 1401.515
Global 934.400 1317.807 717.818 724.808 1117.113 536.580
ATET
Exclusive: deworming 4.287 37.038 1.540
Exclusive: meal 650.962 761.227 557.089
Global package 147.640 237.166 107.304
Sequential: (T1,T2) 239.533 396.249 238.903
Sequential: (T2,T1) 193.044 346.295 132.302
Substitution: (T1,T2) 2581.135 74011.893 2106.510
Substitution: (T2,T1) 874.426 8499.430 287.971
Notes a: Dummy Index-Selection Model, two-step estimations; b: Generalized Roy model, two-step estimations.
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Table 17: Cost effectiveness analysis
DISMa Roy b
Enrollment Promotion Dropout Enrollment Promotion Dropout
Cost deworming only 74.151 74.151 74.151 74.151 74.151 74.151
Cost meal only 13,099.966 13,099.966 13,099.966 13,099.966 13,099.966 13,099.966
Cost deworming and meal 13,174.117 13,174.117 13,174.117 13,174.117 13,174.117 13,174.117
Percentage of additional score
Exclusive: deworming -1.443 -1.263
Exclusive: meal 11.177 2.727 -4.797 19.644 5.021 -5.430
Global of the package 7.040 -9.029 2.547 -8.100
Cost per percentage of additional score
Exclusive: deworming 51.386 58.710
Exclusive: meal 1172.046 4803.801 2730.866 666.868 2609.035 2412.516
Global 1871.323 1459.089 5172.405 1626.434
Notes a: Dummy Index-Selection Model, two-step estimations; b: Generalized Roy model, two-step estimations.
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Table 18: Welfare analysis: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Total expenditurea 11.961 0.474 10.020 13.670
Gini inequality index 0.240 0.066 0.141 0.415
Atkinson inequality index 0.052 0.030 0.016 0.151
Entropy inequality index 0.106 0.064 0.033 0.318
# Children having deworming 0.124 0.414 0 4
# Children having meals 0.368 0.731 0 7
# Children having package 0.053 0.274 0 3
# Children 0-5 years 2.754 2.301 0 19
# Children 6-14 years 4.616 3.092 0 40
# Adults (15 years and more) 6.713 3.982 2 32
# Livestock owned 8.697 12.469 0 502
# Meals per day 2.983 0.183 1 6
Age of household head 51.670 12.988 18 98
Electricityb 0.152
Gender of household headb 0.875
Literacy of household headb 0.180
Area of arable land (in hectare) 0-5b 0.597
Area of arable land (in hectare) 6-10b 0.307
Area of arable land (in hectare) 11-15b 0.044
Area of arable land (in hectare) 16 and moreb 0.051
# Observations (households) 1153
Note: a Expenditure per adult equivalent in log.
Note: b binary variables.
Table 19: Welfare analysis: Three-stage least square estimation
(dependent variable: log of total expenditure)a
Gini Atkinson Entropy
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Welfare Equation
Treatment status
# Children dewormed 0.023 0.043 0.022 0.052 0.024 0.051
# Children meals 0.100∗∗∗ 0.019 0.098∗∗∗ 0.018 0.098∗∗∗ 0.018
# Children package 0.194∗∗∗ 0.060 0.191∗∗∗ 0.064 0.189∗∗∗ 0.065
Household characteristics
Household composition
# Children 0-5 years -0.036∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.036∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.036∗∗∗ 0.007
# Children 6-14 years -0.014∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.014∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.014∗∗∗ 0.005
# Adults (15 years and more) -0.030∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.030∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.030∗∗∗ 0.004
Arable land (in ha)
Area 6-10 0.038 0.027 0.038 0.027 0.038 0.027
Area 11-15 0.218∗∗∗ 0.063 0.218∗∗∗ 0.064 0.222∗∗∗ 0.062
Area 16 and more 0.292∗∗∗ 0.068 0.295∗∗∗ 0.080 0.295∗∗∗ 0.084
# Livestock owned 0.09∗∗ 0.04 0.09∗∗ 0.04 0.09∗∗ 0.04
# Meals per day 0.135∗∗ 0.067 0.137∗∗ 0.070 0.137∗∗ 0.070
Age of household head -0.013∗∗ 0.006 -0.013∗∗ 0.006 -0.014∗∗ 0.006
Age of household head square 0.01∗∗ 0.005 0.01∗∗ 0.005 0.01∗∗ 0.005
Electricity 0.165∗∗∗ 0.038 0.160∗∗∗ 0.047 0.163∗∗∗ 0.044
Gender of household head -0.054 0.039 -0.054 0.040 -0.055 0.040
Literacy of household head 0.122∗∗∗ 0.033 0.121∗∗∗ 0.033 0.120∗∗∗ 0.032
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 19 – continued
Gini Atkinson Entropy
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Inequality index 0.299 1.265 0.708 4.039 0.347 1.720
Intercept 12.103∗∗∗ 0.321 12.136∗∗∗ 0.263 12.143∗∗∗ 0.259
Inequality Equation
Expenditure distribution 4.213∗∗∗ 0.682 1.519∗∗∗ 0.309 3.451∗∗∗ 0.659
Intercept 0.233∗∗∗ 0.002 0.049∗∗∗ 0.001 0.100∗∗∗ 0.002
R-square 0.2459 0.2466 0.2470
χ2 388.52 380.24 385.65
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
# Observations (households) 1153 1153 1153
Notes a: Three-stage least squares estimations.
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Figure 1: Kernel (Epanechnikov) density estimate: Distribution of outcomes (scores: aggregate, French
and Maths; enrollment, promotion and dropout rates) for pupils having only the deworming program
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Figure 2: Kernel (Epanechnikov) density estimate: Distribution of outcomes (scores: aggregate, French
and Maths; enrollment, promotion and dropout rates) for pupils having only meals program
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Figure 3: Kernel (Epanechnikov) density estimate: Distribution of outcomes (scores: aggregate, French
and Maths; enrollment, promotion and dropout rates) for pupils having both programs (deworming
and meals)
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Figure 4: Kernel (Epanechnikov) density estimate: Distribution of outcomes (scores: aggregate, French
and Maths; enrollment, promotion and dropout rates) for pupils who received no programs
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List and definition of variables
Table 20: Table A1. Definition of variables
Variable name Definition Nature
Outcomes
Aggregate score Aggregate test scores in French and Mathematics continuous
French score Test scores in French continuous
Math score Test scores in Mathematics continuous
Enrollment rate Enrollment rate of the school continuous
Promotion rate Promotion rate of the school continuous
Dropout rate Dropout rate of the school continuous
Treatment indicators
Meal Meal program indicator binary (yes=1)
Deworming Deworming program indicator binary (yes=1)
Schools & teachers
Temporary shelters Number of classes in temporary shelters continuous
School manual a Number of pupils per manual in the school continuous
Total pupils Total number of pupils per school continuous
Class size Number of pupils by class continuous
Teacher’s age Age of the teacher (in year) continuous
Distance to school Distance between school and pupils’s
home (less than 1 km) binary (yes=1)
Gender of teacher Gender of the teacher binary (male=1)
No professional diploma Teachers without professional diploma binary (yes=1)
Professional diploma CAP Teachers with a ‘Certificat d’Aptitude Pe´dagogique’
as professional diploma binary (yes=1)
Professional diploma CEAP Teachers with a ‘Certificat Ele´mentaire d’Aptitude
Pe´dagogique’ as professional diploma binary (yes=1)
Other professional diploma Teachers with other professional diploma binary (yes=1)
Academic diploma (bacplus) Teachers having as academic diploma:
baccalaureate or undergraduate or bachelor binary (yes=1)
Academic diploma (brevet) Teachers having as academic diploma:
certificate ‘brevet’ binary (yes=1)
Continuing training Teachers have received continuing training binary (yes=1)
Absenteeism Indicates whether the teachers of the schools
are often absent or not binary (yes=1)
Medicine box Existence of a medicine box in the school binary (yes=1)
Toilets Existence of separate toilets in the school binary (yes=1)
Management committee Existence of a management committee in the school binary (yes=1)
Cooperative school Existence of a cooperative school in the school binary (yes=1)
Association of parents Existence of a Association of pupil’s parents
in the school binary (yes=1)
Association of mothers Existence of a Association of pupil’s mothers
in the school binary (yes=1)
Rural council grant School receives a grant from the rural council binary (yes=1)
Water point Existence of a water point in the school binary (yes=1)
Disturbed courses Disturbances that caused delay of the start courses binary (yes=1)
Storage Existence of a storage -warehouse- in the school binary (yes=1)
Meals near school Opportunity of the pupils to have meal near school binary (yes=1)
Hands washing Existence of a hands washing device in the school binary (yes=1)
School cost School where school expenses
are too high for households binary (yes=1)
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 20 – continued
Variable name Definition Nature
Pupils
Pupil’s age Age of the pupil (in year) continuous
Gender of pupil Gender of the pupil binary (boy=1)
Grade Education level of the pupil binary (CE2=1)
Deworming at home Pupils who dewormed at home binary (yes=1)
Koranic school Pupils who attended a Koranic school binary (yes=1)
Early childhood inst. Pupils who attended an early child institution binary (yes=1)
Sick in last 3 months Pupils who have been sick in the last 3 months binary (yes=1)
Pupils eat at fill Pupils who eat at their fill at home binary (yes=1)
Snack Child who brings a snack to school binary (yes=1)
Households
Total expenditure Monthly total expenditure of household
per adult equivalentb (in log, CFAc) continuous
Health expenditure Annual health expenditure of household ( in log, CFAc) continuous
Education expenditure Annual education expenditure of household ( in log, CFAc) continuous
Livestock Number of head of livestock that the household owns continuous
Gender of household head Gender of the household head binary (male=1)
Lit. of household head Head of household is literate in French binary (yes=1)
Married Married people binary (yes=1)
Land Possession of cultivable land owned
by the household binary (yes=1)
Communities
Primary schools Number of primary schools in the community continuous
College Existence of a college in the school’s village binary (yes=1)
Parents school Child living in a community where parents
are not interested in school binary (yes=1)
Koranic school com. Child living in a community where attending Koranic
school prevent children from going to school binary (yes=1)
Locations
Diourbel Region Diourbel binary (yes=1)
Fatick Region Fatick binary (yes=1)
Kolda Region Kolda binary (yes=1)
Sedhiou Region Sedhiou binary (yes=1)
Note a: This variable is created using total pupils and number of school manuals.
Note b: Ratio between total expenditure and household size per adult equivalent based on Oxford A scales.
Note c: Currency of the French colonies in Africa.
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appendix
A. Methods: General framework for mean of trivariate truncated normal
distributions
Let x, y and z denote three random variables following a trivariate normal distribution with mean µ
and covariance matrix Σ, i.e.,
(x, y, z) ∼ N
 µxµy
µz
 ,
 σ2xρxyσxσy σ2y
ρxzσxσz ρyzσyσz σ
2
z
 .
In this appendix, we establish various neat relations regarding the mean of trivariate truncated
normal distribution. These relations are used in the estimation strategies of the paper and also proved
particularly useful in deriving treatment effects. The formulas we get also have the advantage of being
easy to write in terms of code for most statistical and econometric software. Before proceeding, let’s
briefly recall the well-known formulae for the mean of univariate and bivariate truncation.
A.1. Univariate truncation
The conditional expectation E(x | x > a) involving the univariate truncated normal distribution is
given by
(A-1) E(x | x > a) = µx + σxλxa
[(
a− µx
σx
)]
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where λxa =
φ1
(
a−µx
σx
)
1− Φ1
(
a−µx
σx
) denotes the inverse Mill’s ratio with φ1 and Φ1 denoting respectively
the probability distribution function (pdf) and the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the uni-
variate standard normal distribution. Similarly, the conditional expectation involving the univariate
truncated (from above) normal distribution is given by
(A-2) E(x | x ≤ b) = µx − σxλxb
[(
b− µx
σx
)]
where λxb =
φ1
(
b−µx
σx
)
1− Φ1
(
b−µx
σx
) .
A.2. Bivariate truncation
The conditional expectation E(x|y > a) involving the bivariate truncated (from below) normal
distribution is written as
E(x|y > a) = µx +
cov(x, y)
σy
λya
= µx +
ρxyσxσy
σy
λya(A-3)
= µx + ρxyσxλya ,
where cov(x, y) = ρxyσxσy and λya =
φ1
(
a−µy
σy
)
1− Φ1
(
a−µy
σy
) . Similarly, we can show that
(A-4) E(x|y ≤ b) = µx −
cov(x, y)
σy
λyb ,
where λyb =
φ1
(
b−µy
σy
)
1− Φ1
(
b−µy
σy
) . In what follows, we establish the analogue formulae for the case of
trivariate truncation.
A.3. Trivariate truncation
We are interested in the expressions of E(x|y > a, z > b), E(x|y ≤ a, z ≤ b), E(x|y > a, z ≤ b)
and E(x|y ≤ a, z > b). These conditional expectations involve the trivariate truncated normal
distribution. More specifically, we make use of the conditional distribution of x|y, z. The mean of that
distribution is given by
(A-5) E(x|y, z) = µx +
σxρxy.z
σy
(y − µy) +
σxρxz.y
σz
(z − µz),
where ρxy.z and ρxz.y are derived from and related to the partial correlations, and are given by
(A-6) ρxy.z =
ρxy − ρxzρyz
1− ρ2yz
; ρxz.y =
ρxz − ρxyρyz
1− ρ2yz
.
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A.3.a. Expression of E(x|y > a, z > b)
We can derive E(x|y > a, z > b) by using equation (A-5). Hence,
E(x|y > a, z > b) = µx +
σxρxy.z
σy
E(y − µy|y > a, z > b) +
σxρxz.y
σz
E(z − µz|y > a, z > b)
= µx +
σxρxy.z
σy
[E(y|y > a, z > b)− µy] +
σxρxz.y
σz
[E(z|y > a, z > b)− µz] .(A-7)
Thus, we need to derive the expressions of E(y|y > a, z > b) and E(z|y > a, z > b).
i) Computation of E(y|y > a, z > b)
Since
(A-8) f1(y|y > a, z > b) =
f2(y, z)
P[y > a, z > b]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ Γ
, 1
the conditional expectation can be written as
E(y|y > a, z > b) = E(yz0|y > a, z > b)
= Γ−1
∫ ∞
a
∫ ∞
b
yf(y, z)dydz.(A-9)
By making the variable changes Y =
y−µy
σy
and Z = z−µz
σz
so that dy = σydY and dz = σzdZ,
the expectation can be written as
E(y|y > a, z > b) = Φ−12
[
µy − a
σy
,
µz − b
σz
, ρyz
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ Φ−1
2
∫ ∞
a−µy
σy
∫ ∞
b−µz
σz
(σyY + µy)
φ2(Y,Z)
σyσz
σyσzdY dZ
= σyΦ
−1
2
∫ ∞
a−µy
σy
∫ ∞
b−µz
σz
Y φ2(Y,Z)dY dZ + µyΦ
−1
2
∫ ∞
a−µy
σy
∫ ∞
b−µz
σz
φ2(Y,Z)dY dZ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ Φ2
(A-10)
= σy Φ
−1
2
∫ ∞
a−µy
σy
∫ ∞
b−µz
σz
Y φ2(Y,Z)dY dZ︸ ︷︷ ︸
E
(
Y |Y >
a−µy
σy
,Z>
b−µz
σz
)
+ µy.
Since Y and Z have a bivariate standard normal distribution, we can use the results of Rosen-
baum (1961) or, more generally, the moment generating function approach of Muthe´n (1990)
alongside the iterative incomplete normal moment results from Elandt (1961) to show that:
E
(
Y |Y >
a− µy
σy
, Z >
b− µz
σz
)
= Φ−12
φ1(a− µy
σy
)
Φ1
ρyz a−µyσy − b−µzσz√
1− ρ2yz

+ ρyzφ1
(
b− µz
σz
)
Φ1
ρyz b−µzσz − a−µyσy√
1− ρ2yz
 .(A-11)
1The subscripts 1 and 2 denote respectively the univariate and the bivariate pdf of cdf of the normal or standard
normal distribution.
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Hence,
E(y|y > a, z > b) = σyΦ
−1
2
φ1(a− µy
σy
)
Φ1
ρyz a−µyσy − b−µzσz√
1− ρ2yz

+ ρyzφ1
(
b− µz
σz
)
Φ1
ρyz b−µzσz − a−µyσy√
1− ρ2yz
+ µy.(A-12)
ii) Computation of E(z|y > a, z > b)
Similarly, we can derive E(z|y > a, z > b) as
E(z|y > a, z > b) = σzΦ
−1
2
φ1(b− µz
σz
)
Φ1
ρyz b−µzσz − a−µyσy√
1− ρ2yz

+ ρyzφ1
(
a− µy
σy
)
Φ1
ρyz a−µyσy − b−µzσz√
1− ρ2yz
+ µz.(A-13)
For notational convenience, let us define Λ1 and Λ2 as
Λ1 ≡ φ1
(
a− µy
σy
)
Φ1
ρyz a−µyσy − b−µzσz√
1− ρ2yz
(A-14a)
Λ2 ≡ φ1
(
b− µz
σz
)
Φ1
ρyz b−µzσz − a−µyσy√
1− ρ2yz
 .(A-14b)
Hence, E(x|y > a, z > b) can be written as
E(x|y > a, z > b) = µx +
σxρxy.z
σy
[
σyΦ
−1
2 (Λ1 + ρyzΛ2) + µy − µy
]
+
σxρxz.y
σz
[
σzΦ
−1
2 (Λ2 + ρyzΛ1) + µz − µz
]
.(A-15)
Replacing ρxy.z and ρxz.y by their expressions, and simplifying the previous expression yield
E(x|y > a, z > b) = µx +
σx (ρxy − ρxzρyz)
1− ρ2yz
Φ−12 (Λ1 + ρyzΛ2)
+
σx (ρxz − ρxyρyz)
1− ρ2yz
Φ−12 (Λ2 + ρyzΛ1) .(A-16)
Factorizing yields
E(x|y > a, z > b) = µx +
σxΦ
−1
2
1− ρ2yz
Λ1
[
ρxy − ρxzρyz + ρxzρyz − ρxyρ
2
yz
]
+
σxΦ
−1
2
1− ρ2yz
Λ2
[
ρxz − ρxyρyz + ρxyρyz − ρxzρ
2
yz
]
(A-17)
which can also be written as
E(x|y > a, z > b) = µx +
σxΦ
−1
2
1− ρ2yz
Λ1ρxy(1− ρ
2
yz) +
σxΦ
−1
2
1− ρ2yz
Λ2ρxz(1− ρ
2
yz)
= µx + σxΦ
−1
2 Λ1ρxy + σxΦ
−1
2 Λ2ρxz.(A-18)
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The final expression of E(x|y > a, z > b) is given by
E(x|y > a, z > b) = µx +
σxρxyφ1
(
a−µy
σy
)
Φ2
[
µy−a
σy
, µz−b
σz
, ρyz
]Φ1
ρyz a−µyσy − b−µzσz√
1− ρ2yz

+
σxρxzφ1
(
b−µz
σz
)
Φ2
[
µy−a
σy
, µz−b
σz
, ρyz
]Φ1
ρyz b−µzσz − a−µyσy√
1− ρ2yz
 .(A-19)
A.3.b. Expression of E(x|y ≤ a, z ≤ b)
In this case, E(y|y > a, z > b) and E(z|y > a, z > b) are replaced by E(y|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) and
E(z|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) in equation (A-7). Hence, we need to derive E(y|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) and E(z|y ≤ a, z ≤ b).
Equation (A-8) is now written as
(A-20) f1(y|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) =
f2(y, z)
P[y ≤ a, z ≤ b]
.
Using similar derivations as previously and results from Muthe´n (1990), E(y|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) is given by
E(y|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) = σyΦ
−1
2
[
a− µy
σy
,
b− µz
σz
, ρyz
]−φ1(a− µy
σy
)
Φ1
 b−µzσz − ρyz a−µyσy√
1− ρ2yz

−ρyzφ1
(
b− µz
σz
)
Φ1
 a−µyσy − ρyz b−µzσz√
1− ρ2yz
+ µy.(A-21)
Similarly, E(z|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) is derived as
E(z|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) = σzΦ
−1
2
[
a− µy
σy
,
b− µz
σz
, ρyz
]−φ1(b− µz
σz
)
Φ1
 a−µyσy − ρyz b−µzσz√
1− ρ2yz

−ρyzφ1
(
a− µy
σy
)
Φ1
 b−µzσz − ρyz a−µyσy√
1− ρ2yz
+ µz.(A-22)
Using similar calculations as previously, E(x|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) is derived as
E(x|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) = µx −
σxρxyφ1
(
a−µy
σy
)
Φ2
[
a−µy
σy
, b−µz
σz
, ρyz
]Φ1
 b−µzσz − ρyz a−µyσy√
1− ρ2yz

−
σxρxzφ1
(
b−µz
σz
)
Φ2
[
a−µy
σy
, b−µz
σz
, ρyz
]Φ1
 a−µyσy − ρyz b−µzσz√
1− ρ2yz
 .(A-23)
A.3.c. Expression of E(x|y > a, z ≤ b)
The calculation of E(x|y > a, z ≤ b) involves E(y|y > a, z ≤ b) and E(z|y > a, z ≤ b) in equation
(A-7). The latter two expectations are given by
E(y|y > a, z ≤ b) = σyΦ
−1
2
[
µy − a
σy
,
b− µz
σz
,−ρyz
]φ1(a− µy
σy
)
Φ1
 b−µzσz − ρyz a−µyσy√
1− ρ2yz

−ρyzφ1
(
b− µz
σz
)
Φ1
ρyz b−µzσz − a−µyσy√
1− ρ2yz
+ µy(A-24)
5
and
E(z|y > a, z ≤ b) = σzΦ
−1
2
[
µy − a
σy
,
b− µz
σz
,−ρyz
]−φ1(b− µz
σz
)
Φ1
ρyz b−µzσz − a−µyσy√
1− ρ2yz

+ ρyzφ1
(
a− µy
σy
)
Φ1
 b−µzσz − ρyz a−µyσy√
1− ρ2yz
+ µz.(A-25)
Hence, E(x|y > a, z ≤ b) is given by
E(x|y > a, z ≤ b) = µx +
σxρxyφ1
(
a−µy
σy
)
Φ2
[
µy−a
σy
, b−µz
σz
,−ρyz
]Φ1
 b−µzσz − ρyz a−µyσy√
1− ρ2yz

−
σxρxzφ1
(
b−µz
σz
)
Φ2
[
µy−a
σy
, b−µz
σz
,−ρyz
]Φ1
ρyz b−µzσz − a−µyσy√
1− ρ2yz
 .(A-26)
A.3.d. Expression of E(x|y ≤ a, z > b)
Finally, the calculation of E(x|y ≤ a, z > b) involves E(y|y ≤ a, z > b) and E(z|y ≤ a, z > b) in
equation (A-7), the expressions of which are given by
E(y|y ≤ a, z > b) = σyΦ
−1
2
[
a− µy
σy
,
µz − b
σz
,−ρyz
]−φ1(a− µy
σy
)
Φ1
ρyz a−µyσy − b−µzσz√
1− ρ2yz

+ρyzφ1
(
b− µz
σz
)
Φ1
 a−µyσy − ρyz b−µzσz√
1− ρ2yz
+ µy(A-27)
and
E(z|y ≤ a, z > b) = σzΦ
−1
2
[
a− µy
σy
,
µz − b
σz
,−ρyz
]φ1(b− µz
σz
)
Φ1
 a−µyσy − ρyz b−µzσz√
1− ρ2yz

− ρyzφ1
(
a− µy
σy
)
Φ1
ρyz a−µyσy − b−µzσz√
1− ρ2yz
+ µz.(A-28)
Hence, E(x|y ≤ a, z > b) is given by
E(x|y ≤ a, z > b) = µx −
σxρxyφ1
(
a−µy
σy
)
Φ2
[
a−µy
σy
, µz−b
σz
,−ρyz
]Φ1
ρyz a−µyσy − b−µzσz√
1− ρ2yz

+
σxρxzφ1
(
b−µz
σz
)
Φ2
[
a−µy
σy
, µz−b
σz
,−ρyz
]Φ1
 a−µyσy − ρyz b−µzσz√
1− ρ2yz
 .(A-29)
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B. Further results: Treatment effect heterogeneity
Average Treatment Effects are obtained by taking the average either over the entire sample (this
is the case for the average treatment effect) or over two sub-populations leading to the Average
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) and the Average Treatment Effect on the Non-Treated
(ATENT). All these effects are based on a hypothesis of homogeneity though the ATET and ATENT
can be viewed as heterogenous. In other words, the average effects obtained are extrapolated to the
population considered. In this supplement, we propose to study the variation in treatment effects
across populations.
Treatment effect heterogeneity is an outstanding issue in many impact evaluation studies. As
pointed out by Imai and Strauss (2011), the study of heterogeneous treatment effects is relevant
from a policy perspective as it enables to identify subgroups of populations for which treatments are
effective.2 Treatment effect is heterogenous if some pupils experience larger treatment effects than
others while the treatment is identical for all. This may follow from the characteristics of pupils and
likely some unobserved factors.
B.1. Scores
The distribution of the treatments effects for the scores outcomes are plotted in Figures 1, 2, 3, 4 and
5. Two salient pictures can be observed. On one hand, the exclusive ATE effect for meals program
has a strong uni-modal distribution which is concentrated around the average. At the same time, the
distribution of the exclusive effect of deworming is more heterogeneous, less concentrated and slightly
shifted to the right. In other words, there is a more heterogeneous population that experiences the
effect of deworming while the effect of meals is more homogeneous. As a result the distribution of
the exclusive effect of deworming is more dispersed than the effect of meals. This implies that the
second order moment of the exclusive deworming effect is greater than that of the meals effect. On the
other hand the distributions of global and additional effects are closely related except for the ATET
of Maths score. The distribution of the sequential and substitution effects show similar pictures with
strong uni-modality.
Include Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
B.2. Enrollment, promotion and dropout
Figures 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 display the plots of the distributions of treatment effects for the enroll-
ment, promotion and dropout rates. The outstanding findings concern the enrollment rate and the
distribution of sequential and substitution effects. Regarding enrollment rate, we observe a bi-modal
distribution of the additional ATE with the largest mode having negative values of the treatment
effects and a second less pronounced mode which displays positive values of treatment effects. This
result indicates a double heterogeneity: one related to the sign of the treatment effects and the other
to the multiple modality. Indeed, whereas a significant proportion of pupils experiment an additional
negative effect, another small proportion of pupils experiment an additional positive effect.
The other distributions on the Figure display uni-modal patterns. Figure 6 (left) shows the ef-
fects of treatment on the treated, the exclusive and additional effects of deworming have a bi-modal
distribution with different signs for each modality. We deduce that the heterogeneity picture is more
pronounced than in the previous case. An interesting phenomenon appears in Figure 9 (left). In-
deed, we observe a mirror-like distribution between the two substitution effects for the promotion
rate. While the uni-modality T2T1 is displayed around negative treatment effect values, the substitu-
tion T1T2 reflects the same shape but with a reverse tail and a main mode around positive values of
treatment effects.
2It is worthwhile to notice that we are not conducting a statistical inference on causal heterogeneity. Readers interested
in this aspect can refer to the study of Angrist (2004), Horiuchi et al. (2007), Imai and Strauss (2011) and Imai and
Ratkovic (2013).
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The main conclusion we draw from the study of the distributions is that while some effects are
homogeneous (e.g, exclusive ATE for meals and substitution effects for treated and untreated for
the scores), other effects are clearly heterogeneous (mainly though some effects on enrollment rate,
sequential and substitution effects). In other words, pupils react differently to the same intervention.
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Figure 1: Distribution of treatment effects for aggregate score. [Top]: Average Treatment Effect (ATE)
[Bottom-left]: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). [Bottom-right]: Average Treatment
Effect on the Nontreated (ATENT)
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Figure 2: Distribution of treatment effects for French score. [Top]: Average Treatment Effect (ATE)
[Bottom-left]: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). [Bottom-right]: Average Treatment
Effect on the Nontreated (ATENT)
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Figure 3: Distribution of treatment effects for math score. [Top]: Average Treatment Effect (ATE)
[Bottom-left]: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). [Bottom-right]: Average Treatment
Effect on the Nontreated (ATENT)
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Figure 4: Distribution of sequential and substitution effect on the treated. [Top]: Aggregate score
[Bottom-left]: French score. [Bottom-right]: Math score
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Figure 5: Distribution of sequential and substitution effect on the nontreated. [Top]: Aggregate score
[Bottom-left]: French score. [Bottom-right]: Math score
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Figure 6: Distribution of treatment effects for enrollment rate. [Top]: Average Treatment Effect (ATE)
[Bottom-left]: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). [Bottom-right]: Average Treatment
Effect on the Nontreated (ATENT)
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Figure 7: Distribution of treatment effects for promotion rate. [Top]: Average Treatment Effect (ATE)
[Bottom-left]: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). [Bottom-right]: Average Treatment
Effect on the Nontreated (ATENT)
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Figure 8: Distribution of treatment effects for dropout rate. [Top]: Average Treatment Effect (ATE)
[Bottom-left]: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). [Bottom-right]: Average Treatment
Effect on the Nontreated (ATENT)
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Figure 9: Distribution of sequential and substitution effect on the treated. [Top]: Enrollment rate
[Bottom-left]: Promotion rate. [Bottom-right]: Dropout rate
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Figure 10: Distribution of sequential and substitution effect on the nontreated. [Top]: Enrollment rate
[Bottom-left]: Promotion rate. [Bottom-right]: Dropout rate
17
References
Angrist, J. (2004): “Treatment Effects Heterogeneity in Theory and Practice,” The Economic Journal,
(114), C52–C83.
Elandt, R. C. (1961): “The Folded Normal Distribution: Two Methods of Estimating Parameters
from Moments,” Technometrics, 3, 551–562.
Horiuchi, Y., K. Imai, and N. Taniguchi (2007): “Designing and Analysing Randomized Experiments:
Application to a Japanese Election Survey Experiment,” American Journal of Political Science,
(51), 669–687.
Imai, K., and M. Ratkovic (2013): “Estimating Treatment Effect Heterogeneity in Randomized Pro-
gram Evaluation,” The Annals of Applied Statistics, (4), 443–470.
Imai, K., and A. Strauss (2011): “Estimation of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects from Random-
ized Experiments, with Application to the Optimal Planning of the Get-out-the-vote Campaign,”
Political Analysis, (19), 1–19.
Muthe´n, B. (1990): “Moments of the Censored and Truncated Bivariate Normal Distribution,” British
Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 43, 131–143.
Rosenbaum, S. (1961): “Moments of a Truncated Bivariate Normal Distribution,” Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society, 23, 405–408.
18
The UNU‐MERIT WORKING Paper Series 
 
2014-01 The medium‐term effect of R&D on firm growth by Marco Capasso, Tania Treibich 
and Bart Verspagen 
2014-02 Diverse and uneven pathways towards transition to low carbon development: The 
case of diffusion of solar PV technology in ChinaMichiko Iizuka 
2014-03 User  innovators and their  influence on  innovation activities of  firms  in Finland by 
JariKuusisto, MerviNiemi and Fred Gault 
2014-04 Migration, remittances and household welfare in Ethiopia by Lisa Andersson 
2014-05 Path‐breaking  directions  of  nanotechnology‐based  chemotherapy  and  molecular 
cancer therapy by Mario Coccia  and Lili Wang 
2014-06 Poor  trends  ‐  The  pace  of  poverty  reduction  after  the Millennium Development 
AgendaRichard Bluhm, Denis de Crombrugghe, Adam Szirmai 
2014-07 Firms' adoption of international standards: Evidence from the Ethiopian floriculture 
sector by MuluGebreeyesu 
2014-08 School  choice,  segregation,  and  forced  school  closureby  Cheng  Boon  Ong 
andKristof De Witte 
2014-09 Gender  difference  in  support  for  democracy  in  Sub‐Saharan  Africa:  Do  social 
institutions matter?by MatyKonte 
2014-10 Why are women  less democratic  than men?  Evidence  from  Sub‐Saharan African 
countries by Cecilia García‐Peñalosa and MatyKonte 
2014-11 Tipping  points?  Ethnic  composition  change  in Dutch  big  city  neighbourhoods  by 
Cheng Boon Ong 
2014-12 Technology  life cycle and specialization patterns of  latecomer countries. The case 
of the semiconductor industry by Giorgio Triulzi 
2014-13 Patents as quality  signals? The  implications  for  financing  constraints on R&D by 
Dirk Czarnitzki, Bronwyn H. Hall and Hanna Hottenrott 
2014-14 Assessment of effectiveness of Chinese aid  in competence building and  financing 
development in Sudan by SamiaSatti Osman Mohamed Nour 
2014-15 Education,  training and  skill development policies  in Arab Gulf  countries: Macro‐
micro overview by SamiaSatti Osman Mohamed Nour 
2014-16 Structure  of  labour  market  and  unemployment  in  Sudan  by  SamiaSatti  Osman 
Mohamed Nour 
2014-17 Overview  of  knowledge  transfer  in  MENA  countries  ‐  The  case  of  Egypt  by 
SamiaSatti Osman Mohamed Nour 
2014-18 The  impact of  ICT  in public and private universities  in Sudanby SamiaSatti Osman 
Mohamed Nour 
2014-19 End‐user  collaboration  for  process  innovation  in  services:  The  role  of  internal 
resources by Mona Ashok, Rajneesh Narula and Andrea Martinez‐Noya 
2014-20 Public  investment  and  regional  politics:  The  case  of  Turkey  by  Mehmet  Guney 
Celbis, Denis de Crombrugghe and Joan Muysken 
2014-21 Infrastructure  and  the  international  export  performance  of  Turkish  regions  by 
Mehmet Guney Celbis, Peter Nijkamp and Jacques Poot 
2014-22 Discovering  and  explaining  work‐family  strategies  of  parents  in  Luxembourg  by 
Nevena Zhelyazkova 
2014-23 Parental  leave  take  up  and  return  to  work  of  mothers  in  Luxembourg:  An 
application of the model of nested dichotomies by Nevena Zhelyazkova 
2014-24 Millennium  Development  Goals:  Tool  or  token  of  global  social  governance?  by 
Mueid  Al  Raee,  Elvis  Amoateng,  Elvis  Korku  Avenyo,  Youssef  Beshay,  Mira 
Bierbaum, Charlotte Keijser and Rashmi Sinha 
2014-25 One Europe or  several? Causes and consequences of  the European  stagnation by 
Jan Fagerberg and Bart Verspagen 
2014-26 The  harmony  of  programs  package: Quasi‐experimental  evidence  on  deworming 
and  canteen  interventions  in  rural  Senegal  by  Théophile  Azomahou,  Fatoumata 
Diallo and Wladimir Raymond 
